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A N A L Y S I S
In my thesis I criticise the most important Causal Theories 
that have been advanced, and put forward a Causal Theory of 
my own.
In Chapter 1 I describe some of the theories that have been 
advanced, or criticised, as Causal Theories, and point out 
that they fall into several distinct types.
In Chapter 2 I criticise the sort of Causal Theory that 
includes the thesis that our knowledge of the physical world 
is in some sense inferential.
In Chapter 3 I argue against the sort of Causal Theory which 
involves the supposition that sense-data or their like are 
involved in perception.
In Chapter 4 I argue in favour of the sort of Causal Theory 
which contains the view that the perception of a physical 
object is a matter of the perceiver's being caused by it to 
have a sense-experience.
In Chapter 5 I argue that the experiential element in 
perception is not a matter of the perceiver's acquiring or 
tending to acquire a belief.
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In Chapter 6 I inquire whether perception must involve the 
having of a sense-experience which in some sense represents 
the perceived object, and specify the conditions which the 
perceptual experience must fulfil. I introduce the expression 
"have a good representation" in terms of one sense of "seem" 
and its cognates.
In Chapter 7 I conclude that representation enters into 
perception insofar as the perceived object must bring about 
the perceiver's sense-experience in a way which I describe 
as "productive of good representations". I advance my own 
Causal Theory of Perception, to which this contention is 
central.
In Chapter 8 I support my theory by considering the 
perception of certain sorts of physical objects that may 
appear problematical and have been unduly neglected by 
philosophers in the past.
CHAPTER ONE: THE CAUSAL THEORISTS AND THEIR CRITICS
SECTION I. The notion of the Causal Theory of. Perception
My title is "The Causal Theory of Perception". This is satisfactory 
insofar as it brings to mind the issues I intend to discuss, but in 
another way it may be misleading. Philosophers have advanced their 
views, calling them "The Causal Theory of Perception", and other 
philosophers have opposed certain doctrines again under the heading 
"The Causal Theory of Perception". The implication is that there is 
a constant body of doctrine concerning perception which has been 
held by all those who have called themselves or been called "causal 
theorists", and that it is this that is being criticised in the works 
of the professed opponents of the Causal Theory of Perception,
What I want to do now is to consider whether this is so: whether 
philosophers who are known as causal theorists have advanced broadly 
the same doctrines, and whether the picture its critics have of the 
Causal Theory remains constant from one to another. The importance 
of asking these questions is obvious. For if we find that the Causal 
Theory has several varieties, criticisms that are valid against one 
variety may have no force against another; one variety may be correct, 
even though the others are wrong, I will begin by studying the meaning 
attached to the expression "The Causal Theory of Perception" by those 
who criticise a doctrine to which they give that name.
- 7 -
SECTION 2. Critics of the Causal Theory of Perception
H. H. Price devotes a chapter of his book "Perception" to a 
doctrine he calls "The Causal Theory". He makes the sense he 
attaches to this expression very clear. On p.66 he says that the 
causal theory holds: "(l) that in the case of all sense-data (not 
merely visual and tactual) "belonging to" simply means "being caused 
by", so that "M is present to my senses" will be equivalent to "M 
causes a sense-datum with which I am acquainted"; (2) that 
perceptual consciousness is fundamentally an inference from effect 
to cause". To understand this account one has to understand the 
terms of art Price uses.
First, "sense-datum". Price defines a sense-datum as an entity 
of the sort that, whenever we perceive physical objects, we cannot 
doubt to exist and are "directly present to our consciousness".(p.3). 
As to "belonging to" and "being present to my senses". Price offers 
the following words of introduction (p.25 f.): after declaring
that there is a sense of "perceive" in which it is not possible to 
perceive what does not exist, he writes: "In this sense "I perceive 
a candle" means (l) I sense a sense-datum, (2) this sense-datum 
is related to a candle in a pecuhar and intimate manner; (3) there 
is no other thing to which this sense-datum is related in that 
manner . . .  We shall describe this as "having a material thing 
present to one’s senses". " Price also says on p.25: "We need 
a name for the relation subsisting between the sense-datum and the 
material thing when the material thing is present to the senses of 
the being who is sensing the sense-datum. For the present we shall 
follow Professor Moore in calling it the relation of "belonging to"."
The way the term "having a material thing present to one’s
— 8 —
senses'* is introduced is open to objection, as condition (5) 
seems to be otiose, as Price’s attempts to state the Causal 
Theory in Oh,4 of "Perception" show. For it is made quite plain 
there that for a relation to be a candidate for the rùle of the 
peculiar and intimate one which exists between sense-datum and 
perceived object it is necessary that a sense-datum can stand in 
that relation to only one physical object. We may also note 
that Price cannot at the start of his work further characterize 
"belonging to" than as a peculiar and intimate relation. Perhaps 
the main aim of his work is to give a full and adequate account 
of "belonging to".
Finally, there is the term "perceptual consciousness". Price 
first declares that sensing a sense-datum is not a sufficient 
condition of holding a belief about a physical object - some 
further mental process is needed "by which the subjects of such 
beliefs are brought before the mind". This process, he declares, 
since Reid’s time, has often been called "perceiving". This 
mental process, which is non-sensuous and can be true or false, 
Price calls "perceptual consciousness", (pp.21-3) Price’s own view 
of it is that, taken in isolation, a single act of perceptual 
consciousness is like what Cook Wilson called "being under the 
impression that " (p.l40) I think there is a real difficulty for 
Price here: for perceptual consciousness is at once thought of as 
a mere bringing before the mind of matter to be judged about, and 
if it was this it could scarcely be described as being true or 
false, and at the same time is described as if it were a form of 
belief, albeit uncritical belief. But if it is a form of belief, 
how can it do the job it is introduced as doing - bringing the
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subject of belief before the mind, before the formation of the 
belief? Price struggles with this problem in ch.6, but does not 
solve it.
If we replace Price’s terms by ordinary ones, we can describe 
his notion of the Causal Theory. For him, the Causal Theory is 
the theory that holds (l) that "P perceives M" (where M is a 
material object) means "M in a peculiar and intimate way causes 
P to have a sense-datum", (2) that the beliefs about physical 
objects we arrive at whilst perceiving are reached by inference. 
So, according to Price, the Causal Theory is a two-headed doctrine 
involving both the analysis of the perception of material objects 
in terms of their causing the perceiver to have a sense-datum and 
also the view that our knowledge about the physical world is 
arrived at by inference from knowledge about our sense-dat&.
Compare this with the statements of a philosopher who makes 
frequent mention of a view he calls "The Causal Theory", and has 
many obligations to Price and his work on perception - A. J. Ayer. 
Ayer gives different accounts of the nature of the Causal Theory. 
On pp.iyi-2 of "The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge" he writes: 
"The question that will be raised is how, if material things . . • 
are not directly given, one can ever acquire any knowledge of 
them . . . .  The usual answer has been that one can justify 
beliefs about the existence and character of things outside sense- 
data by means of a causal argument, and it is throu^ accepting 
this answer that philosophers come to hold what is known as a 
causal theory of perception." Ayer says that the Causal Theory 
is concerned with linguistic rather than factual considerations.
He writes (p.172): "On this showing, its purpose is to elucidate
the meaning of sentences of the form "this is an x" and "A is
—  10 —
perceptually conscious of x", where A stands for a person and 
X for a material thing." (it is to be noted that he uses the 
term "x" in a confused and ambiguous way.) He supposes the 
causal theorist to hold that the former sentence means "This 
is caused by an x" (or something similar). (So one could be 
perceptually conscious of x without x existing, if the inference 
were false.) The causal theorist, according to Aver, is led to 
these views because he believes we can never immediately 
observe, be directly aware of, material things. So that when I 
say, for instance, "This is an inkstand" the "this" refers to 
what is directly given, whilst the inkstand mentioned is a 
material thing. Thus, if such statements are ever to be true, 
they cannot be statements of identity, as they appear to be at 
first sight. The most reasonable suggestion is that they are 
statements of causal relation. This is the sort of reasoning 
the causal theorist is supposed to go through to reach the 
conclusion that "This is an inkstand" means "This is caused by 
an inkstand". I have brought in the inkstand example, which 
Ayer does not mention, because it is used by G. E. Moore in the 
discussion that clearly gives rise to Ayer's views here. ("Some 
Judgements of Perception" in PAS I9I8-I9). There Moore argues 
that one who judges "This is an inkstand" when he is perceiving 
one, cannot be judging that the thing he indicates by the "this" 
is identical with an inkstand. For it is the object of direct 
acquaintance, and on philosophical analysis we realise that this 
is never identical with -a physical object. So the statement
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"This is an inkstand" must have a hidden complexity, in explaining 
which Moore is characteristically undogmatic. Ayer is slipshod 
in describing his proposed causal theory, for he fails to mention 
that the judgments that are being analysed are judgments of 
perception, unless he really means to attribute to his causal 
theorist the views that all statements of the form "This is an x" 
(where an x is a material object) are to be analysed as "This is 
caused by an x". For clearly one can be justified in making 
such statements when one does not perceive the physical object 
in question. And in these cases the person making the statement 
is not having a sense-datum causally related to the physical 
object about which the judgment is being made. Take, for instance, 
the case of a blind man who turns towards a picture on his wall 
and says "This is a Matisse". He makes good sense, even though we 
don't believe he perceives the picture. But on the proposed 
analysis, he statement will have to be either false or meaningless, 
according to whether he is supposed to be referring to some sense- 
datum not involved in the perception of the picture, or to be 
failing to refer to anything at all. In this case, where there 
is no question of there being anything caused by the picture to 
which the man could refer by his "this", and in similar cases, 
the proposed analysis would be a non-starter. But I suppose 
Ayer means his causal theory to be a theory about the analysis 
of perceptual judgments.
Even so, it seems a remarkably unattractive theory. For 
even if we grant that perceiving a physical object involves 
having a sense-datum that is distinct from the physical object, 
why should we accept that the "This" in perceptual judgments like
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"This is an inkstand" refers to the sense-datum? It is surely much 
more natural to take it to refer to the physical object. In all such 
cases, we couJd have replaced the "This" by "This physical object" without 
significantly altering the sense of the statement. Or we could have 
pointed to the inkstand instead of saying "This is an inkstand" and 
said "An inkstand", and in doing so conveyed just the same information.
And in such a case there would be no doubt that what was pointed at was 
the physical object itself, not a sense-datum. I believe, then, that 
Moore, in his attempt to clarify the notion of a sense-datum, only 
succeeded in introducing a new problem for himself when he insisted these 
judgments of perception had a hidden complexity. However, it may be said 
that if Moore believed that material objects were never perceived (on 
the grounds that they were never the objects of direct acquaintance) he 
was for this reason forced to accept that these judgments had such a 
hidden complexity. For it might be asked how the "this" in such judgments 
could ever find reference if it were supposed always to refer to 
imperceptible things. It might be said that in my example of the blind 
man referring to the Matisse the "this" only succeeds in making reference 
because the hearer can perceive the picture even though the speaker 
cannot. However this may be, Moore’s analysis of judgments of perception 
is very unattractive, whilst Ayer's version of the Causal Theory (with 
which he himself does not agree, of course) is equally implausible.
Ayer’s causal theory, as presented in "The Foundations of Empirical 
Knowledge" is quite different from Price’s. For it involves 
a doctrine about the analysis of perceptual judgments of the form 
"This is an x", which Price’s does not. Price’s theory
advances a causal account of perceiving physical objects, which
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Ayer’s does not. In common, they have the contention that 
perceptual consciousness is inferential. But Ayer’s use of the 
expression "The Causal Theory" in this book does not tally either 
with his use of it in his later work "The Problem of Knowledge".
The sense he attaches to the expression there may be grasped 
from the following quotations^(pp.113-4, Penguin); "On this view, 
(i.e. the Causal Theory of Perception) though we perceive physical 
objects, we do not perceive them in their natural states; they 
never appear in public unmade-up . . . .  We can then work out 
what the object must be like in order to have, in such conditions, 
the effects on us that it does. It turns out to be just what 
science tells us that it is." Here, it is plain, Ayer is using 
the expression "Causal Theory" to mean the theory that physical 
objects possess only a certain number of the qualities they seem 
to have (the primary qualities). But then Ayer goes on to reject 
the theory he calles the Causal Theory of Perception, for a very 
strange reason (p.115): "It fails for the reason that however
strong the evidence for the existence of these scientific entities 
may be, our belief in the existence of such physical objects as 
stones and trees and chairs and tables does not depend on it. We 
could give up all of current physical theory without being logically 
committed to denying the existence of things of these familiar 
sorts . . . .  And from this it follows that, whatever may be said 
in defence of the causal theory, it cannot be regarded as 
furnishing an analysis of our perceptual judgments." The theory 
that Ayer is attacking here (as the Causal Theory) seems to be one 
that states that our everyday statements about chairs, tables, etc., 
are equivalent to statements using the terms employed in current
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physical theory. The scientific entities, which are referred to in 
current physical theory, are clearly meant to be atoms and 
electrons and the like. So here Ayer is using the term "Causal 
Theory" to refer to the (preposterous) one that our everyday 
statements about physical objects are equivalent in meaning to 
statements about atoms, electrons, etc. I conclude that Ayer 
does not give a fixed sense to the expression "The Causal Theory 
of Perception" in "The Problem of Knowledge".
A more recent critic of a theory he calls "causal" is 
Don Locke, in his book "Perception and our Knowledge of the 
External World". On p.ll4 he writes: "The Causal Theory is the
theory that we never perceive physical objects directly, but only 
indirectly". He glosses this by saying : "We perceive them only 
in the sense that we perceive their effects, the percepts they 
produce in our minds." We may note that exactly this theory is 
mentioned and criticised by R. J. Hirst in his book "The Problems 
of Perception" (see, for instance, p.25 and p.175). But he 
calls it "The Representative Theory of Perception".
So much then for the critics of theories that they severally 
call "causal". It is plain that the theories criticised under 
the heading of "Causal Theory" vary to an extent from person to 
person. Ayer, in particular, has his own idiosyncratic 
conceptions - varying from place to place - of what the Causal 
Theory is. The other philosophers, however, agree in describing 
a theory as causal if it analyses a man’s perception of a physical 
object in terms of its causing him to have an experience of a 
certain type: but they differ over the description of this type.
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For D. Locke says it is the perception of a sense-datum or 
percept; for Price it is the sensing of a sense-datum, and for 
him sensing and perceiving are quite different phenomena. Price 
also makes a certain doctrine about human knowledge - that perceptual 
consciousness is inferential - an integral part of the Causal The cry . 
Ayer follows him, but Don Locke does not. They regard this view 
of perceptual consciousness, rather, as an unwanted and 
unattractive consequence of the Causal Theory of Perception.
SECTION 3. The Causal Theorists; Locke
Let us now consider the main doctrines advanced by those who 
are generally known as "causal theorists", and discover whether 
there is anything common to all of them. In the case of those 
who have actually called themselves "Causal Theorists" we can 
enquire into the meaning they attach to this expression.
The name most closely associated with that of the Causal 
Theory is John Lockfs. He declares ; "Our senses, conversant 
about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind 
several distinct perceptions of things, according to the various 
ways wherein those objects do affect them; . . .  This great 
source of most of the ideas we have . . .  I call "sensation"."
(Essay Concerning Human Understanding 11, 1, iii). In 11, 19, ii, 
he says that sensation is "the actual entrance of any idea into 
the understanding by the senses." The causal role that physical 
objects have is brought out clearly in Locke’s discussion of 
secondary qualities. Such qualities are "nothing in the objects 
themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by 
their primary qualities." (11, 8, x). In the next paragraph
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Locke says: "The next thing to be considered is, how bodies
produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the 
only way we can conceive bodies operate in".
What is Locke doing here? Is he telling us what the 
perception of physical objects is? Or is his view that we only 
perceive things in our own minds? The problem is complicated 
by the fact that Locke does not use "perceive" as most modern 
philosophers do, as the genus of which seeing, hearing, feeling, 
etc., are the species. By the term he means "the first faculty 
of our minds exercised about our ideas." (11, 9, i) What we 
want to know is what Locke thinJ^ s we see and hear - physical 
objects or sense-data. Now he often speaks of us as seeing and 
touching physical objects, but philosophers who hold that we don’t 
do this often slip back into saying we do when they are not 
concentrating on the issue of whether we do or don’t, so this 
is not conclusive evidence. If Locke were to say that his term 
"sensation" meant the same as "seeing" and "feeling", then we 
could class him as one of those who gives a causal analysis of 
the perception of physical objects (to use that term in its 
modern sense). But he nowhere explicitly states this, or equates 
the causal process he describes with what we call "seeing" or 
"feeling".
Locke’s view of our knowledge of the existence of things 
other than God and ourselves is that "it is to be had only by 
sensation". (IV, 11, i). He goes on: "No particular man can
know the existence of any other being, but only when it makes 
itself perceived by him." However, what we want from Locke is 
a description of the circumstances in which our assurance of the
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existence of a physical object is rational. When in IV, 11, ii, 
Locke says: "It is the actual receiving of ideas from without
that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and 
makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us 
which causes that idea in us", he is giving a description of 
the way our knowledge is brought about, but it is not clear 
exactly how he thinks we are justified in holding the belief 
that does indeed arise at such a time. A little later, however, 
describing his knowing that there is a piece of white paper in 
front of him when he sees it, he says: "Of this (that the paper
exists) the greatest assurance I have, and to which my faculties 
can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and 
sole judges of the thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely 
on as so certain I can no more doubt . . .  that I see white and 
black . . .  than that I write or move my hand." Locke is here 
treating our senses as reliable witnesses, whose evidence we can 
trust. But this analogy is unhelpful. For though the principle 
"It is reasonable to believe that p if a reTable witness tells 
one that p" 'is eminently acceptable, it can only metaphorically 
be applied to the case where I know that this paper is white 
because I can see it. My eyes do not really tell me anything. 
Moreover, the testimony of a witness can be tested against the so- 
called "evidence of our senses", but by what touchstone is this 
evidence to be judged? Perhaps Locke, in speaking of the senses 
as reliable witnesses, is expressing in a metaphorical way the 
view that it is at least sometimes the case that my seeing X 
justifies me in believing that X exists. But Locke nowhere 
states this view clearly and explicitly, and would seem to be
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dissatisfied with such a short answer to the sceptic. For he 
goes on to produce four very poor arguments to show that physical 
objects exist.
It will be noted, however, that Locke nowhere argues that 
all our beliefs about the physical world are inferential, or 
that a man must have reasons he can give to support a particular 
belief of this sort if he is to be said to know that it is true.
He is quite convinced that we do have knowledge of the physical 
world, but does not succeed in giving a convincing explanation 
of its foundations.
SECTION 4* Bertrand Russell
To give such an explanation is one of Russell’s most 
enduring intentions, and he spends more time on this question 
than on discussing the nature of perception. In "The Problems 
of Philosophy" (I912) he tries to show that our knowledge about 
physical objects is not as secure as we uncritically take it to 
be. Speaking of the table in front of him, he says (HUL Edition 
p.11): "It becomes evident that the real table, if there is one,
is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or 
touch or hearing. The real table . . .  is not immediately known 
to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately 
known," What is "immediately known in sensation" is called by 
Russell a "sense-datum". (p. 12) When in Ch.2 Russell is led 
to consider what reason we can have, knowing about sense-data, to 
believe that th®re are physical objects, the reason he finds is 
that if we suppose physical objects exist and cause our sense-data, 
we can find simpler explanations for the course of our sense-data.
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The same approach is taken in "The Analysis of Matter" (I927). 
Here he writes (p. 181): "I have come to regard these things
(physical objects) as inferences. I do not mean that I inferred 
them formerly, or that other people do so now. I fully concede 
that I did not infer them. But now, as the result of an argument,
I have become unable to accept the knowledge of them as valid 
knowledge, except in so far as it can be inferred from such 
knowledge as I still consider epistemologically primitive".
This knowledge is knowledge about sense-data, and we get our 
knowledge of physical objects by inferring the existence of causes 
(physical objects) from the existence of effects (sense-data).
The Causal Theory that embodies this view, says Russell, has as 
its main ground "the desire to believe in simple causal laws"
(p. 200).
A rather different presentation, but with the same emphasis 
on inference, is found in "Human Knowledge" (1948). On p. 181 
Russell makes a distinction between beliefs that arise spontaneously 
and beliefs for which no further reason can be given. The latter 
class, which he calls "data", are "the indispensable minimum of 
premises for our knowledge of matters of fact". And on p. 185 
he declares "Only sensations and memories are truly data for our 
knowledge of the external world." To infer the existence of 
physical objects from that of our percepts, we need some general 
principles. Russell sets out to formulate these in the last part 
of his book. Knowing these, and knowing certain truths about 
our percepts, we can infer the truths of science with validity.
As to our knowledge of these principles, he holds that it'bannot 
be based upon experience, though all their verifiable consequences
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are such as experience will confirm", (p. 52?)
Russell is quite sure that inferenœ is inextricably bound 
up with our knowledge of the external world. It is a common 
theme throughout his epistemological writings. In the first 
book mentioned; he seems to suggest that we do in fact infer 
every proposition we know about physical objects, it being under­
stood that we know a fair number; in all the books the view is 
that if we are to know any such propositions we must have inferred 
them validly from other propositions; but in the later books 
Russell would seem to be calling into doubt our belief that we 
and others know many things about the physical world, not 
accepting it as in "The Problems of Philosophy".
But what is Russell’s view of the perception of physical 
objects? Does he believe we ever do perceive them? We will 
remember that on pWof "The Problems of Philosophy" he writes that 
the real table is not the same as what we "immediately experience 
by sight or touch or hearing". Now if we take, for example, 
"experience by sight" to mean "see", we find that Russell is 
saying we don't see the table - or not immediatêLy. Some philosophers 
have drawn a distinction between mediate and immediate perception 
(e.g. Armstrong, Smythies, D. Locke), But Russell doesn’t. And 
he gives us no help in understanding what he means by "immediately 
experience". So this passage does not assist us in our enquiry.
In "The Analysis of Matter", however, Russell writes (p. 197) 
"Common sense holds - though not very explicitly - that perception 
reveals external objects to us directly: when we'teee the sun" it 
is the sun that we see. Science holds that, when we "see the sun" 
there is a process, starting from the sun . . . finally producing
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the event which we call "seeing the sun"." There is nothing 
controversial about this. But there is when Russell continues 
by saying that the facts of science entail that our knowledge 
of the sun must be inferential; that our direct knowledge is of 
an event which is in some sense "in us". More to the point, 
though, does Russell think it follows from the fact (if fact it 
be) that we have no "direct knowledge" of the sun that we don’t 
see it in the situation we describe as "seeing the sun"? I think 
he probably does. I think the notion of "direct knowledge" he 
uses is the notion of an awareness of things, an awareness of the 
sort we have in perception. This is certainly the impression given 
by the passage in "The Problems of Philosophy" that I quoted, 
where the term "immediate knowledge" crops up. (on p. 11 of 
"The Problems of Philosophy"). I believe that the view being put 
forward in this passage of "The Analysis of Matter" is that we 
don’t perceive physical objects; the belief that we do is false, 
and its falsity is revealed by the physicist.
This view seems to be reproduced in "Human Knowledge", in the 
discussion of perception of pp. 218-225. Talking there of "percepts", 
Russell says that a percept is "what happens when, in common-sense 
terms, I see something or hear something." In his view, the 
common-sense opinion is that, e.g. on certain occasions which are 
"seeing the sun", "the kind of event called "seeing the sun" 
consists in a relation between me and this object, and when 
this relation occurs I am "perceiving" the object. " But then, 
Russell says, physics intervenes, and "we cannot ther^re identify 
the physical sun with what we see; nevertheless what we see is 
our chief reason for believing in the physical sun." This seems 
clear enough: Russell is saying that what normal people take to
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be a transaction between themselves and the sun, and so call 
"seeing the sun", is in fact the occurrence of a percept, which 
does not involve a transaction with the sun. So we do not perceive 
physical objects.
However, Russell goes on, whilst discussing the variety of 
ways in which the objects we say we perceive are related to our 
percepts, to write such things as: "The other senses do not give
us the same kind of perception of distant objects or of inter­
mediate links in causal chains (as vision)", and "It is clear that 
the relation of a percept to the physical object which is supposed 
to be perceived is vague, approximate, and somewhat indefinite.
There is no precise sense in which we can be said to perceive 
physical objects,"
And there is more in this vein in his "Reply to ]X(y Critics" 
in "The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell" (1944)* On p. J02 he 
defends a theory he calls "The causal theory of perception".
And on p. 703 he writes: "It is obviously possible to produce,
by artificial means, an occurrence which: will seem to the
percipient to be a case of "seeing the sun", though in fact it is 
not so. Unless a special kind of causal connection with the sun 
exists, we are not "seeing the sun", even though our experience 
may be indistinguishable from one in which we are "seeing the 
sun". "
¥e may thus conclude that Russell throughout his writings on 
perception proclaims his allegiance to a theory he calls "The Causal 
Theory", But in expounding tiis theory he seems to move uncertainly 
between two alternatives: one view, that we don’t perceive physical 
objects, but the things we do perceive, sense-data, are caused by
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physical objects. The other view istbat physical objects are 
perceived and that it is a logically necessary condition of a 
man’s perceiving a physical object that the object causes him 
to have an experience of a certain sort. Further, whichever 
view of perception he takes, Russell thinks that it leads us to 
the doctrine, which he gladly accepts, that all our knowledge 
about physical objects is in some sense inferential.
SECTION 5 C. D. Broad
Another writer who is spoken of as a causal theorist, and who 
sometimes calls himself by this title, is C. D. Broad. Indeed, 
in his early book "Perception, Physics, and Reality" (I914), he 
adopts what he calls "The Causal Theory", which he contrasts with 
"The Instrumental Theory". On p. 197 he writes; "We have seen 
that all the facts are capable of two interpretations, viz. the 
Instrumental one which holds that our organs and their detailed 
structure are instruments by which the mind perceives real things 
and their real qualities and characteristics; and the Causal one 
which holds that our organs and their internal structure are 
conditions of the perception by the mind of objects and distinctions 
in them, both of which, for aught we can tell, are mere appearances", 
The distinction between the Instrumental and Causal Theories, as 
they are here described, is a very fine one; for the instrumental 
theorist, in holding that our sense-organs are instruments by means 
of which we perceive, must hold that they are conditions of our 
perceiving the things we do, and so he has this view in common 
with the Causal Theorist. The only difference in their views is 
that the Causal Theorist takes an agnostic stand on the nature of
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th# object* of perceptiom, wherea* the In»trumentali»t is a 
stalwart Realist*
But later on in the book, Broad represents the Causal 
Theory as holding that what is perceived is always an appearance, 
which is a phenomenon wholly produced by certain factors including 
the perceiver's brain, and exists no longer than it is perceived - 
and so cannot be a physical object. He writes on p. 204: "In
the causal theory something X acts on the organ, the organ and 
the mind together produce a perception as a whole, i.e. something 
from which indeed an object can be analysed out, though there is 
no reason to think it can exist out of that whole called a 
perception. Such an object is an appearance in our sense of the 
word."
Broad realises that there is a problem facing the causal 
theorist: how can he justify his belief that the cause of each 
appearance resembles it, at least in respect of the primary 
qualities? In other words, if the causal theory is correct, how 
can we have knowledge of the physical world? The answer (given 
on p. 267) is as follows; "The further determination of the real 
world does not pretend to be anything more than hypothetical . . .  
In comparing the probability of any two alternative theories as 
to the further determination of the nature of the real causes 
of perception we need not consider anything but their repective 
success in explaining what we do perceive. And there is certainly 
no alternative theory of the nature of the real before the public 
at present that can claim to explain so many of the facts so 
well as the theory of science."
There is a similar treatment of the epistemological problem
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in "Scientific Thought"* On p. 268 he writes: "The belief
that our sensa are i ^ Ppearances of something more permanent 
and complex than themselves seems to be primitive, and to arise 
inevitably in us with the sensing of sensa. It is not reached 
by inference, and could not logically be justified by inference. 
On the other hand there is no possibility . . .  of coordinating 
the facts without it."
Returning to Broad’s view of perception, we must consider 
his "Object Theory" of sensible appearance, which is advanced 
for the first time in "Scientific Thought". This is described 
best on p. 259» as follows: "Whenever I truly judge that x
appears to me to have the sensible quality q, what happens is 
that I am directly aware of a certain object y, which (a) does 
really have the quality q, and (b) stands in some peculiarly 
intimate relation, yet to be determined, to x." Broad later 
concludes that this relation is causal, and when the Object 
Theory has this stipulation that the relation is causal added 
to it, it becomes the "Critical Scientific Theory" described on 
p. 272f.
Now this theory of appearing seems to commit Broad to the 
view that for a man to perceive a physical object he must be 
caused by that object to have a sense-experience (in Broad’s 
view this having of a sense-experience would be the sensing of 
a sensum). For there is surely a sense of the word "appear" - 
and it is the one Broad has been analysing - in which a thing’s 
appearing somehow to me is nothing more or less than my 
perceiving it. 0 perceives M iff M appears somehow to 0.
So, if the notion of an object’s appearing to a man is to be
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analysed causally, so must the notion of a man’s perceiving 
an object. And again, if Broad’s view is that physical objects 
do appear to people, then he must agree that we sometimes 
perceive physical objects.
Now both in "Scientific Thou^t" and in "Mind and its Place 
in Nature" (I925), Broad takes it for granted that we perceive 
physical objects. But as to the causal analysis of perception. 
Broad never explicitly advances it. Indeed, what he says about 
perception contains no reference to the causal analysis. On 
p. 243 of "Scientific Thou^t" he mentions the "sensum theory 
of sensible appearance" (i.e. the "object" one) and says:
"Closely connected with it is a theory about the perception of 
physical objects, and we may sum up the whole view under 
discussion as follows: Under certain conditions I have states
of mind called sensations. These sensations have objects 
which are always concrete particular existants, like coloured 
hot patches . . . .  Such objects are called sensa. The existence 
of such sensa . . . lead us to judge that a physical object 
exists and is present to our senses." Is this really meant to 
be a complete description of the perception of a physical 
object? It is hard to think so, as it is plainly Broad’s view 
that in hallucination we sense sensa, and this sensing could 
be accompanied by a judgment that a physical object existed, 
but Broad would not want to say that this complex of events wouH 
be the perception of a physical object. But he says that he is 
presenting a theory about the perception of physical objects.
And there is no mention of causation in this theory.
In "Mind and its Place in Nature" Broad analyses "perceptual
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situations" which are described by sentences like "I am seeing 
a chair" and "I am hearing a bell", (p. 140f). On p. I5I 
Broad suggests that in every perceptual situation more is 
involved than the perceiver and a spatio-temporally extended 
particular - there is also the conviction that the particular 
is part of a physical object. If this were meant to be a 
complete description of the perception of a physical object, it 
would fall under the same criticism as the view in "Scientific 
Thought". (The examples Broad gives scotch the suspicion that 
Broad might be using "perception " in the sense which Price 
denotes by the expression "perceptual consciousness;,") But I 
cannot help thinking it is meant to be such a description.
And again we may note that there is no mention of causation.
Yet on p. 182 of "Mind and its Place in Nature" Broad reiterates 
the "Sensum" or "Object" theory of sensible appearance, which he 
goes on to accept, preferring it to two alternative theories.
And on p. 185 he describes how the "Sensum" theory leads us to 
the "Critical Scientific Theory", if, that is, we wish to keep 
as near to the common-sense notion of physical objects as 
possible. And the "Critical Scientific Theory", as we have seen, 
is an analysis of appearing in causal terms, which therefore 
implies that perception must be analysed in causal terms, too.
I conclude that in the two later works Broad presents an 
analysis of what it is to perceive a physical object on the one 
hand and of what it is for a physical object to appear somehow 
to us on the other. The account given of each of these 
phenomena is remarkably constant from one work to the other, but 
the analysis of perception seems to be inconsistent with that of
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appearing; for I have suggested that there are reasons for 
supposing a causal analysis of appearing demands to be comple­
mented by a causal analysis of perceiving (p. of this 
thesis); but Broad gives a causal analysis of appearing, 
whilst his account of perception makes no reference to causation. 
Both these analyses are incompatible with the view of perception 
expressed in "Perception, Physics, and ReeLity", where the object 
of perception is stated to be an appearance, which is produced 
in part by the action of a physical object on a man’s sensory 
equipment.
SECTION 6. Contemporary writers.
If we wish to discuss what contemporary philosophers who 
call themselves causal theorists, or are so called by others, 
hold to be true about perception, we will do best if we begin • 
with H. P. Grice, who has dealt with the subject carefully and 
in some detail in AS Supp. Vol. I96I. In his article "The 
Causal Theory of Perception" he asks *Vhat is to count as holding 
a causal theory of perception?" (This language suggests he is 
alive to the fact that there are many varieties of the causal 
theory.) In answer he writes (p. 121); "It may be held that 
the elucidation of the notion of perceiving a material object 
will include some reference t> the role of the material object 
perceived in the causal ancestry of the perception (or of the 
sense-impression or sense-datum involved in the perception).
This is central to what I regard as a standard version of the 
Causal Theory of Perception." Grice then tries to carry to 
completion the particular version of the Causal Theory that he
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isolates. He attempts, by the addition of further conditions, 
to give an account of the perception of a physical object, 
starting JEtom the condition that this cannot occur unless the 
object plays a part in causing the perceiver to have a sense- 
experience, The details of this account will be studied in a 
later chapter; what we should notice now is that though he 
proclaims himself a supporter of the Causal Theory Grice rejects 
the view that all our perceptual beliefs are inferences (p. 146f). 
Thus he does not agree with the account of the Causal Theory 
given by Price and Ayer, where this view is said to be integral 
to it.
A similar view to Grice’s about the justification of our 
perceptual beliefs is taken by another philosopher who is 
naturally spoken of as a causal theorist. This is R. M. Chisholm, 
who in his book "Theory of Knowledge" (I966) suggests that the 
very fact that a man is in the state of thinking he perceives 
such-and-such a thing gives that man some reason to believe that 
he is perceiving a thing of that sort; and that in certain 
circumstances this reasoned belief can become rational conviction • 
Now in his book "perceiving" (1957) Chisholm attempts to define 
"the simplest of the nonpropositional senses of "perceive"* and 
his definition of "S perceives x'î involves the notion of causation, 
since for x to be perceived x has to be a "proper stimulus" of S, 
causing S to have an experience. What the "proper stimuliv" of 
each sense are is specified by Chisholm in the language of 
physics and physiology,. , For instance, by "a proper visual 
stimulus of S" Chisholm means an object such that ligbt trans­
mitted from it stimulates a visual receptor of S, provided that
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this light is not reflected after being transmitted from the 
object.
A further doctrine in "Perceiving" that should be noted is 
Chisholm’s view that the inference from "x appears ^ to S" 
to "There is something which is jZ5" is always fallacious - an 
example of what he calls the ".Sanse-datum Fallacy".
Scientists have always been fond of advancing "Causal 
Theories". A recent presentation is the Bepresentative Theory 
in Smythies’ "Analysis of Perception" (I956). Smythies says 
his task is "to give an account of the relation between our 
sensory experience and the physical and physiological processes 
of perception." (p. l) He thinks the perception of objects 
must involve the sensing of sense-data, on grounds relating to 
hallucinations and the like. The mental and the physical ane, 
he concludes, radically different in nature, so perception 
consists in a physical process starting from the perceived object 
and terminating in the perceiver’s brain, plus a mental event 
in the perceiver (tais sensing of a sense-datum), which is brou^it 
about by the brain state.
When he turns to face objections, he falls back on a 
distinction between direct and indirect observation. His theory 
does not result in the view that physical objects are unobservable. 
For though only sense-data are directly observed, physical 
objects are observed indirectly. And he gives an argument to 
show that we can have knowledge about what can only be observed 
indirectly.
A more philosophically sophisticated view of this type is 
to be found in Hirst’s "The Problems of Perception" (1959)- On
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p. 507 he says in summarizing his theory : "Perceiving is a
relation between person and public object in which a mode of 
active experience, perceptual consciousness, is caused in him 
by the stimulation of his sense Q.3?‘gans by the object or by 
emanations from it". We need not go into the method he employs 
to avoid the problems attached to the traditional dualism of 
mind and body,
SECTION 7• Conclusions and programme for the rest of the thesis.
I set out in this chapter to discover whether the 
philosophers who are known as causal theorists have advanced 
broadly . the same doctrines, and whether the picture its critics 
have of the causal theory remains constant from one to the other. 
Now it will have become clear that there is little in common 
between all the theories that have been advanced as causal 
theories or criticised as causal theories. They axe all theories 
about perception, in which a prominent part is given to the 
concept of causation, but this seems to be about all they have 
in common.
What we can do, however, is distinguish various types of 
causal theories, I think we can separate out four main types, 
two of which can be divided usefully into sub-types. The fist 
type of causal theory (a ) is that of which the theories of 
Grice, Chisholm, and Smythies are examples. The distinctive 
feature of these theories is that in them a causal analysis is 
given of the perception of physical objects, but no account of 
the genesis or justification of our knowledge of these objects 
is integral to them. Broad’s "Critical Scientific Theory" of
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sensible appearance is another theory of this type.
The second type of causal theory (b ) is that of which 
Broad’s theory in "Perception, Physics, and Reality" is an 
example. This is the theory that sense-data or sensa or percepts 
are the only objects of perception, and that physical objects 
are known to us only as the causes of these: we are never 
perceptually acquainted with them. We noted that John Locke may 
have held this view, though we could not be sure.
The third type is the one of which the theory Price 
criticises in "Perception" is an example: it results from the
addition to A of a further thesis, that our perceptual judgments 
are all inferential, and that all our knowledge of the physical 
world is therefore in some sense inferential. Let us call this 
thesis I, and the third type of theory AI.
The fourth type results from the conjunction of I with B.
Let us call it BI. We can now say that Russell in the works I
have discussed wavers between AI and BI. He most closely
associates himself with AI in his "Reply". We should note that
it is possible to hold B without I. Indeed, Braod, who favours
B, is not attracted towards I. He prefers to think of the
assumption of a physical world as a transcendnial hypothesis
which alone can enable us to make sense of our perceptual experiences.
These, then, are the four types of theory that have been 
advanced, and criticised, under the title of causal theories. In 
order to make the programme for the rest of my thesis clearer, I 
would also like to subdivide A and AI, according to whether the 
causal analysis of perception given involves reference to sense- 
data or the like. Chisholm’s theory is of type A, but avoids all
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reference to sense-data. Let us say it belongs to type . 
Smythies* theory is of type A, but makes use of the notion of a 
sense-datum. Let us say it belongs to type A2 . Similarly, 
theories of type AI may be divided into theories of type Aj^ I 
and A2I, Russell’s theories of type AI clearly fall into type 
A2I#
Having made these distinctions, I can briefly describe 
the programme of my thesis: it is, first, to see if the correct
theory of perception falls into any of the above-mentioned types; 
and, second, if it appears that the correct theory of perception 
does fall into one of these types, to attempt to specify it 
more exactly, giving conditions separately necessary and jointly 
sufficient for perception. In this attempt, should it be made,
I will strive to present my causal theory in the most attractive 
light possible, though not at the expense of a proper critical 
examination of the theory. But I shall take it as my task to 
be an advocate fir the theory, rather than against it, if I am 
once satisfied that a theory of its type must be correct.
I shall proceed first to the examination of the thesis I.
If I proves unacceptable, then no theory of types AI or BI can 
be acceptable (Ch. 2), I shall then discuss whether sense-data 
or the like can, and do, have any part to play in perception.
If it appears they cannot, and do not, no theory of type A2 or 
type B can be acceptable (Ch. 5). Then I will consider whether 
it is reasonable to suppose that it is in a theory of type A^ 
that the correct account of perception is to be found (Ch. 4)*
It is as well that I should now say that it is my view that a 
theory of type Aj is correct. The remainder of my thesis will
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be devoted to an attempt to give an adequate specification 
of this causal theory (Chs. 5 - 8)«
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CHAPTER TWO: THE THESIS THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OP THE PHYSICAL
WORLD IS INFERENTIAL.
SECTION 1. Introduction
I want now to begin my examination of The Causal Theory 
by considering a theory which inter alia contains the assertion 
that our knowledge of the physical world is in some sense 
inferential. Is such a theory bound to fail? The first point 
that will come immediately to our minds is that most of the 
writers we discussed as being causal theorists did not hold 
such a theory. It is not held by Locke; it is explicitly 
rejected by Broad, who writes: "The belief that our sensa are
appearances of something more permanent and complex than them­
selves seems to be primitive, and to arise in us with the sensing 
of the sensa. It is not reached by inference, and could not 
logically be justified by inference." ("Scientific Thought", 
p 268). Neither Grice nor Chisholm accept it, Chisholm 
advancing a completely different view of the way we are justified 
in believing such propositions. (Theory of Knowledge, Ch. 5). 
Price, indeed, makes the point that "perceptual consciousness 
is fundamentally an inference from effect to cause" an integral 
part of what he calls "The Causal Theory" ("Perception", p 66), 
but only in the philosophy of Russell do we find this doctrine 
advanced as part of a causal theory.
However, such is the importance of Russell’s work, I will 
discuss the thesis that all our knowledge of contingent truths 
about physical objects is inferential, to see whether a causal 
theory of which it is an essential part must fail because the
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thesis leads to scepticism of the senses or some other insuperahJe 
difficulty. For I take it to be the case (as Russell himself 
does) that we do have some knowledge of contingent truths about 
physical objects. If some theory implies that we do not, then 
that theory is unacceptable. We may also note that a thesis 
similar to Russell’s has been held by another distinguished 
philosopher, C. I. Lewis. He is not a causal theorist, or, 
rather, I find no evidence for his being one in his works, but 
he does hold the doctrine which I am now discussing. So it will 
be worthwhile to consider what Lewis says on the subject.
First, however, we must make it clear just what the doctrine is 
which Bussell and Lewis hold, which I have described as "The view 
that all our knowledge of contingent propositions about physical 
objects is inferential." Do they mean to say that as a matter of 
fact all such knowledge is arrived at by inference, though it 
might fee that it could be acquired in some other way? No. They 
believe, rather, that if I had not inferred that p ( "p" being 
a contingent proposition about physical objects) it would be 
improper for me to be said to know that p. Unless I have inferred 
that p, and inferred it validly from other propositions that it is 
reasonable for me to hold, then it is not reasonable for me to 
hold that p, and if it is not reasonable for me to hold that p 
then I cannot know that p: such is their view. What we have to
discuss, then, is the doctrine that if "p" is a contingent 
proposition about physical objects then a man cannot reasonably 
believe that p unless he has validly inferred that p, from other 
propositions that he reasonable believes.
Or, rather, something like this. For this is not an adequate 
expression of the Russell-Lewis position. We can see strai^t away
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that the doctrine I have described is likely to lead to scepticism. 
For it may be said that amongst the premisses of any argument of 
which the valid conclusion is a physical object proposition there 
must be at least one physical object proposition. Thus, if in 
the argument of which p is the conclusion, q is this premiss, 
and I infer p from q and the other premisses, I only believe 
that p reasonably if I believe that q reasonably. But I can only 
believe that q reasonably if I have correctly inferred it from 
another physical object proposition which I believe reasonably.
But I can only have performed a finite number of inferences in 
my life, and the earliest physical object proposition in the 
regress, in terms of which all the others are to be justified 
(if they are to be justified at all), will not be justified 
itself - for I did not believe it reasonably because I inferred 
it from no other proposition. But then the whole edifice of my 
justified beliefs collapses. This criticism would not apply 
to the sort of inferential justification of physical object 
beliefs given by Descartes, however. One mi^t argue that God 
must exist, and that he could not suffer us to have a completely 
delusive sense-experience. Thus one might infer on a particular 
occasion that such-and-such was probably the case with regard to 
the physical world, using as a premiss the proposition "God would 
not in general deceive me about the nature of the world I live in." 
However, this Cartesian approach has problems of its own, as is 
clear.
But in fact the Russell-Lewis view is as follows: There is
a set S which is composed of a number of propositions. From 
members of S and other propositions which we reasonably believe
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all physical object propositions nat in S must be validly 
inferred if they are to be reasonably believed. (The members of 
S are reasonably believed for other reasons than that they can be 
inferred from other propositions.) However, it may be said that 
this view is no different from the one we all accept uncritically.
For we all agree that many of the propositions about physical 
objects that we know we know because we inferred them validly 
from other propositions we knew. So to make the originality of 
the Russell-Lewis view patent, we must add: "For Russell and 
Lewis the members of S are a limited number of hypotheticals 
which license inferences from propositions about mental phenomena 
to propositions about physical phenomena; and no proposition 
about physical phenomena that is not a member of S, (and is not 
reasonably believed because validly inferred from other reason­
ably believed propositions about physical phenomena which are 
not members of S), is reasonably believed unless it is validly 
inferred from a proposibon (or propositions) about mental 
phenomena that we are justified in believing, in conjunction with 
a member (or members) of S." The distinctive feature of the 
Russell-Lewis view is thus that our beliefs about the physical 
world are only held to be justified if they have been validly 
inferred from some propositions we are justified in holding about 
our mental phenomena and some hypothetical propositions which 
allow inference from the mental to the physical. (Though, of 
course, Russell and Lewis would agree that a man is also justified 
in believing propositions about physical phenomena that he has 
validly inferred from propositons about physical phenomena that 
he is justified in holding in the above-mentioned way).^
^This account of Russell’s position is misleading; - See Appendix p 256
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This is a general account of the Russell-Lewis view. The exact 
specification of the propositions which they believe license 
inference to propositions about physical phenomena will be given 
later. Two very damaging criticisms of the Russell-Lewis view 
could be developed in the following way: first, if it could
be shown that, though indeed we do arrive at some of our beliefs 
about the physical world by inference, the vast majority of our 
beliefs about physical objects, including those which are the 
basis of the inferential beliefs I have just mentioned, are not 
in fact inferred from propositbns about our minds along with some 
hypothetical propositions. For then we would be led to suppose 
that we are not justified in holding these beliefs, that is, we 
would be led to a position where we had to admit we knew little 
or nothing about the physical world, should the Russell-Lewis 
view be correct. For according to this view, we can only be 
justified in these beliefs if we have carried out such inferences. 
Second, when we come to consider the proposed constituents of 
the set S (the propositions licensing inferences from ibe mental 
to the physical) we may discover that these are in some way 
defectiveI they may not in fact license the inferences as they 
are meant to; or they may not be propositions which are in them­
selves reasonable to believe. For if the Russell-Lewis view is 
to survive, these basic hypotheticals must be able to stand 
without need of justification, since we are supposed to be 
justified in holding propositions about physical phenomena just 
because they follow from these hypotheticals. We must consider, 
then, whether a man would be justified in holding these hypothetic als 
even though he could provide no justification for holding them.
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The two questions we must ask, then, are; "Do we infer the 
majority of our beliefs about the physical world?" and "Can we 
justify these beliefs by reference to propositions about mental 
phenomena and some self-evident hypothetical propositions 
licensing inferences from the mental to the physical?" If the 
answer to both questions is "No", then the Russell-Lewis view 
is completely overthrown. If the answer to the first is "No", 
but to the second "Yes", Russell and Lewis can say that although 
we are not in fact justified in holding the beliefs we do about 
the physical world, we could acquire such justification if we 
wished. Both these questions are discussed, and answered, by 
Price in Ch. 4 of "Perception", and it is clearly worthwhile to 
study his answers before attempting to give any of our own.
SECTION 2. Price on the doctrine that perceptual consciousness is 
an inference.
Price discusses the doctrine that (as he puts it) perceptual 
consciousness is fundamentally an inference from effect to cause 
in Ch. 4 of "Perception", as I have said. His criticisms of 
the doctrine will be helpful to us in our attempts to criticise 
it. The main weight of Price’s attack should be directed on the 
view that the judgments we make about physical objects whilst 
perceiving them are inferences - for this is the doctrine he sets 
out to criticise. And indeed he does argue against it. But most 
of his time is spent first in describing as best he can a method 
of justifying our beliefs about physical objects and their 
properties by referring to our sense-experience and certain causal 
principles; and second in exposing this method as unsuccessful.
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That is, he spends most of his time arguing whether or not we 
can justify our beliefs about physical objects by means of 
inferences from what we know about our mental phenomena along 
with some general principles that are self-evident. The intro­
duction of these arguments seems irrelevant to Price’s purpose - 
that p cannot validly be inferred from q does not prove that a 
man cannot infer p from q, for he may argue incorrectly - and 
Price’s purpose is to show that a certain set of judgments - 
perceptual ones - are not inferences. Perhaps what Price is 
doing is trying to show not only that perceptual consciousness 
is not an inference, but also that even if it was, it could not 
provide us with assurance about physical objects, their existence 
and nature. However, we have the benefit of seeing a theory 
about the inferential justification of physical object propositiois 
advanced and destroyed.
Price begins by erecting a theory in which perceptual 
consciousness is presented as inferential. The difficulty he 
encounters is to make it plausible. As he says (p. 67): "It is
obvious that we are not ordinarily conscious of making any 
inference at all when we see a table or a chair or a tree; and 
this might seem to be already a fatal objection to the theory.
But several answers are offered. The theory may say, like 
Helmholtz and others, "You do infer but you are not conscious of 
inferring, because you do it so quickly and without any effort." 
This will not do. If we are not conscious of inferrii^, what 
evidence is there that we do it at all?" Paced with this 
supposed difficulty. Price thinks the best way such a theory 
can be stated is if it is held that I have in the past inferred
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material objects from sense-data by causal arguments, and this 
has enabled me to establish the inductive generalisation that 
whenever such and such a kind of sense-datum exists, such and 
such a kind of material object exists, too. What happens next, 
he says, is as follows; "Once having established it, I proceed 
henceforth to apply it in a mechanical way to all my sense-data 
as they come along, without thinking any more about the grounds 
upon which it is tased, and without troubling to verify it in 
each new case by going through the whole causal argument again", 
(p. 68). Price’s argument here is a little strange: he rejects
the view that we go through an argument about the causes of our 
sense-data when we have them, concluding in a judgment that 
there is a material object of some kind that is responsible for 
each, and rejects it on the grounds that we are unconscious of 
any such argument; but then he allows the suggestion that, thou^ 
not going through such an argument, we do go through some form 
of reasoning in every case of the type, that is, we argue "This 
is a sense-datum of sort S, and these are always connected with 
material objects of type M, so there is a material object of 
type M." But if it is true that we are not conscious of any 
reasoning process when making perceptual judgments, and we cannot 
fail to be conscious of any such reasoning if it occurs (both of 
which propositions Price holds), then it would seem that he 
cannot accept the alternative formulation he proposes for the 
inferential theory, any more than the original one. Perhaps 
what Price thinks is that we could not carry out a complex piece 
of resoning (such as the first version of the theory proposes) 
without being conscious of it, but we could do this if it were
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the simple inference of the alternative theory. And, indeed, it 
does seem to be the case, as I shall argue later, that there are 
unconscious inferences. But Price does not himself say that theœ 
can be.
Price, having described a theory of perceptual consciousness 
which holds that it is inferential, goes on to give the most 
plausible account he can of how we could validly infer the 
existence of a physical object from the existence of a sense- 
datum. It is not obvious how this inquiry is relevant to the 
question "Is perceptual consciousness an inference from effect 
to cause?" Perhaps, though. Price is thinking on the following 
lines: "Perceptual consciousness usually is correct, i.e. the
propositions we come to believe through it are usually true. But 
then it can only be inferential if it is possible to argue valid]y 
to propositions about physical objects from others about sense- 
data. For if this were not possible, why should perceptual 
consciousness, if inferential, so often be correct?"
To turn now to Price’s account, he begins by stating that, 
if the inferential justification view is to be correct, we would 
need to be sure that every event has a cause. But then are we 
forced to invoke . the existence of physical objects to be the 
causes of sense-data? Could not they be caused by one another? 
Price replies that if we were omnisentient beings, then it would 
be plapsible to suggest that sense-data mi^t be caused ly other 
sense-data. But things are different in fact - "Every drowsy 
nod, every turn of the head, every blink", he says, "would destroy 
the order of Nature, if Nature consisted simply of our sense-data. 
Even the simplest laws, e.g. that unsupported bodies fall.
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cannot b® stated in terms of our sense-data alone . . . .
When the motor-car is moving, I do not and cannot see the 
explosion in the cylinder. Here are effects without causes, if 
we insist upon stating causal laws in terms of sense-data 
alone. And again we have causes without effects. I drop a 
pencil from my window on a dark night. This should cause 
its fall. But I never see its fall," (p. 72). Thus, if every 
event has a cause, and if our sense-data are events, something 
must exist besides our sense-data; to redress the balance of 
the "old" world of our chaotic and disorderly sense-experiences 
we have to supplement it with a "new" world of physical objects. 
This argument for unsensed causes is, in Price’s opinion, the 
only plausible basis for inferences from the existence of our 
sense-data to the existence of physical objects. Provided we 
are reasonably assured of the principle that every event has a 
cause, we can (he thinks) be reasonably assured that there are 
things other than our sense-data, that cause them, (whether we 
are so assured concerning the principle of universal causation, 
he discusses later.)
But, Price observes, the argument for unsensed causes tells 
us nothing as to the causes of our sense-data, except that they 
are not sense-data themselves. However, there are several 
methods, based on the argument for unsensed causes, which purport 
to show that these causes are material things, extended in space 
and enduring through time, and having such causal properties as 
natural science attriblutes to them. These methods (as presented 
by Price) are complex and hard to understand, and Price’s 
arguments against them are equally difficult. The clearest
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method is the Method of Correspondence, derived from Descartes* 
principle that there must be at least as much "reality" in the 
cause as in the effect, i.e., at least as many positive attributes. 
One who holds this priciple argues tiat wherever we find different es 
in the sense-data, there must be differences in their causes.
Thus there must be differences in the non-sensible corresponding 
to spatial and temporal differences among sense-data. There 
must be a plurality of factors in the non-sensible, and they 
must be related to each other in an order having at least four 
dimensions. Further, as one part of our sense-field can change 
when other parts do not, as whenever (as we say) we see something 
move, the diverse factors of the non-sensible must have a certain 
independence of each other. Having argued that the non-sensible 
must have such characteristics, the theorist suggests that he 
has shown that it is a world of bodies in space and time, and 
that this world is at least as complex as common sense - supposes.
But Price replies (p. 92) that all the theorist can have 
shown by his use of the method of correspondence is that in the 
Non-sensible there must be an ordered plurality of some sort. It 
does not have to be an ordered plurality of individuals, for 
there might be a number of characteristics of the same thing, 
which displayed sufficient independence to account for the 
observed facts. Again, Price argues, though our sense-data have 
spatial relations to each other, their causes need not; as it 
does not follow from the fact that my decision to draw a circle 
is the cause of its production that my decision is itself 
circular. Thus, Price concludes, it seems doubtful whether a man 
who is reasonably assured about the law of universal causation
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and of the validity of such methods as the method of correspondence 
can validly infer the existence of physical objects bynsing these 
principles in conjunction with his knowledge of his mental state. 
But can one even be reasonably assured about the principle of 
universal causation? On p. 102 Price calls this principle into 
question. For Price thinks that the most we are justified in 
believing is that every event in the material world has a cause. 
"But is this proposition relevant to sense-data?" Price asks.
Only if we are willing to assert that sense-data are events 
in the material world, he replies. But then we must assume the 
existence of the material world before we can use the principle 
of universal causation with regard to our sense-data. So we 
cannot use this principle to prove that there must be some other 
things than our sense-data, that is, material objects, which 
are the causes of our sense-data.
Price, then does : not think we have rational assurance 
about premisses strong enough to enable us validly to infer the 
existence of physical objects, given that we have knowledge 
about our sense-data. Indeed, he thinks that no inference of 
this type can be made without begging the question. But what of 
the view that perceptual consciousness is inferential (whether 
the inference is valid or not, whether or not it usually results 
in true beliefs)? Well, Price simply asserts (on p. 99) that, as 
a matter of fact, we do not reach the belief we have in physical 
objects by inference from our beliefs about our sense-data. I 
suppose his reason for saying this is that we are not conscious 
of any passage of our minds from beliefs about sense-data to 
conclusions about physical objects at the time we are perceiving
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the objects, for he thinks that if there was any such inference 
we would have to be conscious of it. But .this does not seem to 
me to be at all plain, as I will argue below. I think a 
better argument to show that no inference of the supposed type 
takes place is presented by Price on p. 101.; the fragmentariness 
and interrupted existence of our sense-data, one of the starting 
points of the causal argument, is not historically original at 
all. Price declares. For we start out believing in physical 
objects, not in sense-data, since we have to be persuaded by 
argument that these are not identical with our sense-data. So 
it cannot be that, starting with a belief in our sense-data, we 
argue from them to physical objects.
The reason I think this latter argument is better I will 
now make plain, and in doing so I will generalize Price’s 
argument into a criticism of any theory that holds that our 
perceptual judgments about the existence and nature of physical 
objects are inferences from what we know about our mental content 
at the time, along with some other principles. (Thus the argu­
ment will apply whether or not the mental content is supposed 
to be the sensing of sense-data or something else.) Earlier on 
I disagreed with Price’s view that if perceptual consciousness 
were an inference, we could not fail to be conscious of it. For 
it is plain that, in many cases where it is proper to say we 
have reached some concbsion by inference, we are not conscious oC 
having drawn these conclusions from some premisses. This is most 
obvious in everyday cases, for instance, when one concludes that 
the occupants of a house have gone away on holiday when one 
sees the milk-bottles piling up on their front step, or when one
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realizes that a certain person known for his boisterousness has 
come home when one hears the front door slammed and the tread of 
heavy feet. Why is it proper in cases like these to say that 
one irferred that the people were on holiday, or that the 
boisterous person has come home? There may be no conscious 
passage of the mind from premisses to conclusions. What makes 
this sort of case one of inference is surely that I hold a 
certain proposition because I hold some other propositions and 
because I believe it follows from them. In this case I can be 
said to have inferred the proposition, even though my belief, 
in the other propositions, and that they imply the inferred 
proposition, is not conscious. The test of whether an inference 
has taken place is my being ready and able to give reasons for 
the belief I have acquired (thou#i they may not be good reasons), 
and my acknowledgement that if these reasons do not in fact 
support the supposedly inferred proposition, I no longer have 
the justification I had for holding it. In the case of the 
milk bottles, if asked why we thought the occupants of the house 
were away, we would say; "There were milk bottles piling up on 
the steps". If then someone were to say "So what?" we might 
continue and make the other premiss of our inference clear;
"People don’t let their milk-bottles pile up when they are at 
home". The further test would be one which made it plain whether 
or not it was for these reasons that we held the belief that 
they were away, and this test could be carried out by replying 
to the supposed inferrer "What if I told you that the people 
there are so forgetful that they often let milk bottles pile up 
even when they’re at home?" If the acceptance of this information
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caused the supposed inferrer to question his belief that the 
people were away, then this would be a strong reason to say he 
had inferred it.
So the fact that we are not conscious of inference does 
not mean we have not carried out an inference. What counts is 
whether we can give reasons for a belief we have acquired, 
along with the fact that we hold that belief for those reasons 
(or, at least, that those are among our reasons for holding 
that belief.) But to turn to the case in point, whether the 
beliefs we acquire about the existence and nature of physical 
objects during our perception of them are in general inferential, 
it is plain that they are not. If I am asked "What makes you 
think that there is a piece of piper with writing on it, and a 
hand (your hand) with a blue and silver pen in it before your 
eyes at the moment?" I find it hard to give an answer. I
might try to scrape up an answer, if I thought it was incumbent 
on me to produce one, for instance, "It looks as though there’s 
a piece of paper, etc, and things are usually the way they look", 
but apart from the fact that this is a philosophically doubtful 
reason, it seems quite plain to me that it is not for this 
reason that I came to believe what I did about the things I was 
seeing. Indeed, it is clear that in the majority of cases of 
Ihis type, a belief arises in us which is not the product of a 
train of reasoning, conscious or unconscious. For we find it 
difficult to give any reasons for our belief, and, even if we 
give them, we feel doubtful whether we acquired the belief for 
these reasons. It is for this reason that I think Price’s 
argument that we have to be led to a belief in sense-data from
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our belief in physical objects has force. For if a man does not 
believe there are sense-data (having never even heard of them) 
how could he possibly infer that a physical object of a certain 
type existed because he was sensing a certain sort of sense- 
datum? He could not. However, the sense-datum theorist might 
reply that indeed the man’s judgment could not be of the form 
"I am having a ^ sense-datum", but it could be of the form "It 
looks as though there is a ^ physical object", and that it was 
he (the sense-datum theorist) who introduced the terminology of 
sense-data as a philosophically more perspicuous language for 
describing the phenomena which ordinary people describe in 
the terminology of seeming. So that the ordinary man is making 
judgments about sense-data, although he would not put it in 
those terms. But then it might be replied to the sense-datum 
theorist that as the language of seeming is, and must be, 
learnt subsequently to expressions in which physical objects 
are simply said to exist and have properties, there must be many 
statements made, and beliefs acquired, about physical objects 
which cannot have been inferred from prior beliefs about what 
seemed to be the case. But even if the language of seeming is 
not parasitic upon the everyday language about physical objects 
and their properties, it still does not seem to me that we are 
prepared to justify our physical object, statements by reference 
to statements about what seems to be the case - or, rather, not 
in general.
So I conclude that the majority of our beliefs about 
physical objects, I.e. the vast majority of those we acquire 
whilst perceiving the objects in question, are not reached by
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by inference. If, then, as Russell and Lewis suggest, we are 
only justified in holding such beliefs if we have inferred them 
from other propositions we know, we are not justified in holding 
them, and hence we will turn out to have no knowledge at all of 
contingent propositions about the physical world,^
Still, it is open to Russell and Lewis to say that we could 
turn our belief into knowledge if we carried out certain 
inferential procedures that we have open to us. Our beliefs about 
physical objects can, they could say, be rendered reasonable if 
we validly infer them from our knowledge about our mental states 
along with certain other propositions.
But didn’t Price show that this is impossible? Didn’t he 
prove that the law of universal causation, and the principle 
enshrined in the method of correspondence were not sufficient, 
along with propositions we know about our minds, to entail 
contingent propositions about physical objects? Yes, he did.
But it may be objected that thou^ Price believed the argument 
he described was the only one the causal theorist could use with 
any plausibility at all, he did not show that all the other 
possible suggestions that causal theorists might make about the 
justification of physical object propositions would be implausible. 
Russell and Lewis may then be able to describe for us a set of 
principles which are such that along with propositions we can 
know about our mental state they entail propositions about 
physical objects. If so, then they can at least claim that men 
can acquire knowledge about the world around them: provided, 
that is, a man is justified in holding the principles in question 
even though he can give no reasons for tiis holding them. For 
^This is not entirely fair to Russell - See Appendix p 2$6.
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even if these principles along with propositions about our 
mental state do entail physical object propositions, they will 
not be able to justify our believing in such physical object 
propositions as we do validly infer from them, if our only 
reason for holding that the principles are true is that they 
are supported by physical object propositions we already know 
to be true. The principles, then, must be self-supporting.
SECTION Russell and Lewis on the inference to physical 
object propositions.
tn "An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth" (1940) Russell makes it 
clear that he believes everyday judgments like "That is a dog", 
made when one is seeing a dog, are inferences. He introduces 
the notion of an "epistemological premiss" which is "(a) a 
logical premiss, (b) a psychological premiss, and (c) true 
as far as we can ascertain" (Penguin edition, p. 124). Amongst 
these epistemological premisses, which are the foundations of 
our empirical knowledge, are "basic propositions", which are 
beliefs caused in us by sensible occunences, and of such a 
form that no other basic proposition can contradict them (p.l^l). 
He elsewhere (p. 142) defines them as "those propositions about 
particular occurrences which, after a critical scrutiny, we 
still believe independently of any extraneous evidence in their 
favour". Statements like "There’s a dog" don’t survive critical 
scrutiny. Because it can look to us as if there’s a dog when 
there isn’t one (we could be seeing a film and not realizing 
this) we will, according to Russell, on such occasions "avoid
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such rash credulity as is involved in saying "there’s a dog".
We will say "there is a canoid patch of colour." (p. 14)). 
Beliefs like "There’s a dog"must be acquired by inference.
The basic beliefs concern our experiences, and it is from these 
that we must infer propositions about physical objects, if we 
want to know that they are true. Such is Russell’s view in this 
and his other works.
We have to go to "Human Knowledge" to discover the 
principles that, according to Russell, can, along with suitable 
basic propositions, entail physical object propositions. On 
p. 4)6 he writes: "Scientific inferences, if they are in 
general valid, must be so in virtue of some law or laws of 
nature, stating a synthetic property of the actual world, or 
several such properties. The truth of propositions asserting 
such properties cannot be made even probablie by any argument 
from experience, since such arguments, when they go beyond 
hitherto recorded experience, depend for their validity on 
the very principles in question." The sixth part of the book, 
entitled "Postulates of Scientific Inference", is an enquiry 
into "what those principles are, and in what sense, if any, we 
can be said to know them."
The result of the enquiry is the formulation of five 
postulates. These postulates are supposed to be inherent in 
many of the everyday arguments we use, but to be consciously 
employed by scientists. The first is the postulate of quasi­
permanence, which states: "Given any event A, it happens very 
frequently that, at any neighbouring time, there is at some 
neighbouring place an event very similar to A". The use of
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this postulate is said (p. 506) chiefly to be to replace the 
common sense notions of "thing" and "person", a "thing" being 
said by Russell totbe a series of events such as are mentioned in 
the postulate. The second postulate is as follows: "It is
frequently possible to form a series of events such that, from 
one or two members of the series, something can be inferred as 
to all the other members." This postulate, along with the first, 
is supposed by Russell to permit us to infer the existence of 
series of mutually interrelated events, which are his analogues 
to what normal people call "things". It also allows us to make 
the inference we do when we attribute "the multiplicity of our 
visual sensations in looking at the night sky to a multitude of 
stars as their causes." (p. 508). The third postulate, of 
spatio-temporal continuity, which is concerned to deny "action 
at a distance", states that when there is a causal connection 
between two events that are not contiguous, there must be inter­
mediate links in the causal chain such that each is contiguous 
to the next, or (alternatively) such that there is a process 
which is continuous in the mathematical sense.
The fourth postulate is the Structural Postulate, which is 
as follows: "When a number of structurally similar complex
events are ranged about a centre in regions not widely separated, 
it is usually the case that they all belong to causal lines 
having their origin in an event of the same structure at the 
centre." This postulate, Russell says, is concerned with 
certain circumstances in which inference to a probable causal 
connection is warranted, e.g. when a number of people hear the 
same sound, the source of the sound is the centre, the
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respective hearings of it are structurally similar complex 
events, and using the postulate we can know that the hearings 
have a common cause, the event which results in the sound being 
produced, (p. 511). The fifth postulate, of Analogy, states:
"Given two classes of events A and B, and given that, whenever 
both A and B can be observed, there is reason to believe A 
causes B, then, if in a given case A is observed, but there is 
no way of observing whether B occurs or not, it is probable 
that B occurs: and similarly if B is observed, but the presence 
or absence of A cannot be observed." This postulate is on the 
lines of the traditional inductive principle, (pp. 511-12).
Now with postulates such as these, plus propositions about 
our experiences, is it possible for us validly to infer other 
propositions about physical phenomena? If the postulates are to 
do their job, they should allow us to draw conclusions about the 
nature of the physical world. But how can they do this?
They contain no reference to physical phenomena, either the 
things in which common-sense believes or the entities which 
scientists describe. So the postulates, along with propositions 
which describe some mental state, cannot imply any propositions 
about physical phenomena. Indeed, there is some difficulty in 
understanding what Russell thinks he is doing. In the first and 
last chapters of Part VI of "Human Knowledge" he makes it sound 
as though the postulates are the basis of all human knowledge, 
not just scientific knowledge. But the very name of the postulates, 
"Postulates of Scientific Inference", suggests a narrower inter­
pretation of Russell’s purpose. The inferences that would be 
licensed by his principles are more like scientific statements
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than statements about the world of common-sense. But the position 
is complicated by the fact that Russell wishes to work with an 
ontology of events alone, and make no reference to things. (Or, 
at least, this seems to be his view on p. 506. On p. 507 a 
different view is expressed: "A "thing" is a series of such
events. It is because such series of events are common that 
"thing" is a practically convenient concept." Of what he says on 
p. 507 I think one can justifiably ask "Is a thing really a series 
of such events?" This seems an utterly implausible suggestion.) 
This being so, it is hard to see how he can relate what he 
does in this part of "Human Knowledge" to what is known either 
by scientists or ordinary men. For they do not, either group 
of them, confine themselves to an ontology of events. However, 
it is plain that Russell does not describe premisses which along 
with propositions about people’s experiences entail propositions 
about physical phenomena. Let us now see if Lewis fares any 
better.
In "An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation" (I946), Lewis 
distinguishes thee classes of empirical statements. First, there 
are "formulations of what is presently given in experience"
(p. 182). These are expressive statements. "The distinctive 
character of expressive language, or the expressive use of 
language, is that such language signifies appearances." (p. 179). 
Second, there are terminating judgments, and statements of them. 
"These represent some prediction of further possible experience 
. . . .  Terminating judgments are, in general, of the form "If 
A then E," or "S being given, if A then E", where "A" represents 
some mode of action taken to be possible, "E" some expected
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consequent in experience, and "S" the sensory cue". (p. I84).
Third, there are non-terminating judgments "which assert 
objective reality; some state of afMrs as actual. These are 
so named because, while there is nothing in the import of such 
objective statements which is intrinsically unverifiable, and 
hence nothing included in them which is not expressible by 
some terminating judgment, nevertheless no limited set of 
particular predictions of empirical eventualities can completely 
exhaust the significance of such an objective statement." (p. 1&). ). 
Lewis is thus to be classed as a phenomenalist.
He goes on to declare that the reason for distinguishing 
expressive statements from the other types is that without this 
distinction "it is almost impossible so to analyze empirical 
knowledge as to discover the grounds of it in experience, and the 
manner of its derivation from such grounds." (p. 185). Thus, to 
know that some non-terminating judgment is correct, we must 
derive it from some expressive statement(s). This is precisely 
Russell’s view. How does Lewis think the derivation is to be 
carried out? By what principles can we pass validly from 
expressive to non-terminating judgments?
Lewis does not deal with this question as clearly as might 
be desired, but his answer is not entirely obscure; on p. 256, 
discussing the justification of a belief in an objective statemait, 
he writes: "If in any instance a belief so arising be challenged, 
the only justification which can be offered for it is by way of 
some multiplicity of inductively corroborated real connections 
in experiencea If you move your eyes, things seen will be 
displaced in the field of vision - unless illusory. If you reach
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for what has certain recognizable but indescribable visual 
characters, you will feel it with your hand - if the apprehension 
is vericiical. It is by learning such real connections in 
experience that we establish the actuality of things seen; learn 
that real objects exist having certain properties signalized by 
certain visual and other data". I take him to be saying that 
we know that certain experiences are good signs of the presence 
of physical objects. This is certainly the import of the last 
sentence of the quotation. This knowledge, he says, is acquired 
by learning. We discover that when we have such-and-such an 
experience we are in the presence of such-and- such a physical 
object. But it is plain that, as an explanation of how, in 
general, we come to know of the presence of physical objects, 
this account is incoherent. For we can only learn that one 
thing is a sign of another if we have an independent way of 
establishing that the second thing is present. So we can only 
learn that an experience of a certain type is a sign of the 
presence of physical objects of a certain type if we have some 
other, prior, way, of knowing the physical objects are there.
It is true, as he says, that we can, when challenged about a 
statement that we have perceived a physical object, support 
our statement by referring to the fact that the object changed 
its place in our visual field when we moved our eyes, or was 
perceptibb by touch as well as sight. But we cannot use such 
justifications in all cases. We have to have some other source 
of justification for our beliefs in physical object propositions 
in the majority of cases; and being so justified, we can go on 
to establish inductively the generalisations of which Lewis
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speaks, which we may then use to justify other physical object 
beliefs we may be challenged about. I conclude, then, that 
Lewis does not give us a satisfactory explanation of how we 
can be justified in holding the hypotheticals that state that if 
one has an experience of a certain sort this is a good sign of 
the presence of a physical object of a certain sort. And so,
I conclude, Lewis has not succeeded in showing that we can 
validly infer the existence and nature of physical objects from 
propositions we know about our minds and some other propositions 
we are justified in holding - for he has not shown how we could 
be justified in holding the hypothetical propositions we must 
have if we are to make the inferences. Thus, Lewis* account of 
the inferential justification of our beliefs about physical  ^
phenomena succeeds no better than Russell’s.
SECTION 4« Conclusion
The accounts given by both Russell and Lewis of the inferential 
justification of our beliefs about physical phenomena were 
failures, Russell’s because his premisses did not permit valid 
inference to propositions about physical objects, Lewis’ 
because one set of his premisses was not satisfactorily justified. 
However, we can produce a theory similar to theirs which does not 
suffer from the (defects under which their theories labour. This 
theory would be identical to Lewis’, except that we would not 
argue that the justification we had for believing that the 
principles of the form "An experience of type A means a physical 
object of type B is around" was inductive; we would say that we
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were justified in holding such principles in the same way as 
we are justified in holding beliefs at a particular time about 
our mental states at that time - that is, in a way that does 
not involve the having of good reasons for the belief. We 
would say that a man could, and does, know such principles 
are true even though he cannot give reasons for holding them, 
and, indeed, even though he has no reasons for holding them.
This view would escape the criticism of incoherence that was 
made against Lewis.
But I do not think our new theory succeeds. My criticism
of it does not spring from the fact that it suggests that
there are propositions that a man knows for which he has no
reasons or evidence: it is plain that there must be some
knowledge of this type if there is to be any knowledge at all. 
Rather, my criticism is that this theory mislocates the propo­
sitions known without evidence amongst the body of our knowledge. 
Principles of the kind in question, I submit, could never be 
known by a man unless he had evidence in their favour. In this 
matter I am completely in agreement with Lewis: for he, as we
will remember, demanded that such principles should be inductively 
corroborated. However, I cannot think of any way of altering 
the principles which along with propositions about our minds 
entail physical object propositions so that whilst still enabling 
us to make these inferences validly they would now be such that 
we would be justified in believing them even thou^ we had no 
reasons for our belief.
So I conclude that just as the view that we arrived at 
most of our physical object beliefs by inference was shown to
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be false, so the view that these beliefs are in fact justifiable 
by inference has also been shown to be incorrect. The upshot 
of this is that any causal theory that involves either or 
both of these views is incorrect just to the extent that it 
does. But, as we have seen, most of the causal theorists, 
e.g. Broad, Chishdkn, and Grice, either openly reject or completely 
ignore both of these views. Russell alone embraces the 
justificatory inference theory.
—  62 —
CHAPTER THREE: SENSE-DATA AND THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION
SECTION 1• Introduction.
The majority of the causal theorists we have enumerated 
are committed to the view that there are sense-data, or 
percepts, or sensa (all these supposed phenomena being of a 
similar nature.) There are on the one hand the theories held 
at certain times by Broad and Russell that the objects of 
perception are always sense-data (otherwise known as sensa or 
percepts); and there are the other types of theory in which 
the perception of a physical object is said to be its causing 
someone to have a sense-datum or percept, as Smythies, Grice, 
and Russell (elsewhere in his writings)^ have suggested. On 
the other hand, there are causal theorists like Chisholm who 
will have no truck with sense-data and the like, as he thinks 
any reference to such phenomena leads to insuperable difficulties 
for the philsopher of perception. We must therefore discuss 
the questions whether there are sense-data, and if they are 
involved in the perception of physical objects. If they are 
found not to be so involved, or not even to exist, then the 
majority of the causal theories we have noted must be in error.
But these questions are not as easy to answer as they first 
may appear; and this is because we must distinguish the 
different views that philosophers may be committing themselves 
to when they declare that there are sense-data, or percepts, 
or sensa. One sense-datum theorist may differ enormously in 
his views from another. Most philosophers who criticize the 
sense-datum theory quite ignore this fact, and speak as though
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it was one clearly-defined view they were attacking. And, indeed, 
they may be attacking one view, but then it should be realized 
that there are sense-datum theorists who will not hold that 
view. So we must look carefully to see what the causal theorists 
who believe in sense-data are committing themselves to. Then we 
will be able to decide whether their theories are severally 
undermined by an adherence to sense-datum theory.
I shall, however, cast my net a little wider, and consider 
what some of the more distinguished sense-datum theorists 
(even if they were not causal theorists) have committed themselves 
to by their theories. I think this is a useful exercise as it 
helps to destroy the view that there is one monolithic sense- 
datum theory, a view which seems to underlie much writing on 
the subject. I shall divide the philosophers into two groups; 
those who introduce the notion of a sense-datum (or percept, or 
sensum) in a controversial way, and those who do not. A 
philosopher introduces one of these terms in a controversial 
way if it is a matter of dispute among philosophers whether 
there are any such phenomena as the ones the term is supposed to 
stand for. Thus if "sense-datum" is introduced as meaning "front 
side of a physical object" then this is uncontroversial. No 
philosophers will rush to dispute that there are front sides of 
objects. But if it is introduced as meaning "non-physical 
particular occurring whenever we perceive a physical object, 
such that the person who is conscious of it cannot be mistaken 
as to its characteristics" then this is a source of controversy; 
for philosophers differ as to whether there are any such things. 
However, it does not follow from the fact that the term in
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question is not introduced controversially that the sense- 
datum theory presented will not as a whole he controversial.
For the further description of the phenomena for which the 
uncontroversially introduced term stands may itself be a source 
of philosophical controversy, as would happen if I introduced 
"sense-datum" uncontroversially as "object of perception" and 
then went on to say that no sense-datum could exist apart from 
a perceiver. Indeed, as Don Locke rightly remarks ("Perception',' 
p. 21), both Moore and Price wished to introduce the term "sense- 
datum" in a fashion which could not give offence, and then to 
proceed to their more controversial statements in describing 
the nature of these sense-data. (Though it may be doubted, as 
I shall argue, whether they did introduce the term 
uncontroversially). So in the case of those who introduce 
whatever term they use in an uncontroversial way, I shall also 
describe their further characterization of it, so that it will 
be plain whether or not they are controversial at a first 
remove.
SECTION 2. Controversial methods of introducing the term 
"sense-datum" and its cognates.
Let us now consider some ways in which the term "sense-datum" 
and its cognates have been introduced. If we say that sense- 
data, percepts, or sensa that have been so introduced exist and 
are involved in perception, we will, I believe, be immediately 
involved in philosophical controversy. One of these ways is 
the one used in Broad’s "Object Theory" of sensible appearance. 
Broad analyses the notion of "sensible appearance" in terms of
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the expressions "direct awareness", "sensum" and "a peculiarly 
intimate relation", which later is declared to be a causal 
relation. He writes ("Scientific Thought" pp. 259-40); "When­
ever I truly judge that x appears to me to have the sensible 
quality q, what happens is that I am directly aware of a 
certain object y, which (a) really does have the quality q, 
and (b) stands in some peculiarly intimate relation, yet to be 
determined, to x . • .. Such objects as y I am going to call 
sensa". Broad does not explain what he means by "direct 
awareness", but presumably he means "perception" or what has 
been called "direct perception". Now it is plain that this 
leads him stiaLght into controversy; for it follows from what 
Broad says that whenever a man perceives something that looks 
different from what it is, he perceives, or directly perceives, 
another object as well, which has the quality the other thing 
seems to have. But this introduction of new entities is con­
sidered highly objectionable by many philosophers.
Another controversial way of introducing the notion is 
the one used by Price, when he uses the famous example about 
the tomato ("Perception", p. 5): "When I see a tomato there is
much I can doubt . . . .  One thing however I cannot doubt; that 
there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, 
standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and 
having a certain visual depth . . . .  Analogously, when I am in the 
situations called "touching something", "hearing it", "smelling 
it", etc., in each case there is something which at that time 
indubitably exists - a pressure, a noise, a smell . . . .  The 
thing present is a "sense-datum"." Now it seems that any
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philosopher could agree with Price, giving the following 
reasons, that there are sense-data: "When I see a tomato it
is true that on most occasions I cannot stop myself doubting 
the existence of something - a tomato. Normally, when we 
perceive physical objects, it is psychologically impossible 
for us to doubt that they exist." So it seems that any philosopher 
can accept that there are sense-data in Price’s sense, and say 
that they are physical objects. But then we may conclude that 
the notion has been introduced by Price in a non-controversial 
way. But I think what Price was really trying to get at 
was that even in those cases where, though I see a tomato, I 
may doubt that there is one there (e.g. if I was told that 
what was a real tomato was a fake), there is something 
there the existence of which I cannot doubt - a patch of a 
certain shape and colour, as he describes it. But I think this 
is philosophically controversial, to say that in every case of 
perception there is something of which the perceiver is aware, 
the existence of which he cannot doubt. For one who believed he 
was being hallucinated when he was in fact perceiving a tomato 
would not as a result of the experience he was undergoing be 
assured of the existence of any entity - or so it might be 
argued by philosophers. Only the philosopher who like Broad 
thinks that, when X that is ^ appears to A, A must be aware 
of a particular that is ^  , and that when it appears to A as 
though there is something that is A must be aware of a 
particular that is will subscribe to Price’s opinion that in 
every perceptual situation there is something the existence of 
which we cannot doubt. So I conclude that it is controversial
- 6 7 —
whether there are sense-data, in the sense Price introduces 
of the term "sense-datum".
We should also note Smythies’ method of bringing in the 
notion of a sense-datum. The basis of the various, 
definitions he gives is that of an after-sensation. "We can 
instruct anyone how to set about observing an after-sensation, 
and no-one is likely to confuse an after-sensation with a 
physical object", he says. ("Analysis of Perception", p. 6).
He then goes on to give an obscure definition of the term 
"sense-datum", using what seems to me to be an unnecessarily 
technical terminology, and one which he leaves unexplained.
He writes: "If (having obtained an after-sensation of a li^t
bulb) you can observe the following spatial relations of the 
after-sensation you will be able to use Defn. 1.1 which states:
’If the boundary J of the after-sensation (hereafter y) can be 
observed to describe a Jordan curve in the total field composed 
of X and y such that it divides the total field into one 
inside and one outside, then x is a sense-datum’." It is plain 
that Symthies is here suggesting that when one has an after­
sensation it is located in a field which contains a variety of 
other things. But this is controversial. Many philosophers 
will wish to deny that after-sensations form a field with any 
other things. They may be ready to say that it looks as 
thou^ one’s after-sensations are imposed on physical objects 
that one perceives, i.e. they seem to be in the same space, but 
they are not in fact so. So much for the controversial ways 
of introducing the term "sense-datum" and its cognates.
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SECTION 5. Non-controversial ways of introducing the term 
"sense-datum" and its cognates.
A definition of "sense-datum" which can be taken in an 
uncontroversial way is Russell’s in "The Problems of Philosophy", 
given on p. 12: "Let us give the name of sense-data to the
things that are immediately known in sensation: such things 
as colours, sounds, smells, roughnesses, and so on." If we 
interpret "immediately known in sensation" to mean "perceived", 
which is the natural interpretation, why should anyone wish to 
deny that there are things we perceive? And if Russell adds 
that sense-data must not only be perceived, but also be colours, 
sounds, and the like, why should anyone wish to deny that there 
are sounds and colours, and that we perceive them? If then this 
is what Russell means by "sense-data", who will take issue with 
him when he says that there are such phenomena?
Several philosophers have attempted to introduce the notion 
of a sense-datum by reference to the notion of appearing. Some 
of these attempts lead to a non-controversial theory about sense- 
data. For instance, Paul, in his article "Is There a Problem 
about Sense-Data?" (PAS 19)6-7), declares himself willing to 
accept the sense-datum terminology insofar as it is used as an 
alternative way of saying something we can already say in 
ordinary language, and provided its introduction serves some 
useful philosophical purpose. The manner of introduction that 
Paul seems to be supporting is that which is, for instance, 
practised by Ayer in "The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge".
On p. 58 Ayer says: "I have chosen . . .  to indicate its
(i.e. the term "sense-datum" ’s) usage by giving examples in
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which sentences referring to sense-data are introduced as 
translations of sentences the meaning of which is already 
known. The general rule which one may derive from these 
examples is that the propositions we ordinarily express by 
saying that a person A is perceiving a material thing M, which 
appears to him to have the quality x, may be expressed in the 
sense-datum terminology by saying that A is sensing a sense- 
datum S, which really has the quality x, and which belongs to 
M"« (Ayer shows no awareness of the variety of senses in which 
"appearing" expressions may be used.)
Grice also (in his article "The Causal Theory of Perception" 
in AS S'iipp. Vol. 1961) declares that the notion of the sense- 
datum can only be introduced by reference to some range of 
locutions of the form "It looks (sounds feels, etc.) to X as 
if . • .." Now if Paul and Grice gave us a set of rules for 
translation into the sense-datum terminology, and stated that 
the sense-datum statement corresponding to a statement of 
appearing according to their rules has its meaning wholly 
determined by the meaning of that statement of appearing, then 
I cannot see how any philosopher could object to the intro­
duction of the new terminology in that it resulted in false 
statements. For no philosopher is going to deny that some 
statements about the way things appear are true; and the sense- 
datum statements would be by definition equivalent in meaning 
to these. But, of course, it remains true that neither Paul 
nor Grice provides such rules; they are merely sketching a 
programme, which if fulfilled would provide a non-controversial 
introduction of the term "sense-datum". Again, neither provide
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any good reasons for introducing this terminology.
Ayer, on the other hand, thinks that the introduction of 
this terminology brings to li^t philosophical problems that 
might otherwise escape our notice, and suggests it souId be 
accomplished as described in the quotation above. In "The 
Foundations of Empirical Knowledge" and "The Problem of 
Knowledge" he attempts to silence criticism of the new terminolcgy 
by saying that the meaning of statements in it is wholly 
determined by the meaning of everyday language statements of 
which they are translations. Of his introduction of the term 
"seeming-x" (or "sense-datum"), he writes; "The transition 
from "it now seems to me that I see x" to "there is a seeming-x 
that I now see" may be defended on the ground that the second 
sentence is merely a reformulation of the first". ("Problem 
of Knowledge", Penguin ed. p. 109). But althou^ Ayer seems 
here to be introducing the notion in an uncontroversial way, 
he concludes that in accepting the terminology of sense-data 
we part with the naive realist who believes that physical 
objects are directly perceived. This is because the naive 
realist overlooks "the existence of the gap between what things 
seem to be, in our special sense of seeming, and what they 
really are." (p. 133). But then the existence of sense-data 
in Ayer’s sense must be controversial. But I think Ayer is 
wrong to connect the introduction of the sense-datum terminology 
with his parting company with the naive realist. For, as Ayer’s 
words show, the supposed error of the naive realist can be 
made clear without any reference to the sense-datum theory; it 
is that the naive realist fails to realize that the occurrence
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of a perceptual experience (its seeming to someone that something 
is the case) does not guarantee that there is something of the 
sort there seems to be. It is not the introduction of the 
sense-datum terminology that produces this dispute between 
Ayer and the naive r^ist, then.
Don Locke, in his recent book on perception, sets out 
deliberately to introduce the tern"sense-datum" in what he calls 
a theory-neutral way. There may be things called percepts, he 
says, which would be mind-dependent entities, existing only in 
so far as they are perceived. But sense-data, he says on p. 22 
on "Perception", are the immediate objects of perception.
They are "the theory-neutral equivalent of percepts . . .
The question at issue between the theories of perception is, 
in part, whether sense-data are percepts." Some difficulty 
arises, though, when Locke attempts to give an account of 
immediate perception, sense-data having been defined as the 
objects of immediate perception (p. 172f). He writes (p. 173)î 
"The crucial point about immediate perception is that it does 
not go beyond what is perceived at the particular moment. Or, 
as we might prefer to put it, sense datum statements, statements 
describing what we immediately perceive, do not refer to or 
describe or entail or imply anything about anything which is 
not being perceived, in its entirety, at that particular 
moment". He then specifies four ways in which sense-datum 
statements do not go beyond the perception of the particular 
moment. First, they imply nothing about the real existence or 
nature of what is perceived. Second, "immediate perception is 
such that our sense data include only what is perceived in its
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entirety at the time in question by the sense in question".
(pp. 174-5). So, Locke says, hearing a train cannot be 
immediate perception, nor can seeing a jug. For in the 
first case, the train is heard indirectly, by means of hearing 
its sound, and in the second the jug is not perceived in its 
entirety - only the outside surface, not every part of it, is 
seen. Third, immediate perception is restricted to the sense 
objects of the appropriate sense, e.g. sounds for hearing, 
odours for smelling. Finally, the report of what is 
immediately perceived describes the sense objects as they 
are perceived to be, not as they really are. "The sound I 
hear may, in itself, be loud and squealing but if, due to the 
cotton wool in my ears, it sounds soft and muffled to me then 
the correct sense-datum description of that sense object is 
"Soft and muffled", not "Loud and squealing." " (p. 177).
One difficulty is the way Locke moves from talking about 
the characteristics of "sense-datum statements" to talking about 
those of immediate perception. The first and last points he 
makes about immediate perception and sense-data are made in 
terms of the language of sense-data; the second and third 
make straight reference to the phenomena mentioned. This smacks 
of confusion, between the more normal sense-datum theory and 
the sort of theory held, say, by Paul and Grice. The former 
theory involves the assumption that there is a range of part­
iculars which are properly called "sense-data". The latter 
does not, only containing the assertion that there is a language 
which can properly be called "the sense-datum language". But 
this obscurity covers a more serious difficulty, which is the
- 73 -
following: it seems we would all be ready to admit the existence
of sense-data if these are said to be the objects proper to 
each sense, or the things perceived in their entirety at a 
particular moment. We all admit that there are sounds, and 
front surfaces of material things. But would we be willing to 
say that the loud ndsè we heard was really soft because we 
heard it. through plugged ears? Would we be willing to say that 
sense-data, as being the proper objects of the senses, possessed 
the qualities they seemed to possess to their perceiver? Surely 
not. We would say that it was an objective matter what 
qualities a sound had, so if sounds were sense-data their 
qualities could not always be what it seemed to their perceiver 
that they were. There appears, then, to be an inconsistency 
in Locke’s criteria, for sense-data. But it is plain that he 
tries to introduce the notion of a sense-datum uncontroversially, 
and that if he had merely defined sense-data as the proper 
objects of perception by each sense or as the things perceived 
in their entirety at some particular time he would have 
succeeded. But he says more, and thus gets into difficulty.
Bon Locke’s account of sense-data seems to leave him, then, 
in a middle position. But the other philosophers whose views 
I have described in this section do succeed in introducing the 
term "sense-datum" in an uncontroversial way. Of those who go 
on to further characterize the nature of sense-data, Russell 
and Ayer agree that they are particulars not to be found in 
the physical world, private to the person who has them, and 
dependent on him for their existence. So Russell and Ayer 
part company with the direct realist, just like those
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philosophers who used a controversial method of introducing the 
term '* sense-daturn", but they do so at a later stage in their 
argument•
SECTION 4• G.E.Moore and the introduction of the term "sense-datum".
I have left G.E.Moore's treatment of the topic until last, as his 
work on the subject is the most thorough and the most complex.
I believe he sometimes introduces the term "sense-datum" in a 
controversial way, sometimes in an uncontroversial fashion.
Anyway, he discussed sense-data and the problems relating to 
them in a series of articles spread over many years. In "Some 
Main Problems of Philosophy" (I9IO-II) he declares that when 
he sees an envelope, he sees a white patch. This he calls a 
sense-datum. There are things he calls sensations, which are 
experiences consisting, e.g. in the seeing of a colour (a 
sense-datum). The act directed upon the sense-datum in such 
cases he calls "direct apprehension". A similar view is 
expressed in "The Status of Sense-Data" (PAS 1915-14)» He 
there interprets the expression "I see X" as "I directly 
apprehend X and X is a patch of colour (or something of the 
sort)". X here is, in his terminology, a sensible or sense- 
datum. Now is there any reason why any philosopher should 
wish to deny that there are sense-data in this sense? For it 
is unlikely that anyone should wish to deny that we see patches 
of colour, hears sounds, etc., and on Moore's definition to see 
a patch of colour is to directly apprehend a sense-datum.
In "Some Judgments of Perception" (PAS I9I8-I9) Moore 
intjroduces the notion in a different way. He first mentions
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a class of judgments of perception, e.g. "This is an inkstand", 
judged when one is perceiving an inkstand. ®iere is one thing 
that seems to him to be very certain about such judgments. It 
is "that in all cases in which I make a judgment of this sort,
I have no difficulty whatever in picking out a thing, which is, 
quite plainly, in a sense in which nothing else is, the thing 
about which I am making my judgment, and yet though this thing 
is the- thing about which I am judging, I am, quite certainly, 
not, in general, judging with regard to it, that i^ is a thing 
of that kind for which the term, which seems to express the 
predicate of my judgment, is a name." He goes on to say: "The 
object of which I have spoken as the object, about which . . . 
such a judgment as this always is a judgment, is, of course, 
always an object which some philosophers would call a sensation, 
and others would call a sense-datum." A similar way of intro­
ducing "sense-datum" is also to be found in Moore's "Defence 
of Common Sense" (1925), There he repeats the contentions he 
has earlier made about sense-data and judgments of perception, 
he goes on to say (Philosophical Papers, p. 54): "In order to
point out to the reader what sort of things I mean by sense- 
data, I need only ask him to look at his own right hand. If 
he does so he will be able to pick out something . . .  with 
regard to which he will see that it is, at first sight, a 
natural view to take that the thing is identical, not, indeed, 
with his whole right hand, but with that part of its surface 
which he is actually seeing, but will also (on a little 
reflection) be able to see that it is doubtful whether it can be 
identical with the part of the surface of his hand in question."
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There can be little doubt that both these ways of intro­
ducing the notion are controversial: for if it is introduced
in the first way there will be many who will want to deny that 
it is certain that, e.g. when I make the perceptual judgment 
"This is an inkstand", we are not judging the thing we refer 
to by the "this" to be an inkstand; whilst if it is introduced 
in the second way, one who accepts that there are sense-data 
in this sense is committed to the view that it is doubtful 
that what one actually sees when one looks at one's hand is 
ever even its surface, let alone the hand itself. And this 
view is certainly controversial.
Moore's work contains differing views about what sense- 
data are, then, some controversial, some not. Summing up his 
own investigations himself (Philosophy of G.E.Moore : "A
Reply to Critics", p. 659) he says: "I think I have always
used and intended to use "sense-datum" in such a sense that the 
mere fact that an object is directly apprehended is a sufficient 
condition for saying that it is a sense-datum". And Moore 
explains "directly see", which is presumably the name of a 
species of direct apprehension, as the sense of "see" in which 
one can speak of seeing an after-image when one's eyes are 
shut, or in which Macbeth saw his dagger (ibid. pp. 629-50).
Is this method of introducing the term uncontroversial? I 
think many philosophers might take issue with it, on the grounds 
that it presupposes that after-images and hallucinatory daggers 
are separate entities on to which we direct our minds in 
perception. It may be said that though this is true of seeing 
real daggers or real pictures, in the case of hallucination and
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and afterimaging there are only objects that we are aware of 
in the sense of intentional objects. However, the objection 
to Moore might be put differently: the objector might agree
with Moore that there are sense-data, but deny what he takes 
for granted, that whenever we perceive a physical object we 
directly apprehend a sense-datum. For the objector might think 
that it was plain that there are, in a sense, hallucinatory 
objects and after-images, and so would not wish to deny that 
there were sense-data in the proposed sense.
This concludes our survey of the ways in which the term
"sense-datum" and its cognates have been introduced. From it
we can observe that many of these ways are quite uncontroversial,
and if the sense-datum theorist who has so introduced the term
becomes involved in controversy, this is because of the way
he further specifies the nature of sense-data. With regard to
the causal theorists who invoke sense-data, it is plain that all
of them but Grice either earlier or later become involved in
controversy. Broad and Smythies introduce their sensa and sense-
data in a controversial way; Russell does not, but he goes
on to attribute further characteristics to them that must lead
to dispute. These three philosophers are committed to the
view that perception involves the consciousness of particulars
that exist in space and time, but are not physical objects or
constituents of physical objects. These particulars are
supposed to exist in some mental realm quite divorced from the
common world of physical objects which we think we perceive.
Grice, on the other hand, in accepting that there are sense-data
and that perceiving a physical object involves having sense-data
only commits himself to the proposition that tiis perception
^This is a misleading account of Russell's views, which varied from time 
t) time - see Appendix p 257.
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cannot occur unless it seems to a man as though something or 
other is the case (in some sense of this expression), I àiall 
discuss Grice's view in a later chapter, where I shall advance 
a similar view to his, without resorting to the terminology 
of sense-data. For the rest of this chapter I shall consider 
whether any theory which involves the thesis that perception 
involves awareness of sense-dalA if these are such as Broad, 
Smythies, and Russell say they are, can be correct. This is 
the thesis which is usually discussed under the heading "Are 
there sense-data?" We, however, have seen that the assertion 
that there are sense-data is not unambiguous. The question 
we are going to ask using this form of words could be re­
expressed as "Are there non-physical particulars the awareness 
of which is involved in every case of perception?"
SECTION 5* Are sense-data the only objects of perception?
It will be remembered that the causal theories that involve 
reference to sense-data fall into two classes: the first sort
hold that the objects of perception axe always sense-data, 
and physical objects are the causes of these; the second that 
the perception of a physical object is its causing us to have 
a sense-datum. In this section I will discuss the first type 
of causal theory, which holds that the objects of perception are 
always sense-data, i.e., always non-physical particulars existing 
in space and time.
This view does not recommend itself to one naturally, and 
its supporters have not in recentUmes treated it as self- 
evident. They have agreed that it is only to be accepted if it
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can be supported by some strong arguments. And in the attempt 
to give this support they have brought forward arguments from 
the facts of illusion, hallucination, and the physical basis 
of perception. But these arguments do not, I believe, succeed 
in showing what they are supposed to. Let us consider them 
in order. First, the argument from illusion. This is the 
rather misleading title given to the argument from the fact 
that things may appear other than they are. The title arose 
because it was mistakenly supposed that it was proper in all 
such cases to say that the people to whom they appeared other 
then they were were suffering from an illusion. The sense- 
datum theorists used an argument of the following kind:
"This penny is round, but when seen under certain circumstances, 
it looks elliptical. At that time, what is seen is elliptical. 
But then what is seen cannot be the penny, because it is round.
So what is seen must be an object of another kind." But this 
argument is clearly invalid, as the conclusion contradicts 
one of the premisses. For starting from the assumption that 
when we see pennies, they sometimes look other than they are, 
it is argued that we do not in such cases see them at all.
If we remove the offending reference to seeing in the premiss, 
and argue "Sometimes pennies look to have characteristics they 
don't have, e.g. they may look elliptical, and in these cases 
we see something elliptical", the argument must still be rejected 
on logical grounds. For when a penny looks elliptical to some­
one in the sense here being used of the word "looks" it follows 
necessarily that the person in question sees it.
However, the argument may be re-stated as follows: "In
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the situation which we would normally describe as "The round 
penny's looking elliptical to me", what I perceive is something 
elliptical; but the penny is round, so that, in the situation 
mentioned, I cannot be seeing a penny." But what reason is 
there to say that in the situation usually described as 
"something's looking elliptical to me" I must be perceiving 
something elliptical? Surely this will only be the case if 
the thing that looks elliptical actually is elliptical? Take 
the case of the situation whbh. I would normally describe as a 
square tower's looking round to me. In this situation am I 
seeing something square or elliptical? Something square.
There might be a temptation among people who haven't learnt 
about perspectival distortion to believe that under such 
circumstances they were seeing something round, but this would 
just be a case of false belief, and one of which experience 
would cure them. Or, at least, I see no reason to suppose 
otherwise. The sense-datum theorist owes us an argument if he 
wants to persuade us of what seems so obviously false - that 
when X looks 0 to me, I must be seeing something that is 0, 
whether X is 0 or not. But the sense-datum theorist gives us 
no such argument. So I conclude that the argument from 
illusion fails.
The argument from hallucination is perhaps stronger. It 
is something like this; "In hallucination, e.g. when Macbeth 
sees the dagger, something is seen, but it is not a physical 
object. But his experience is indistinguishable, at least as 
far as he is concerned, from those of the type we would call 
"perceiving a real dagger". This is why those who are
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hallucinated are usually deceived into believing that they are 
in fact perceiving physical objects - there really are pink 
rats scampering across the floor, there really is someone 
whisperingio them, but just out of sight. But if one 
cannot thus distinguish seeing a hallucinatory object and 
what is usally called seeing a real thing, surely there is 
no difference between them, and even in those cases where we 
think we are perceiving a physical object we must be perceiving 
a non-physical entity, a sense-datum." I think this argument 
does not necessarily lead the sense-datum theorist into the 
unattractive position that there is no difference between 
the cases we usually describe as "being hallucinated" on the 
one hand, and "perceiving real physical objects" on the other.
For he can say that though the person having the experiences 
may not be able to distinguish them, there may be a difference: 
the sense-data involved in hallucination, he can say, in no 
way represent the world about the subject of the hallucination, 
whereas in the other case they in general do. Hallucinations 
and veridical experiences do not differ in a way which is 
obvious to the one experiencing them, only in their relation 
to physical objects, which are never perceived. However, 
even if the theorist can distinguish hallucination and perception 
in this way (and the distinction he draws may well break 
down upon further investigation), I think his argument is 
open to serious criticisms. First, there is his assumption 
that in the case of having a hallucination there is some 
object of which we are aware, as there is in cases of real 
perception. This object is supposed to be like a physical
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object in some ways, but more evanescent and lacking some of 
the essential properties of physical objects. But it seems 
to me that having a hallucination of a dagger is rather to 
be compared to searching for a dagger. The fact that I am 
searching for such-and-such a dagger does not imply that there 
is such-and-such a dagger, plainly. But this does not lead 
us to suppose that when a man is searching for a physical 
object that does not exist, the object of his search is really 
something else - an entity something like a physical object, 
but existing in some ethereal mental realm. Searching can 
have as its object something that does not exist. I suggest 
the same is true of hallucination. The objects of hallucinÈüon 
are non-existent, not things rather like physical objects 
only less substantial. Hallucination only has objects in 
the sense of intentional objects. Now if this is so, the 
theorist cannot go on to argue that what is perceived in those 
cases wecall "perceiving a physical object" is the sort of 
entity that is the object of hallucinatory experience. If 
this were something rather like a physical object, only less 
substantial, then we might be ready to suppose that the 
objects of normal perception were of this type. But we have 
no temptation to say that the things we normally perceive 
are merely intentional objects. We are likely to say: "If
the objects of hallucination are only intentional objects, 
there cannot be a parallel of the kind you suggest between 
hallucination and ordinary perception, for ordinary perception 
is of particulars which it is at least possible can exist 
even though unperceived." And the second point I want to
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make against the sense-datum theorist is that it is not the 
case, as he suggests, that all cases of hallucination are 
indistinguishable from cases of real perception by the person 
who is experiencing them. This is, of course, illustrated 
by the Macbeth case, where Macbeth is in doubt if there is 
really a dagger there. However, it may be said that Macbeth's 
doubt is produced by his inaMity to feel the dagger when he 
tries to grasp it, and also, perhaps, by his disbelief that 
daggers can float unsupported. Thus the doubt is not instilled 
in him by anything in the character of the visual experience 
he has, the hallucination of the dagger. A stronger point 
than this against the argument from hallucination is that even 
if it is allowed that the experiences involved in hallucination 
and perception are identical in some cases, it does not follow 
from this that perception is only of sense-data, even if we 
further allow that hallucination is the awareness of sense- 
data of some sort. All that the argument proves is that when 
one perceives physical objects one must also have an awareness 
of sense-data. For it may well be the case that experiences 
that are identical in themselves may or may hot be perceptual 
experiences according to the different ways in which they are 
produced, and that the object perceived is the thing that 
plays a special part in producing a perceptual experience. In 
this case the sense-datum theorist may only be able to argue 
that the perceptual experience is the awareness of a sense- 
datum, whilst the object of the perception as a whole is 
something different, a physical object. The argument from 
hallucination can only prove its point, then, if it is further
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shown that such an account of perception is incorrect. The 
argument in itself, even if it is correct in stating that the 
experience in perception is the awareness of a sense-datum, is 
not sufficient to show that perception cannot have a further 
object, which may be a physical object. But I do not think it 
is correct even in its view that the perceptual experience is 
the awareness of sense-data. For these are not involved in 
hallucinations, so we cannot argue from the experiental 
similarity between hallucinations and perceivings to the view 
that perceivings involve the awareness of sense-data.
The third argument, from the physical basis of perception, 
seems to be the weakest of the set. It is that, since the way 
things appear to us is a function of the characteristics of 
certain processes in the intervening media and our bodies, the 
nature of the objects of perception is dependent on the 
characteristics of these processes: but the nature of the
physical objects we suppose ourselves to perceive is certainly 
not thus dependent, so the objects of perception cannot be 
physical objects. This argument relies on a suppressed premiss, 
which when stated makes us realize that the argument cannot be 
fully stated without begging the question. The premiss is that 
when things appear to us to have certain characteristics, what 
is involved is their causing us to perceive sense-data having 
these characteristics. It is only on this supposition that 
the sense-datum theorist can plausibly suggest that the nature 
of the objects of perception is dependent on the nature of 
certain processes in the physical world.
So much for the three arguments: it is clear that they
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fail to prove their point. So I can see no reason to abandon 
the view that we very often perceive physical objects, and 
substitute the view that it is always sense-data that we perceive.
SECTION 6. Must the perception of a physical object involve 
awareness of a sense-datum?
A view which is not so immediately open to the charge of 
implausibility which I have made against the thesis that sense- 
data are the only objects of perception is the second one we 
mentioned as being held by causal theorists, that a man's 
perceiving a physical object is nothing other than its causing 
him to have or be aware of a sense-datum. Thie view is not 
open to the criticism that for no good reason it denies one 
of the most firmly held of our beliefs, the belief that we 
often perceive physical objects.
But very serious difficulties beset this view, also. Take 
the exposition that Broad gives of it in "Scientific Thought":
X's looking ^ to P is nothing more or less than P's being 
directly aware of a ^ sense-datum that stands in a causal 
relation to X. Or Smythies' view: P's perceiving X is P's
sensing a sense-datum that stands in a causal relation to X.
It is plain that it is a precondition of these theories being 
correct that some significance should attach to the words "be 
directly aware of" and "sense" which can be elucidated without 
reference to the notion of perceiving a physical object, and 
which is such that it is possible for a man to be able to be 
directly aware of, or sense, a sense-datum, this being supposed 
to be a non-physical particular existing in time and space. Bo
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the theorists succeed in doing this? They do not even try.
But can the job be done? It is up to us to enquire whether 
"sense" and "be directly aware of" can be given an appropriate 
significance.
One possibility is that these terms mean the same as 
"perceive" when it is used in the sentences "Macbeth perceived 
a dagger that wasn't there", "The drunkard may perceive pink 
rats", or "Milton perceived his 'late espoused Saint' in his 
dream." But this possibility is fraught with difficulties.
For it may be held that there is no difference in the sense 
of "perceive" in these examples from the sense in which it is 
normally used. Austin argues thus against Ayer in "Sense and 
Sensibilia" pp 87-102. And Bon Locke takes the same view in 
his recent book on perception (p 16): "It may be true", he
says, "in a way, to say that Macbeth didn't perceive a dagger, 
but this is not true in the way that philosophers take it to 
be true. They usually take it to mean that Macbeth wasn't 
perceiving, that he didn't see a dagger (or anything else), 
that he only thought he saw, or merely "saw" in some special 
square-quotes or Pickwickian sense of the verb, a dagger. 
Obviously Macbeth didn't see a dagger, at any rate not a real 
dagger, but he did see something, something which he described 
as a dagger."
But if this is correct, the causal theorist cannot say 
that perceiving a physical object is the same as being caused 
by it to sense, or be aware of, a sense-datum. For then he is 
saying that perceiving a physical object consists of being 
caused by it to perceive a sense-datum, and this perception of
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a sense-datum must consist, on his view of sensing and direct 
awareness tin the sense-datum's causing the perceiver to perceive 
yet another sense-datum, and so on ad infinitum. So the causal 
theorist, if he wishes to equate direct awareness or sensing 
with perception as involved in hallucination and dreaming, 
must argue that this sort of perception is different from that 
which occurs in normal cases of perceiving physical objects.
This seems to me to be the natural view to take of statements 
like "The drunkard perceives pink rats". What occurs in the 
drunkard's case can be called perception because of the 
similarities in it with what occurs when real objects are 
perceived. But here is the difficulty for the causal theorist: 
it is natural for us to suppose that originally the use of the 
perception words "see", "hear", "feel", etc., to describe 
hallucinatory and dream experiences was metaphorical, for these 
experiences are less frequent than, and parasitical upon, the 
perceivings of physical objects, but that the metaphor hardened 
into standard usage. However, the upshot of this plausible 
view about the way the perceptual words came to be applicable 
to hallucinatory and dream experiences is surely that the 
proper account of the sense of "perceive" in "Drunkards often 
perceive pink rats when ^unk" is "have experiences similar 
to those involved in the perception of pink rats", the word 
"perception" in its last occurence being used in its ordinary 
sense, the one in which I can now say I perceive a piece of 
paper, a pen, and my hand. So if the causal theorist takes this 
view of the meaning of "perceive" in those cases when it is 
used to describe hallucinatory experiences, he cannot make
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reference to it in his analysis of the normal sense of "perceive"• 
For the sense of "perceive" as found in its normal use must he 
understood before one can understand the sense the word is found 
in in those cases where it is employed to describe hallucinatory 
experiences.
However, it may be replied that what makes it reasonable to 
compare the experiences we have in hallucination and dreaming with 
those we have in the perception of physical objects is that in 
both sets of cases the mind is directly aware of some sensuous 
phenomena. This direct awareness, it may be suggested, is 
referred to by the word "have" when we are talking about 
hallucinations and dreams, and also mental images. So the 
suggestion we must now consider is that the terms "direct aware­
ness" and "sensing" are equivalent to "having", in the sense 
this expression is used in when we say a man has a hallucination 
of a dagger, or an after-image of a light bulb, or a dream image 
of a wonderful land. But my reply to this suggestion is that 
whilst sense-data are supposed to be particulars that exist in 
space and time, which can be logically distinguished from the 
mental acts that are directed upon them, it seems to me that 
the objects of "having" that we have mentioned are not like this. 
"I am having a hallucination of a dagger" does not, I suggest, 
imply that I am standing in a relationship - one of awareness - 
to an object which might exist apart from my awareness - a 
hallucinatory dagger. Rather, the expression conveys that I am 
in an unanalysable state of mind, so that the words "am having" 
do not stand for any mental phenomenon by themselves. The words 
"am having a hallucination of a dagger" are the full specification
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of the mental state I am in, and this state cannot be analysed 
into simpler components, to which components of the verbal 
expression could be supposed to refer. "I am having a hallucintion 
of a dagger" is thus to be compared with "I am white" rather than 
"I am eating a good meal". No more than "I am white" does it 
state that I am doing something to something, or am in some way 
related to something. If this is correct, then "be directly 
aware of" and "sense" cannot mean what "have" does in these 
cases, for the objects of sensing and direct awareness are 
supposed to be capable of existing apart from the acts of 
sensing and direct awareness, and the whole situation "I am 
sensing (am directly aware of) a sense-datum is supposed to 
admit of a relational or act/object analysis.
This being so, I cannot see any other notion that seems at 
all appropriate for the role of explicating the sense of these 
two terms, and am thus led to doubt whether any analysis of 
the perception of a physical object which involves reference to 
being directly aware of, or sensing, sense-data, can be correct. 
Moreoever, we have to face the well-known difficulties that the 
acceptance of sense-data brings, if we do introduce them. The 
world will be populated by an enormous number of entities the 
existence of which we do not recognize in our pre-philosophical 
innocence. They cannot be placed in the physical world, so they 
must exist in a mental realm, and then we are faced with the 
difficulty of describing how these mental phenomena are related 
to physical objects. Further, the nature of this mental realm 
must be highly complex. As sense-data are supposed to be 
extended in space, and to exist in time, the world in which they
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exist must have three dimensions of space and one of time.
How can these worlds be individuated, supposing each conscious 
person to have his own? It may be replied: "By reference to
the persons to whom they severally belong." But as the theorist 
must hold that it is possible for people to have qualitatively 
identical sense-data at the same time, and thus that several 
qualitatively identical private worlds can exist at the same 
time, the private worlds must themselves exist in a common 
space (or something analogous to it) if they are to be capable 
of individuation one from the other. Thus we arrive at the 
picture of a multi-dimensional universe of minds, each mind 
being causally related to a body in the physical world, as 
suggested by Smythies. Whether or not this suggestion about 
the nature and relations of mind and matter is coherent and 
comprehensible, it would seem that, for Occamite reasons, we 
should avoid it if possible.
But why should we accept the view that whenever we perceive 
physical objects we are aware of sense-data? The view that we 
perceive only sense-data was held to be prima facie implausible 
because it raji counter to our belief that there are times when 
we perceive physical objects, and so we demanded of the sense- 
datum theorist some good reasons for giving up our belief, and 
when he failed to give them, we felt that we could safely dis­
regard his view. Now, in the present case, the theorist does 
not deny that we ever perceive physical objects, but he seems 
to me to make an equally implausible suggestion, that whenever 
we are conscious of a physical object in perception, we are 
also conscious of something else, a non-physical particular
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that is private to us. We have seen that his position is 
rendered all the more difficult "by problems he encounters 
when he specifies the nature of this consciousness (as "direct 
awareness" or "sensing" or whatever) and by the complexity of 
the ontological picture which his views commit him to. What 
reason can the sense-datum theorist give us for accepting a 
position so far removed from ordinary beliefs and so beset by 
problems? He must have recourse to rather differently stated 
versions of the arguments from illusion, hallucination, and 
the causal basis of perception that we discussed before.
As to the argument from illusion, he will say: "Whenever 
the penny I perceive looks elliptical to me, I am directly 
aware of something that is elliptical, so the perception of 
the penny must involve the awareness of something else, a sense- 
datum; for the penny is round." But what reason is to be found 
here for holding the position that is recommended to us? The 
sense-datum theorist merely asserts something to be true that 
no normal person accepts. A man might believe that he was 
conscious of something elliptical when he was in fact seeing a 
round penny, if he was deceived by a perspectival trick, but 
when he was shown the penny from a normal angle, he would 
give up the view that he had been conscious of something 
elliptical. For what he believed was that he was seeing some­
thing elliptical, not that he was directly aware of it, if 
direct awareness is supposed to be something different from 
perceiving. Normal people don't believe that they are / 
always aware of some other phenomena whenever they perceive
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physical objects: the only consciousness of objects involved in 
perception is, they think, the perception itself, of the physical 
objects. In the case of the man tricked about the shape of the penny, 
he did not believe that he was conscious of two things, a penny, and 
something elliptical, the consciousness of the latter being involved 
in the (perceptual) consciousness of the penny.
I don't think the sense-datum theorist persuades us to accept 
his view by referring to the facts of what he calls illusion, then.
How does he fare with the re-stated argument from hallucination? The 
sense-datum theorist will argue: "When a man is hallucinated, he does 
not perceive the objects we say he perceives in the same sense of 
"perceive" as that in which we may be said normally to perceive physical
objects. But in hallucination a man is indeed aware of certain objects ,
not physical ones, but sense-data. How then could it come about that 
men confused hallucinatory and perceptual experiences unless a similar 
type of experience occurs in each case? So the perception of physical 
objects must at least involve the awareness of sense-data in order to 
produce the required experiential similarity, even though this perception 
may not be anything more than the awareness of sense-data." The object­
ion I make to this argument is the same as I made to its earlier counter­
part: that it seems doubtful to me that hallucination involves the
awareness of sense-data, if these are supposed to be particulars capable 
of independent existence. There is the further difficulty that I have 
already dealt with in this section, that of describing the nature of 
the supposed awareness. This we were unable to do in a plausible fashion.
Ttie third argument, from the physical basis of perception, can only 
be stated in a question-begging way, just like its counterpart. The 
theorist must say that the nature of the objects of direct awareness in 
perception depends on the state of the perceiver*s body, etc., so that
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these objects, sense-data, must be different from physical objects.
But this argument only has force if we assume that when we perceive a 
physical object that seems ^ , we must be directly aware of a sense- 
datum that is But this is what the argument sets out to prove, or, 
rather, it implies the truth of the desired conclusion of the argument 
all by itself.
I conclude that the sense-datum theorist cannot provide us with 
good reasons for rejecting our everyday belief that we are conscious 
in their perception only of physical objects, or for accepting his view 
that we are aware in a non-perceptual way of other phenomena, sense- 
data, in every case of perceiving a physical object.
SECTION 7» Conclusion
We have seen that one who is described as a sense-datum theorist may 
hold one of a variety of views, not all of which need be a subject of 
philosophical controversy. In Section 5 and 6 we considered whether 
causal theories which embodied a controversial sense-datum theory were 
for this reason rendered unacceptable. The controversial theory was that 
sense-data are non-physical particulars extended in space and existing in 
time.^ We saw that sense-data in this sense might be said to be involved 
in perception in either of two ways: there was the theory that sense-data 
were the sole objects of perception, and that physical objects were their 
causes; and the theory that to perceive a physical object was to be caused 
by it to have a sense-datum. Both these theories, the first held sometimes 
by Broad and Russell, the other held by Russell and Smythies, were found to 
be unacceptable because they involved a belief in the existence of sense- 
data, in the controversial sense I mentioned, and the supposition that the 
awareness of these was somehow involved in the perception of physical ob^ts.
 ^This is not a fair statement of Russell's position. See Appendix p 256.
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CHAPTER FOUR; THE THEORY THAT PERCEIVING A PHYSICAL OBJECT IS 
BEING CAUSED BY IT TO HAVE A SENSE-EXPERIENCE
SECTION 1• Introduction
We have in the last two chapters considered two sets of 
difficulties that beset at least some of the causal theories 
we enumerated in the first chapter. These difficulties related 
to the views held by some causal theorists that, on the one 
hand, perceptual consciousness should be inferential if it is 
to provide us with knowledge about the world, and, on the other, 
that perception is of, or involves the awareness of, non­
physical particulars that have been called sense-data or something 
of the sort. As a result of this consideration we have 
concluded that causal theories to which either of these views 
are integral cannot be upheld with plausibility. So we are 
left with the causal theories of the type held by Grice and 
Chisholm: for these theorists support neither of the above-
mentioned views. (We saw that Grice did, indeed, introduce 
sense-data into his theory, but the significance he gave to 
sense-datum statements rendered them philosophically innocuous 
and to all intents and purposes unobjectionable.) We must 
now discuss whether any theory of this type can be correct, 
and if we conclude that one of them must be, we will proceed 
to study the individual versions produced by Grice and 
Chisholm in more detail. I shall also take into account the 
theory of perception advanced by R. J. Hirst in his book 
"The Problems of Perception". Though he does not call it a 
a causal theory, it has much in common with the theories of
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Grice and Chisholm.
But what exactly do these theorists' views have in common?
How are we to characterize the common theory to which they 
subscribe? I suggest it can be characterized in the following 
way. First of all, they agree that if a man is to perceive an 
object at some particular time, he must be having an experience 
of a certain type at that time. Hirst speaks of it (rather oddly) 
as the perceiver's being subject to "a mode of active experience", 
by which he does not mean the sensing of a sense-datum, for in 
this latter supposed form of experience an act can be distinguished 
from an object upon which it is directed, whilst in Hirst's 
opinion no such distinction exists in the experience that must 
occur if perception is to take place. Such is Hirst's view, and 
Chisholm concurs, describing such an experience as "its appearing 
in such-and-such a fashion to someone", e.g. "its appearing redly 
to me." Grice calls the experience "the having of a sense-datum", 
but suggests that this expression means no more than standard 
locutions of the type "It seems to such-and-such a person as if 
such-and-such were the case", and so repudiates the more contro­
versial claims of sense-datum theorists.
I shall describe this view that these theorists share by 
saying that they make it a necessary condition of A's perceiving 
X at t that A should have a sense-experience at t. this I mean 
to suggest no more than that they agree on the necessity of some 
experience of a type peculiarly related to perception. This 
condition for perception that they advance seems to me to be 
uncontroversial and obviously correct: no-one denies that perception 
involves having experiences of a distinct sort at the time of the
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perception. What may be argued about is the nature of this 
experience: some have said it is the awareness of sense-data,
others the acquisition of beliefs about the world, others the 
sort of occurrence we describe as "its seeming as though some­
thing is the case to someone". I shall later give my own views 
about the nature of the experience involved in perceiving 
physical objects, but at present let us leave the matter 
undecided.
The second common element in the views of Grice, Chisholm, 
and Hirst, is that they bèlieve that A cannot perceive X at t 
unless X play some part in producing a sense-experience of A's 
at t. This is the nub of their theories. No-one will dispute 
that X cannot be perceived unless A has a sense-experience; 
what is controversial is the further demand that X play a part 
in producing this sense-experience of A's. How do they support 
their view that this is a logically necessary condition for 
perception? Hirst and Chisholm do not say: they seem to take 
it for granted, presumably because they believe that an acceptance 
of modern scientific doctrine on perception is incompatible with 
its rejection. Grice, however, and Martin, in his book 
"Religious Belief", advance arguments to support this view. We 
must now consider these, and more generally come to a decision 
whether we should hold, like the proponents of this brand of 
causal theory, that we cannot perceive a physical object at a 
time unless it helps to bring it about that we have a sense- 
experience at that time.
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SECTION 2• The thesis that to perceive a physical object is to 
be caused by it to have a sense-experience.
Let us consider this thesis about perception, that A cannot 
perceive X at t unless X helps to bring it about that A has a 
sense-experience at t. Does it accord with our everyday beliefs? 
And how does it fare when brought face to face with competing 
theories of perception? I shall take into account three other 
theories concerning the perception of a physical object. The 
first simply states that perception is an unanalysable relation 
between perceiver and perceived, its nature being sui generis.
The second is that perceiving a physical object is a matter of 
forming a certain judgment about it. The third is that one 
perceives a physical object when one has a sense-experience whidi 
represents it. (it is here understood that it is not part of 
B's representing C that C should have played a part in bringing 
B into existence.) It is plain that with regard to the first 
view, it must be wholly false if the version of the causal 
theory we are now discussing is correct. The two other theories 
can be combined with the causal theory, once it is admitted that 
they do not encapsulate the whole truth about perception, e.g., 
one might decide that A's perceiving X was a matter of X's 
causing A to have a sense-experience which represented X.
The first argument advanced in favour of the causal theory 
that I want to deal with is to be found in Grice's article 
"The Causal Theory of Perception" ( AS Supp. Vol. 1961 p 142). 
Here Grice describes a situation where it looks to a man as 
though there is a pillar of a certain type in a certain place; 
and there is indeed such a pillar in that place. But it is not
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seen. What is seen is another pillar of the same type, but in 
a different place, which is reflected in a mirror which stands 
between the first pillar and the perceiver. It is reflected 
so that it appears to be where the first pillar actually is.
Why do we say the first pillar is not seen, whereas the second 
is seen? Grice replies that it is because the second, but not 
the first, pillar plays a part in making it seem to the man 
as though there is a pillar before him, that is, in producing 
the sense-experience involved in the perception. The 
difficulty I find about this example is that opponents of the 
causal theory might well accept the conclusion that when a man 
perceives an object by reflection it must play a part in bringing 
about the sense-experience involved in the perception of the 
object. This is because those who do not think that it is in 
general a necessary condition of perceiving a physical object 
that it play a part in producing the sense-experience involved 
in its perception may think that this the case when it is a 
matter of hearing and smelling physical objects, and perhaps 
also of seeing them by reflection. For it seems natural to 
suppose that hearing a physical object is a matter of hearing 
(in another sense of "hear") a sound produced by the object.
In the same way, it might be argued that seeing an object by 
reflection is a matter of seeing a mirror-image produced by the 
object. Thus the philosophers who do not in general allow that 
perception involves causation may allow that it does in cases 
like this. To make his example safe from this possibility Grice 
would have to show that it is not reasonable to compare seeing 
an object by seeing its reflection with hearing an object by
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hearing its sound. This could be done by showing that sounds 
are real particulars produced by physical objects, but reflections 
are not. But until this is done, Grice*s argument is 
inconclusive.
Grice's other example is much stronger. He writes (p I42): 
"Suppose that it looks to X as if there is a clock on the shelf; 
what more is required for it to be true to say that X sees a 
clock on the shelf? There must, one might say, actually be a 
clock on the shelf which is in X*s Held of view . . . .  But 
this does not seem to be enough. For it is logically conceivable 
that there should be some method by which an expert could make 
it look to X as if there were a clock on the shelf when the 
shelf was empty; there might be some way in which X's cortex 
could be suitably stimulated, or some technique analogous to 
post-hypnotic suggestion. If such treatment were applied to X 
on an occasion when there actually was a clock on the shelf, 
and if X*s impressions were found to continue unchanged when 
the cbck was removed or its position altered, then I think we 
should be inclined to say that X did not see the clock which 
was before his eyes, just because we should regard the clock as 
playing no part in the origination of his impression." It will 
be noticed that Grice thinks that what I have described as a 
man's having a sense-experience is the same as its seeming to 
him that something is the case. Whether this is so, and in 
what sense of "seems", I will consider later in this thesis, as 
I said in Ch. Martin, in his book "Religious Belief",
advances a similar argument, but calls the having of a visual 
sense-impression "the having of a visual response". He writes
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(p 109); "Someone is sitting looking at a patch of light. An 
expert physiologist knows that if he inserts a very fine needle 
into a particular area of the person's brain that person will 
have a visual response exactly similar to his visual response 
to a patch of light. While the subject is still looking at 
the patch of light, the physiologist inserts the needle and at 
this moment the subject closes his eyes. The subject notices 
no difference, the visual reaction is the same as it was, and 
the patch of light is still before him on the wall. Does he 
still see the patch of light? Surely not, because now the 
existence and nature of the patch has nothing to do with his 
visual reaction. Indeed, it might as well be no longer before 
him."
I think these arguments (their content is virtually the same) 
are fatal to the judgment and representation theories of percgt- 
ion that I outlined - obviously so. For part of the strength 
of Grice's and Martin's arguments is that they make it clear 
that the experiences involved in perception and hallucination may 
have little or nothing about them to distinguish them apart. So 
what distinguishes hallucination from perception must be the 
absence of some other factor or factors, and it is plausible to 
say that this or these must relate to the way the experience 
is brought about. Now the theorist who declares that perceiving 
a physical object is making a judgment about it of some kind 
cannot deny that exactly the same judgment may be made by a 
hallucinated man - in the Grice example it might be "That's a 
big clock on the shelf I" Again, as the Grice and Martin 
examples show, a man's sense-experience may represent reality 
(as both their expert-beset subjects prove to us) and yet still
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be hallucinatory. It seems then that both these theories 
cannot stand in the form they are cast in, but need supplement­
ation if they are to be plausible. Take the theory that percept­
ion is judgment. If this is so, and, let us say, the perception
of a pen that I am now experiencing consists in my judging 
"There is a pen in front of me", or something of the kind, then 
by a like argument, if a blind man judges that there is a pen 
in front of him, he will be perceiving it, even if the only 
reason for his judgment is his having been told there is one in 
front of him. It seems that the judgment theorist must add 
some further conditions, over and above those relating to judg­
ment, to his account of perception. For whatever type of 
judgment he may offer as peculiar to perception, the same will 
be found to occur when no perception need be taking place. And 
it is plausible to suggest that the further conditions will 
contain reference to the way the perceived object brings about
the judgment that is involved in its perception. In the case
of the hallucinated man, the clock does not play a part in 
bringing about his judgment in the way it would in bringing it 
about if he saw it. The pen does not affect the blind man in 
the way it affects me; it is plausible to say this is why I 
perceive it, and he doesn't, given that we make the same 
judgment. As to the représentationalist, like Grice he may 
conclude that what separates the hallucinated man from the 
perceiver, when each has a sense-experience that represents an 
object as well as the other's, is that the object represented 
stands in some causal relation to the perceiver when it is 
perceived. For this is indeed the case in the example of the
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man who is subjected to the expert's attentions - his having the 
sense-experience he does is not due to the presence and nature 
of the clock on the shelf.
The point that is to be found in what both Grice and Martin 
say, that the experiences involved in hallucination and 
perception may be indistinguishable, is enough to undermine 
these two theories of perception, then, and to recommend their 
alteration into causal theories, each giving its own version 
of the nature of the sense-experience involved in perception - 
the having of a representation in one case, the making of a 
judgment in another. We shall consider these versions of the 
causal theory at a. later stage in this thesis. There remains 
for consideration the view that perception is an unanalysable 
notion. Now the theorist who holds this view must challenge 
the view implicit in what Grice and Martin say, that the 
experience in perception may not differ from that in hallucination. 
And, unlike the other two theorists who could scarecely fail to 
agree with Grice and Martin, the philosopher who holds that 
perception is an unanalysable relation between person and thing 
can advance a case against them which has some plausibility.
Unless he does. , his theory collapses; for he cannot deny that 
the Unanalysable relation he talks of must be identical with 
what we have called the experience involved in perception, since 
it is undeniable that whenever one perceives one has a sense- 
experience, and on his view there is no complexity in perception. 
So if at least one phenomenon occurs whenever we perceive, that 
phenomenon, he must agree, is the perceiving. The theorist 
should, then argue as follows; "The experiences men have in
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perception and in hallucination seem very similar to the persons 
who have them, and for this reason it is reasonable that we 
should, as we do, have a set of expressions that describe 
experiences of either kind without distinction - "it seems as 
though p", and cognate locutions, when employed in one of their 
senses. But the truth is that there are two very distinct 
kinds of mental phenomena here; there are perceptions, and 
there are hallucinatory experiences. These are in themselves 
quite different types of mental phenomena, though it is hard 
for one undergoing them to distinguish them." The theorist 
thus contends that perceptions, which are one sort of sense- 
experience, are quite different in nature from hallucinatory 
experiences, which are another sort. He does not, therefore, 
find himself forced into the position of seeking some other 
factor to distinguish perception from hallucination, as the 
judgment and representationalist theorists did. Though he 
may have to face some difficulties concerning the way we are 
supposed to distinguish perceptions from hallucinatory experienoss , 
if they are so similar.
But the theorist has now to meet Grice and Martin's main 
point. He has said that perception is an unanalysable relation 
between a person and a physical object. But they have argued 
that one cajinot perceive a physical object unless it plays a 
part in causing one to have a sense-experience. Their example 
is that of the man whose experience is produced by an expert's 
tinkering with his brain. Now it seems clear to me that in 
this case we deny that the man perceives a physical object, just 
because that object plays no part in the origination of his
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sense-experience. How can the theorist avoid drawing the 
conclusion that Grice and Martin do, that the existence of 
the causal relation is a logically necessary condition of 
perception? The only way I can see is if he argues that in 
the case in question we decide that the sense-experience 
the man is having is not a case of perception, i.e., that in 
this case the unanalysable relation of perception does not 
obtain between man and object, because the causal antecedents 
of the sense-experience do not involve the physical object in 
question (nor, indeed, any physical object in the required 
way.) For we know that, as a matter of fact, a man never 
stands in the unanalysable relation of perception to a physical 
object unless that object affects him in some way. That the 
object should affect the man is a causally necessary condition 
of his perceiving it, not a logically necessary one. Is this 
suggestion plausible? If the theorist is right, it is not 
logically impossible that the man in the examples does see 
the clock on the shelf or the patch of light. But this is false. 
It is not just a matter of fact that when we perceive objects, 
they cause us to have sense-experiences. It is not the case 
that situations such as Grice and Martin describe just don't 
happen to be cases of perception; we can see from the very 
description of them that they could not be such, whatever the 
facts of nature might be. The examples Grice and Martin provide 
persuade me that the fact that a physical object plays no , part 
in the origination of a sense-experience is not merely evidence, 
but rather a logically sufficient reason, for saying that any 
perception which the sense-experience is involved in is not a
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perception of that physical object.
So it seems to me that the view that perception is an 
unanalysable relation fails, because perception has been shown 
to be some sort of being caused to have a sense-experience. And 
if we cannot perceive unless the object of perception causes us 
to have a sense-experience, the views that perception is judgment 
or the having of representations (and nothing more) must be wrong, 
too. This has been shown to be the case by reference to examples 
in which, using our everyday terms of reference, we conclude that 
a physical object is not perceived because it plays no part in 
producing a sense-experience in some individual. We have seen, 
then, that there are good reasons for accepting the thesis 
about perception that I proposed for discussion, that A cannot 
perceive X at t unless X helps to bring it about that A has a 
sense-experience at t. But before accepting it as correct, we 
will have to be satisfied that certain criticisms that have 
been levelled against it do not succeed. I shall therefore 
proceed to examine these.
The first set is to be found in A.R. White's reply to Grice 
in the A.S.Symposium "The Causal Theory of Perception" 
(A.S.Supp.Vol. 1961). There White declares (p 159): "If we 
suppose that it is sometimes true that someone sees (or in any 
way perceives) a particular material object, X, e.g., the word 
"gaol", a snake, and also true that it looks to him as if there 
were a . . ., then . . .  there appear to be two possibilities. 
Either it looks to him as if there were an X (e.g., the word 
"gaol", a snake) or it looks to him as if there were something 
other than X (e.g., the word "goal", a stick.) According to
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Grice's version of the causal theory it follows that it is true 
in each of these cases that the existence of the material object 
X (e.g., the word "gaol", a snake) "causally accounts for" its 
looking to him as if there were a . . .. I argue against this 
that when someone sees an X and it looks to him as if there were 
an X, then the existence of X does furnish an explanation, though 
not of course a complete explanation, of its looking to him as 
if there were an X but does not furnish a causal explantion; 
and that when someone sees an X and it looks to him as if there 
were something other than an X, then this has a causal explamtLon, 
though it also is not a complete explanation, but that it is not 
furnished by the existence of X."
White deals first with the first-mentioned case. He writes: 
(pp 161-2): "I want to hold that the explanation of its looking 
to him as if there were, e.g. the word "gaol" (a snake, a bush)
when he sees e.g., the word "gaol" (a snake, a bush) is that he
sees what he sees in normal conditions and it is an analytically 
true statement that the word "gaol" (a snake, a bush) looks to 
normal persons in normal conditions as if it were e.g., the word 
"gaol" (a snake, a bush) . . . .  To say, as we may, that it 
looks as if it were the word "gaol" because it is the word "gaol" 
is not to say that the word "gaol" "causally accounts for" its 
looking like this, but is to explain it be reference to the 
above analytical truth."
White then deals with the other case. He writes (pp 163-4): 
"Suppose that someone is reading a passage in a book: he comes 
across the word "gaol", but it looks to him as if there were the
word "goal". What sort of causal explanations would we give of
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this? Well, we might say that the two words are rather similar, 
the printing is rather poor, that the right word in the passage 
would have been "goal", that the reader was in a hurry or 
inattentive or poor at English, or that for some reason he 
wanted or expected the word to be "goal". But surely we could 
not say that the cause of its looking to him as if there were 
the word "goal" was the presence or the existence of the word 
"gaol"."
White, then, argues that in neither of the possible types
of cases is it plausible to suggest that the perceived object
is mentioned in any correct causal explanation of the occurence 
of the sense-experience involved in its perception. But neither 
of his arguments seems to me to have any weight. Let us deal 
with the first argument first. It strikes one immediately that 
the explanation of its looking to a man as if there were the 
word "gaol" that he provides is, in fact, only applicable in a 
certain set of cases - those where the word "gaol" is perceived 
in normal conditions. So White has not shown how it is that 
the existence of an X furnishes an explanation of its looking 
to a man as if there were an X in every case where the man sees
an X and it looks to him as though there is an X. For he
ignores the fact that even in abnormal circumstances it can be 
true of a man both that he sees an X and that it looks to him
as though there is an X. (Unless it is part of his account of
A's seeing an X in normal conditions that it should look to A
as thou^ there is an X. But then his suggested explanation
would be no explanation at all. For it would then be of the 
form: "Why does it look to him as though there is an X?
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Because he sees an X under conditions one of which is that it 
looks to him as thou#i there is an X, and it is an analytically 
true statement that an X looks as if it were an X under conditions 
one of which is that it looks as if it were an X". But White 
surely cannot he falling into this error.)
But more significant criticisms can be advanced against 
White's argument. For, first of all, it does not seem to be true , 
let alone analytically true, that an X looks to normal people in 
normal conditions as if it were an X. (Unless we trivialize the 
statement by giving the sort of account of normal circumstances 
for perception that I mentioned above.) It may be true that an 
X usually looks like an X when perceived in normal conditions, 
but it does not always have to look so. White's own example of 
the word "gaol" can be used to show this. On p 119 of "The 
Philosophy of Perception", ed Warnock, (in the Oxford Readings 
in Philosophy series), a misprint occurs at the beginning of the 
second line. In reproducing White's article, the word "gaol" 
has been printed where the word "goal" is needed. (This misprint 
does not occur in the original, the A.S.Supplementary volume.)
At first when I read the passage I did not notice this error; 
it looked to me as thou^ the word "goal" was printed there. So 
I saw the word "gaol" but it looked to me as though "goal" was 
written,there. According to White, this could only occur if I 
saw "gaol" in conditions other than the normal. But it seems 
to me that there was nothing abnormal about the conditions of 
my seeing "gaol". It may be said that they were abnormal in 
that I was prepared to see the word "goal", and this accounted 
for >my misreading "gaol". But quite the reverse seems to be
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true. Whenever we read, our grasp of the context is an inescapable 
and natural determinant of the way what we see looks to us. This, 
that the misperception and misreading occurred in, and because cf, 
the presence of a certain expectation produced by the context, 
to the effect that the word "goal" was about to appear, does 
not mean that they occurred under abnormal conditions. What 
might be true is that the perception of words or things which 
occurred to a man who entertained expectations utterly unjustified 
by the context was perception in abnormal conditions. But it is 
clear that in the present case an expectation that the word 
"goal" was about to appear was eminently justified by the context.
The second criticism I would make of White's argument is 
that it runs glaringly against the facts. Who, apart from one 
wishing to hold a thesis at all costs, would wish to deny that 
one of the things responsible for its looking to A as though 
there is an X, in the circumstances of his seeing an X, was an 
X? If we trace back the causal processes leading to the sense- 
experience, will we not come to an X? Light-waves pass from the 
X to A's eyes, certain brain processes ensue . . . .  Who could 
deny this? But this is enough to show that White is wrong to say 
that the perceived object can play no part in bringing about the 
sense-experience involved in its perception.
White's second argument seems equally weak. He asks how we 
might explain its looking to someone as though there were the 
word "goal" when what he sees is the word "gaol". He suggests, 
(correctly, I believe) that we might point out that "goal" and 
"gaol" look alike, that the misread "gaol" was badly printed, or 
was a misprint for "goal". But, I wish to inquire, what
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relevance would these facts have to the explanation of the misperception 
unless it were supposed that the word "gaol" had played a part in bringing 
it about that it looked to the man as though there were the word "goal"?
If the word "gaol" had nothing to do with the production of the sense- 
experience, how could its similarity to "goal" or its being badly printed, 
or a misprint, bear upon the explanation of the misperception? It could 
not. So I conclude that White has not succeeded in showing that Grice 
is wrong, and that the existence of the perceived object cannot account 
for the occurrence of the sense-experience involved in its perception.
A second set of objections to the causal theory is to be found in 
Mrs J. Teichmann's article "Perception and Causation". (PAS I97O-I).
The first argument she advanced is this; "If we start trying to think of 
trees, chairs, the moon, etc., as causes of the perception of trees, 
chairs, the moon, etc., we at once come across a certain difficulty; 
namely, the fact that it is impossible to classify trees and chairs 
and so forth in terms of efficacy. One brick is just as good as another 
qua producer of perception; and whatever changes a certain 
brick might undergo, short of shrinking to the point of invisibility, 
or entering into a disembodied state, its capacity to produce 
perception does not vary . . . .  No-one could classify material 
objects in such a way that they were listed in order of degree of 
power to produce perception . . . .  Increase of light, changes 
in distance, all alter the appearance of an object, not its
efficacy. We can contrast this peculiar character of the 
supposed causal power of objects to produce perception with the 
real power a saucepan handle acquires, loses, and has in varying
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degrees, depending on its own state, and not merely on its 
relational properties, of producing burns. We do not regard 
the capacity to produce perception either as a common or as an 
uncommon property of material things; it is not analogous to 
"radioactive"; "magnetic"; "conducts electricity"; etc,"
(pp 25-6).
I have two criticisms to make of this argument. First, 
its conclusion, stated in the last sentence, is false. For 
it is clear that we do distinguish some things as having the 
power to make themselves perceived, from others which lack 
this power. What is it to say that something is luminous, 
noisy, smelly? It is to say that it can, to use Mrs. Teichmann's 
terminology, produce perception. Sources of light often 
illuminate themselves, e.g., the sun, a lamp bulb within the 
field of view. All material objects that can move themselves 
have the power of making themselves perceived - they can bump 
into one deliberately, and make one feel them. Other things, 
not capable of self-initiated movement, can make themselves 
felt by the heat they give out. The sun, a lighted candle, a 
restless cat or dog, a noisy car, each of these has "the power 
to produce perception" and this power it has "depending on its 
own state, not merely on its relational properties". Indeed, 
we may say that all material objects have the power of making 
themselves felt, given that the perceiver places a sensitive 
area of himself in contact with them.
My second criticism relates to Mrs. Teichmann's intention 
in advancing the argument. Given, as is true, that many 
physical objects do not possess the power of making themselves
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perceived (at least by all the senses), what follows from this 
that is relevant to the truth or falsity of the causal theory?
If her argument is that it follows from the fact thGb there is 
no such thing as a "power to produce perception" that it is 
impossible to think of trees, chairs, the moon, and so on, as 
"causes of the perception of" trees, chairs, the moon, and so 
on, then she plainly fails in her purpose. For it is not a 
fact that there is no such thing as a "power to produce 
perception". But perhaps her argument could be re-stated as 
follows: "It is admitted that those things that have a power
within themselves of making themselves perceived can be 
thought of as causes of their own perception. But we cannot 
so think of those things which lack this power. But if the 
Causal Theory is to be correct, this must be possible". However, 
this re-statement seems unacceptable, too. For we are quite 
willing to accept that 0 is the cause, or amongst the causes, 
of some event, E, even though C does not have within itself the 
power of bringing about such events as E. We may ask, for instance, 
what is the cause of puddles of water collecting in someone's 
back yard. A reasonable answer might be that there were uneven 
patches in the paving, or that there was a blockage in the drain 
that served the yard. But it is plain that neither the holes in 
the yard nor the blockage in the drain, though they might quite 
properly be cited as causes of the gathering of water in the 
yard, has within itself the power of producing this occurrence.
If water did not find its way into the yard, the puddles could 
not appear. In just the same way, if the sun was not shedding 
its light, I could not now see this paper. The paper would not
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illuminate itself. But this does not mean that the paper can 
play no part in bringing about the sense-experience involved 
in my now seeing it. Indeed, it is obvious that it does play 
its part. So I conclude that Mrs. Teichmann's first set of 
objections is unsuccessful.
Her second set is more interesting, and relates to the 
variety of things which we can properly be said to perceive.
She suggests that it is impossible to conceive of some of these 
as acting on a perceiver so as to produce (as I would put it) 
a sense-experience. My reply to these objections must be 
deferred to chapter 8. It will be advanced as a part of what 
I believe to be the most powerful sort of recommendation of 
the type of Causal Theory that I am now suggesting is correct: 
the specification of a theory of this type which contains a 
satisfactory account of the perception of every type of object 
which it can plausibly be expected to explain. For, as we will 
see, the thesis that A cannot perceive X at t unless X helps 
to bring it about that A has a sense-experience at t, thou^i 
correct, is not a complete account of the perception of a 
physical object. We must now consider whether any causal theory 
of this type so far advanced gives such an account. If not, I 
shall have to attempt to provide such an account myself.
SECTION 3• The Causal Theories of Hirst, Chisholm, and Grice.
We have seen that Grice, Hirst, and Chisholm have presented 
theories of perception that are on the right lines, correctly 
embodying the thesis that perceiving a physical object is 
being caused by it to have a sense-experience. But does any
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of them succeed in giving a full account of perception that will 
stand scrutiny? Hirst in his book "The Problems of Perception" 
does not in fact attempt to define perception, so it is unfair 
to criticise him for failing to describe conditions sufficient 
for a man's perceiving a physical object. We may gather from 
what he says that he thinks that there is involved in A's 
perceiving X X's causing A to have a type of sense-experience 
which he describes in some detail. Now it is plain that more 
than this is involved in perception. For as Price pointed out 
many years ago ("Perception", p 70), every perceptual experience 
has many physical objects involved in its causation. In the 
case of seeing a table the light rays, the electric li^t 
(presuming the table is seen by such a light), the wires 
conveying the current to the light, the dynamo that generates 
it all play some rôle in the production of the perceptual 
experience. So it seems some further conditions must be added 
to the one that the perceived object cause the perceiver to have 
a sense-experience.
We find this is done by Chisholm, in his book "Perceiving". 
He defines "seeing", "hearing", etc., separately, and has no 
fear of employing technical terms in his definition. The 
definition he gives of "perceive" is as follows (p 149): *’ "S 
perceives x" means: x appears in some way to S". On p I48 he 
has defined "x appears . . .  to S" as meaning: "(i) as a 
consequence of x being a proper stimulus of S, S senses . . .; 
and (ii) in sensing . . ., S senses in a way that is functionally 
dependent on the stimulus energy produced in S by x." A proper 
stimulus is defined as a stimulus of one of five types, proper
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visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, and touch stimuli. A 
proper visual stimulus, for example, is defined (p I44) as follows; 
"We may say that x is a proper visual stimulus for S provided 
(i) that light transmitted from x stimulates a visual receptor 
of S and (ii) that this light, after being transmitted from x 
and before reaching the visual receptors of S, is not reflected." 
Chisholm does not define "visual receptor" but it clearly means 
"eye". Chisholm thus employs technical terminology of a sort 
about which everyday folk might well be ignorant. Grice 
criticises this type of method of defining perception\dth the 
following remarks (AS Supp. Vol. I96I p 143); "If we are 
attempting to characterize the ordinary notion of perceiving, 
we should not explicitly introduce material of which someone 
who is perfectly capable of employing the ordinary notion 
might well be ignorant." I take Grice to be saying, not that 
an everyday concept A cannot be correctly analysed in terms of 
concept B unless the ordinary man if asked to analyse it would 
so analyse it, but rather than an everyday concept A cannot be 
correctly analysed in terms of another, B, if normal people who 
have A may not have the concept B. We may not be able correctly 
to analyse concepts that we possess, and possess beyond a 
shadow of a doubt; any philosopher knows that from his own 
experience. On the other hand, if a man may not have a concept 
B, it is utterly implausible for me to bring B into my analysis 
of a concept A, which he certainly has. I am in full agreement 
with Grice about this. As a result, I find Chisholm's analysis 
of perception quite unacceptable. For it is plain that a man 
without the concept of a light-wave or a sound-wave or of stimulus
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energy could still know what perception was. Indeed, these 
scientific concepts have been developed in recent times, but 
we do not wish to assert that the many references to seeing and 
hearing, etc., in earlier literature are not really references 
to these phenomena at all. It is also clear that Chisholm's 
account is objectionable on other grounds, e.g., that it implies 
that what we call seeing things by reflection (e.g. in mirrors) 
is not seeing at all. For he demands, if S is to perceive x 
by sight, that the light transmitted from x should not be 
reflected whilst on its way to stimulate S's visual receptors.
How then does Grice attempt to describe the conditions 
sufficient for A's perceiving X? He writes (pp 143-4): "I
suggest that the best procedure for the Causal Theorist is to 
indicate the mode of causal connexion by examples; to say that, 
for an object to be perceived by X, it is sufficient that it 
should be causally involved in the generation of some sense- 
impression by X in the kind of way in which, for example, when 
I look at my hand in a good light, my hand is responsible for 
its looking to me as if there were a hand before me, or in 
which . . . (and so on), whatever that kind of way may be ; and 
to be enlightened on that question one must have recourse to 
the specialist. I see nothing absurd in the idea ihat a non­
specialist concept should contain, so to speak, a blank space to 
be filled in by the specialist . . .  We do not, of course, 
ordinarily need the specialist's contribution; for we may be in 
a position to say that the same kind of mechanism is involved in 
a plurality of cases without being in a position to say what 
that mechanism is." Grice's view of the perception of a physical
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object is that it is that object's causing a person to have a 
sense-experience in the kind of way in which some specified objects 
severally cause people to have sense-experiences in specified 
circumstances. As Grice points out, a detailed account of the 
kind of way this is could only be given by a specialist, but all 
that the ordinary man is required to do when he ascribes perception 
to a person is that he should decide that what is happening in 
the case before him is relevantly similar to what happens in 
standard cases.
I don't wish to disagree with Grice's contention that we 
can know that the same mechanism is involved in a plurality of 
cases without being in a position to say what the mechanism is.
One might quibble with the way Grice, in describing his paradigm 
case of perception, of his hand in a good light, assumes that ore 
who looks at his hand in a good light cannot fail to see it; it 
might be that by the e:&cts of post-hypnotic suggestion or some 
complex or other a man might fail to see his own hand even thou^ 
he looked at it; again, it is assumed that there is only one 
way in which my hand, when I look at it in a good light, is 
responsible for my having a sense-impression of a hand. This 
might not be so. However, I take it that Grice is trying to 
describe an ostensive definition of the mode of causation. He 
imagines someone saying: "You want to know what perception is?
Well, it's what occurs when a physical object causes one to 
have a sense-experience in the way that my hand is now causing 
me to have a sense-experience of a hand". (This being said 
whilst the man holds up his hand and stares at it). If this is 
what Grice is saying, then I think there is much truth in his
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words. He is only attempting to describe conditions sufficient 
for perception: he thinks we should mention a set of paradigm 
cases of modes of causation, such that if an object thus causes 
a man to have a sense-experience, the man will perceive the 
object. It is not necessary, as he makes plain, that an object 
should produce a sense-experience, in any of the particular 
ways mentioned in order that it would be perceived. Or I take 
it that this is what he is saying. If he means to suggest that 
the modes of causation proper to perception are strictly 
limitable - for instance, to the ways in which toe things we 
see, hear, smell, taste, and feel produce the sense-experiences 
they do, at this particular time, things being as they are, 
then I cannot agree with him. He would still be right, of 
course, in saying that the sense-experience does not have to be 
produced in any single one of these fashions to the exclusion 
of the others if perception is to take place, but he would be 
wrong in supposing that in order to be perceived a physical object 
must produce a sense-experience in a person in one - any one - 
of the ways in which these sense-experiences are now produced in 
us when we perceive. For it is plain enough to me that the 
physical processes involved in seeing could alter quite 
considerably, and yet we would not wish to say that seeing 
occurred no more. Or if we found a set of people, recognizably 
human, whose eyes, we discovered, performed no function, but 
whose foreheads were sensitized to light-rays so that they had 
the same sort of sense-experiences as we have in vision, would 
we not say that these people enjoyed the power of sight?
Hut I don't think Grice holds this view, that one perceives
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a physical object only if it produces a sense-experience in one 
by some one of the ways in which physical objects produce 
sense-experiences in people at present when they perceive.
Rather, his view is that the list of paradigm cases is open- 
ended. I think he is wise to hold the latter view; but I think 
that either view holds the seeds of its own destruction. For, 
it may be asked, why, amongst the ways in which objects produce 
sense-experiences, should a few (the way in which my hand 
produces a visual sense-experience when I look at it, the way 
in whbh it produces an auditory sense-experience when I strike 
it on my other hand, etc.) be singled out and classed together 
as the ways proper to perception? And if we are prepared to 
extend the list of modes, as I suggest we are, what is the 
rationale of the extension? Surely there must be a rationale.
I conclude that Grice describes a way of advancing sufficient 
conditions for perception, but that by failing to grasp tiie 
rationale by which we decide whether a certain mode of causation 
of sense-experiences is proper to perception, he renders himself 
unable to give a general account of perception. I shall try to 
give an account of the conditions jointly sufficient and separately 
necessary for the perception of a physical object, in general 
terms, without reference to the particular ways in which our 
sense-experiences are now produced in perception. Thus, I shall 
neither specify these in the manner that Chisholm does nor state 
that ostensive definition is of necessity involved when we try 
to give an account of perception.
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SECTION 4» Conclusions.
My conclusions in this chapter are twofold. First, that one 
version of the causal theory of perception is correct, the one 
embraced by Grice, Chisholm, and Hirst, to the effect that A 
cannot perceive X at t unless X helps to bring it about that 
A has a sense-experience at t. (it is understood that the 
having of a sense-experience is not to be construed as the 
having of a sense-datum, at least not in the context of those 
sense-datum theories criticised in Chapter 3») Second, we 
have seen that neither Hirst nor Chisholm nor Grice gives a 
satisfactory account of the perception of a physical object. 
Hirst does not really try; Chisholm resorts to technical 
terminology; Grice describes sufficient conditions, but 
renounces any attempt to give his account the generality 
which it cries out for. I will now attempt to give a 
satisfactory causal account of perception, and to do this will 
range widely in my discussion, though in the end I will return 
to a position close to Grice's.
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CHAPTER FIVE: TEE NATURE OF HAVING A SENSE-EXPERIENCE,
PART ONE; IS IT HAVING A HELIEF?
SECTION 1. Introduction.
In the last chapter we concluded that it was a necessary condition 
of A's perceiving X at t that X played a part in bringing it 
about that A had a sense-experience at t. As we had seen that 
one version of The Causal Theory was based on this assertion, we 
concluded that some causal theory of this type must be correct.
But when we considered those that had been advanced, we found 
that none of them gave a satifactory account of the perception 
of a physical object, though Grice's views seemed to contain a 
great deal of truth. So we decided to attempt to formulate an 
account of perception containing the condition we found to be 
necessary, but proof against objections of the sort which arose 
against the theories of Hirst, Chisholm, and Grice.
I suppose that this enterprise should begin with an attempt 
to clarify the nature of having a sense-experience. The account 
we have given of this phenomenon has up till now been deliberately 
thin. This was because we found there was general agreement 
amongst philosophers that there was a sort of experience peculiar 
to perception, and without the occurrence of which perception 
could not take place. (But we decided tkiere was more to percept­
ion than simply having this experience - in Chapter 4» section 2.) 
There was disagreement, however, as to the nature of this 
experience. So, in order that we might consider whether this 
experience, whatever it was, had to be produced in a certain
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way if a certain object was to be perceived, and in order that 
we might do this without prejudicing our answer by becoming 
involved in controversy about the nature of the experience, 
we restricted our description of it to the expression "the 
having of a sense-experience", this meaning no more than "the 
having of the peculiar sort of experience without which 
perception cannot take place." But clearly if we wish to give 
a proper account of perception, we must specify the nature of 
having a sense-experience in other terms. The problem that 
faces us, then, is to specify the nature of the experience which 
A must have if he is to perceive X. We should also enquire 
whether X's playing a part in bringing it about that A has such 
an experience suffices for A's perceiving X. If so, our search 
for an account of perception will cease with our giving an 
account of the having of a sense-experience. If not, it will 
continue even though we establish the nature of the experiential 
element in perception. The first suggestion I want to consider 
is that having a sense-experience is having a belief of some kind, 
or, perhaps, having a tendency to acquire a belief of some kind. 
This will be the subject of this chapter.
SECTION 2. Perception as being caused to acquire a belief or 
tendency to believe.
In the last chapter we briefly considered the view that percept­
ion is nothing more than judgment, and suggested that it was more 
plausible if reformukted as the theory that perception is being 
caused by the perceived object to make a judgment of some kind.
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This theory holds that to have a sense-experience is to make a 
judgment of some kind, then. One who seems to have progressed 
from the less attractive to the more attractive of these positions 
is Professor D, M. Armstrong, who in his book "Perception and 
the Physical World", and more recently "A Materialist Theory of 
the Mind" has argued that perception is a matter of acquiring 
beMeCs. Only in his latest book does he clearly step forward 
as a causal theorist, a tendency which, is, however, to be found 
in his earlier book on perception.
Armstrong's most recent discussion is in Ohs. 10-11 of 
"A Materialist Theory of the Mind". I shall be concerned with 
what he says in Ch. 10 where he argues (to use his own words)
"that an account of perception can be given in terms of the 
acquiring of beliefs about the physical world". (Hoc. cit. p 208) 
In Ch. 11 he goes on to argue that these acquisitions can be 
analysed as "states of the person apt for the production of 
certain physical behaviour, or states apt for being brought about 
by certain physical objects or situations." But the analysis 
Armstrong gives of belief and its acquisition might well be wrong 
whilst his contentions about its relation to perception were 
correct. So I shall ignore Ch. 11.
Armstrong begins by saying that perception is the acquiring 
of true or false beliefs about the current state of our body and 
environment. He points out (p 214) that this account meets the 
objection that perception cannot be belief, for perception is an 
event whilst belief is dispositional. For the acquisition of a 
belief is an event. But then he faces a more serious objection 
(p 216): "There are cases where perception occurs, but there is
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no acquiring of true or false beliefs". The examples he gives 
are of two types - "perception without belief" and "perception 
without acquiring of belief", (in the title he gives to the 
second type, stress should fall on the word "acquiring" to bring 
out Armstrong's meaning, as will become clear. But his choice 
of titles strikes me as unfortunate and confusing.) The first 
type of case includes those occasions when we perceive something, 
but acquire no beliefs about it, and this failure to acquire 
beliefs is not due to the fact that the only beliefs that we 
might have been led to acquire in the situation were ones we 
already had. The cases of perception without acquiring of 
belief, as he calls them, are of the following type: "if I am
looking at a red book, I may know with perfect certainty that 
it will continue to be red in the next instant. So when my eyes 
still rest upon the book during that instant, I cannot be said tD 
acquire the true belief that it is now red, because I already 
knew it would be red during that instant." ( p 216).
The upshot of Armstrong's consideration of such cases is 
that he amends his account so that perception is said to be the 
acquisition of an inclination to believe things about the current 
state of our body and environment, or the acquisition of potential 
beliefs of this kind. He points out (p 221) that "if a thing 
looks to be a certain way, although we know on independent grounds 
that it cannot actually be that way, we may still half-believe, or 
be inclined to believe, that it is as it looks." But then, as 
when one sees oneself in a mirror, perception can occur without 
even the inclination to believe (that there is a person in front 
of one) arising in one, Armstrong declares. But what happens
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here, Armstrong suggests is that "an event still occurs in our 
mind, an event which can be described as one that would be the 
acquiring of a belief but for the existence of other, contrary, 
beliefs that we already hold. The event might perhaps be 
called the acquiring of a potential belief. We come to be in 
a certain state which would be a belief state but for the 
inhibiting effect of other, contrary, beliefs", (p 225). And 
in the cases of perception without acquiring of belief, 
something similar occurs: a potential belief is acquired, but 
here the event is one that would have been the acquiring of 
belief if belief had not already been acquired", (p 224).
Armstrong concludes his account of perceiving a physical 
object by distinguishing perceiving that p from perceiving x.
To say that A perceives x is, according to Armstrong, to say 
that information or misinformation about x: is acquired, but 
not to specify this input further (p 228), Moreoever, he 
declares: "If A is said to perceive an x, then it is entailed
that X (sic ) is the cause of A*s perceptions, whatever these 
are", (p 229) But having gone so far, Armstrong abruptly declaies 
"What must be added to the causal condition to give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for saying we perceive an X? I do not know 
the answer, A further condition seems to be that there must be 
some resemblance, even if slight, between the perceptions and 
the object said to be perceived", (p 250) I take it that by this 
Armstrong means that we must acquire a belief or potential belief 
that there is something with certain characteristics, and the 
object perceived must have at least some of these characteristics.
So Armstrong's picture of A's perceiving X seems rou^ly to
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be as follows; "A's perceiving X is a matter of X's causing 
A to acquire a belief or potential belief that there currently 
exists an object with certain characteristics; and X exists, 
and has a fair number of those characteristics." We must take 
into account the fact that he does not claim that it is the 
full picture. Now before asking whether Armstrong has correctly 
described the experiential element in perception that is 
indubitably there, and which we have called the having of a 
sense-experience, we should note not only what Armstrong admits, 
that his account does not provide conditions sufficient for 
perception, but also that however we specify the conditions 
relating to the nature of the beliefs which he considers 
essential if perception is to occur, these conditions along 
with the condition that X must affect A so that A has beliefs of 
this type will not together ential that A perceives X. The 
reason is plain. Imagine I had not seen this page, but you had 
and you described it to me, and I believed you, I would then be 
acquiring beliefs, which might be very exact, about the page, 
and the page would have played a part in bringing this about.
For if it had not acted on you when you saw it, you could not 
have described it to me. And I believe that however the content 
of the supposed beliefs is specified, we will be able to find 
counterexamples of this sort.
Let us now turn to the question whether the having of a 
sense-experience is the acquisition of beliefs or potential 
beliefs. The suggestion that such acquisitions are the whole of 
the experiential element in perception seems to me to be obviously 
false. For must there not be another type of mental phenomenon, 
quite other than belief, which must occur in my history at the 
time when I perceive something? This element has been referred
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to in various ways - direct awareness, sensing _ of a sense- 
datum, sensing in a certain way, sensory awareness - by different 
philosophers, but most have agreed that it must be there. I 
shall mysàf attempt to give an acceptable - and readily compre­
hensible - description of this element in the next chapter. I 
think most of those who have believed that one cannot perceive 
a physical object unless one makes a judgment or acquires a 
belief have agreed that there is a further experiential element 
in every case of perception. What I shall now do is to consider 
this view: that the experiential element in perception which we 
have called the having of a sense-experience is a complex 
phenomenon, which is in part the acquisition of some belief. I 
shall do this by asking whether the perception of a physical 
object can occur without the acquisition of some belief.
SECTION 5. Is there a necessary connection between perception 
and belief?
There is considerable plausibility in the suggestion that a man 
cannot perceive a physical object at a particular time unless 
he acquires some belief, or has some belief reinforced,at that 
time. Several significant modern philosophers have advanced 
this view. A classic theory of this form is that of Thomas 
Reid. In the second of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers 
of Man, the fifth chapter (of the Essay "Concerning the powers 
we have by means of our external senses") is devoted to his views 
on perception.
He says there: "If, therefore, we attend to that act of
our mind which we call the perception of an external object of
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sense, we shall find in it these three things: - First, Some 
conception or notion of the object perceived; Second, A 
strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present 
existence; and, Third, That this conviction and belief are 
immediate, and not the effect of reasoning." It might be 
doubted whether Reid meant the same by the word "perception" 
as we do, i.e., the genus of which seeing, hearing, etc., are 
the species. Perhaps by "perception" Reid meant something like 
what Price suggests he does, i.e., what Price himself calls 
"perceptual consciousness", which Price rather obscurely 
describes as a non-sensuous bringing before the mind of the 
subjects of subsequently acquired beliefs, the being under the 
impression that something is the case. ("Perception", pp 21-5, 
140). But I think Price must be wrong, and by "perception"
Reid does mean the genus of seeing, hearing, etc. For after 
the passage quoted above, Reid continues: "It is impossible
to perceive an object without having some notion or conception 
of that which we perceive . . . .  ¥e have commonly a more clear 
and steady notion of the object while we perceive it, than we 
have from memory or imagination, when it is not perceived. Yet, 
even in perception, the notion which our senses give of the 
object may be more or less clear, more or less distinct, in 
all possible degrees.
"Thus we see more distinctly an object at a small than at 
a great distance. An object at a great distance is seen more 
distinctly in a clear than in a foggy day. An object seen 
indistinctly with the naked eye, on account of its smallness, 
may be seen distinctly in a microscope."
—  12 9 —
Here the examples of perception given hy Reid are those of 
seeing things, just the sort of examples of perception I would 
give to exemplify my use of the term. The passage just quoted 
also illustrates the dual rôle of the notions and conceptions 
of things that Reid mentions. Like Locke's ideas, they are 
both what we would call concepts and what have been called 
sense-data or presentations of sense.
Two modern writers on perception take a similar line to 
Reid, but they are more guarded in their statements. After 
defining "S sees X" as "as a consequence of x being a proper 
visual stimulus of S, S senses in a way that is functionally 
dependent upon the stimulus energy produced in S by x",
Chisholm continues ("Perceiving", p 150): "Perhaps we would not 
want to say that a man sees an object x unless, in addition to 
sensing in the required way, the man also took the object x to 
be something . . .. To make our definition adequate to this 
felt requirement, we have only to add the qualification 
and states x to have some characteristic."
Lon Locke, too, amkes the presence of a belief necessary to 
perceiving a physical object. For he says perceiving - that is 
necessary to perception. ("Perception and our Knowledge of the 
External World", p 52). Of perceiving - that he says: "Let us 
say that to perceive that p is to consider p to be true of the 
things I notice, where either I considered p to be true because
I now notice them, or would consider p to be true for this reason 
if I did not already consider it true for other reasons."(ibid p55) 
We may thus see that, according to Locke, A's perceiving that p 
does not eniall p's being true. This seems to me to be an obvious
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mistake. The phenomenon mentioned here which Locke thinks 
is necessary if we are to perceive physical objects is not 
correctly described as "perceiving - that". Put in more 
acceptable terms, what Locke is here saying is necessary if 
we are to perceive physical objects is that we should hold 
some beliefs about the things we notice, where we hold these 
beliefs because we now notice them, or would hold these beliefs 
(if we did not already hold them) because we now notice them. 
(Locke gives no account of the concept of noticing, which he 
uses here.)
Must I then hold some belief about what I perceive if I 
am to perceive it? Clearly I do not have to make a correct 
identification of the object of perception - I can see John 
but take him to be Jack, or see a scarecrow but take it to be 
a man. Nor, if my belief about the object of perception relates 
to its characteristics, does my belief have to be true: in a 
certain light I may take it that a brown dress is black; I may 
think that I have put my hand in cold water, when the water is 
in fact warm, if my hand has previously been immersed in very 
hot liquid. Chisholm and Locke accept such facts as these, and 
suggest that all that is necessary if A is to perceive X at t 
is that A should at t acquire some belief about X or have some 
belief about X reinforced. But are they right even to demand 
this much? A problem is to know exactly what they are demanding, 
For what is to count as having a belief about X? If I see John, 
and as a result come to believe that John has grown fatter, then
clearly in perceiving him I have acquired a belief about John. 
But what of the case where I see a mouse, but only for a second.
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so that all the belief I acquire is that something moved across 
the floor; have I here, in perceiving tie mouse, acquired a 
belief about it? It is true that the thing that moved was the 
mouse, and I believe that something moved, but if I am asked 
"^at was it that moved?" I can give no answer, I can in no 
way specify the thing. In the same way I may hear noises in 
the next room which lead me to believe no more than that some 
man or animal is moving around. Suppose it is, in fact,
Jemima, my cat, that is moving around. Is my belief a belief 
about Jemima? And it is plain that in many cases of perception 
of physical objects the belief we acquire is only about the 
object perceived in the way in which the two beliefs I have just 
described are about the mouse and Jemima respectively.
I think, in fact, that in cases such as these it is hard 
to say that the perceiver acquires, or is reinforced in holding, 
any belief about the object of perception. However, I wish to 
give the philosophers I am criticising the benefit of the doubt, 
and will suppose them not to have denied that perception takes 
place in cases like these. What I will consider is whether a 
man can perceive a physical object if he is not at the time he 
is perceiving it acquiring, or being reinforced in, any belief 
at all about himself or the world around him. If I can show 
that he can do this, I think I will have completely exploded the 
thesis that perception involves belief, in whatever form this 
thesis may be presented. I think I can show this, and will 
present my arguments in a critical discussion of a recent valuable 
contribution on this subject. Afterwards I' Will support my 
position by meeting certain objections.
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SECTION 4• Professor Lretske on Non-epistemic Seeing.
Professor P.I.Lretske in his recent book "Seeing and Knowing" confines 
himself to the visual sort of perception. In tie second chapter of his 
book he discusses "non-epistemic seeing", as he calls it. This is 
contrasted with epistemic seeing, which is, roughly, seeing that some­
thing is the case. What he means by "non-epistemic seeing" can be 
understood when we grasp his notion of positive and negative belief 
content. He writes (p 5): "Let S be some sentient agent, and let "S. . ." 
be some statement about S. . . If the statement "S . . . "  entails that S 
has a particular belief, or set of beliefs, then we will say that the 
state of affairs expressed in the statement has a positive belief content.
If the statement entails that S does not have some belief, or set of 
beliefs, then the situation is one of negative belief content."
Professor Lretske uses these notions in the following way: he argues 
that there is a fundamental visual ability the exercise of which is devoid 
of positive belief content. That is, there is a way of seeing such that 
for any proposition P, the statement "S sees L" does not entail the 
statement "S believes P". These statements of Lretske's are of interest 
to me because in his view these exercises of visual ability without positive 
belief content are those mental phenomena we would describe as "our 
perceivings of physical objects". Lretske supports his case that it is 
not a necessary condition of our perceiving a physical object 
that we should have a particular belief or set of beliefs by 
reference to a series of examples. He first points out that one 
can see, say, a screwdriver without identifying it as such. But, 
as he continues, further mistakes are possible. I can mistake a
human being for a dummy, a shadow, or other things. Indeed, I 
do not even have to take the thing I see to be a physical
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phenomenon. As Lretske points out, one may see something, e.g. 
a face at a window, but fail to believe that there is such a 
thing there, thinking rather that one is imagining things. We 
can, indeed, think of odd situations where people are placed in 
odd situations without knowing it, and may thus be led to think 
they are dreaming, or being hallucinated, when in fact they are 
perceiving physical objects. Imagine that a man goes to bed 
in Ealing one night, falls asleep, and is then drugged and 
transported to the forests of equatorial Africa. When he comes 
round he sees lush vegetation, snakes, inquisitive pygmies.
But his likely response would be to think that he was dreaming, 
or had gone mad, not to believe he was seeing these things.
I think, then, that Lretske is right in supposing that the 
perception of a certain physical object is compatible with any 
belief whatever about it, for what one makes of what one sees is 
largely dependent on the background of beliefs that one possesses. 
And this background can be infinitely various - and strange. 
However, it may be said that though these arguments prove what 
Lretske sets out to show - that there is no particular proposition 
entailed by the statement that a particular man is seeing a 
particular physical object - they do not prove what I set out to 
show, that a man may be perceiving even though at the time of 
perceiving he is not acquiring, or being reinforced in, any belid' 
at all about himself or the world around him. But I think 
certain arguments which Lretske goes on to advance (though not,
I believe, with the intention of proving the thesis I support) 
lead us to the conclusion that my stronger thesis is correct.
We may begin by noticing two of these examples provided by
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Lretske. One is that of the person who reads a book, (p 11). 
Pi-esumably to understand a book one must see and distinguish 
the great majority of the words on its pages. And to see the 
words one has to see the letters. But is it at all reasonable 
to suggest that in reading a book a person acquires some belief 
about each of the words, let alone about each of the letters 
composing them? Another example Lretske provides is of the 
preoccupied man. He may walk down a street, and afterwards 
remember nothing about the people, shops, cars, etc., that were 
there - all he may have is a generalized memory that he has seen 
things. He cannot remember having acquired any information 
about the individual things he has seen.
Starting from these examples, let us discuss the matter mom 
generally. In what circumstances, if it is granted that a person 
is not acquiring a belief or having one reinforced at a time, 
would it be plausible to suggest he was, nevertheless, perceiving 
a physical object at that time? One circumstance occurs when 
two factors are combined: a person's being preoccupied with his 
own thoughts and feelings, as opposed to the things going on 
around him, and his being in an excellent position to perceive 
some readily perceptible physical object. Let us suppose a 
philosopher goes into his study, intent on working out a problem. 
He paces back and forth, his eyes fixed on the floor. Let us 
suppose the floor is covered by a carpet. In this situation, 
provided the phislosopher is not blind, or does not suffer from 
some sort of "psychological blindness" with regard to his carpet, 
(which would seem an unlikely phenomenon, anyway), we would 
agree that he sees the carpet. But we could also suppose that
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at the time he was seeing the carpet, he had no thoughts about 
his room and its contents, or of his own present condition, so 
that if afterwards he was asked what he had seen whilst in his 
room he would have to say "I must have seen the carpet, the 
desk, the window . . . "  In other words, he would have to 
reconstruct what he saw from his previously acquired knowledge of 
the contents of his room and his beliefs about what one could
not fail to see amongst these. The whole of his mind at the time
t
he was in his room might have been taken up with arguments 
about the problem. This is one situation where it is quite 
reasonable to suppose that a man is perceiving a physical object 
without acquiring, or reinforcing beliefs about his environment 
or himself.
The second situation I will describe is far more common, 
and Dretske's example of the man reading the book falls into this 
set of cases. These are cases where we exercise a certain skill 
which cannot be exercised effectively unless objects are perceived, 
yet the exercise does not involve intellectual processes, and is 
usually not accompanied by any. Take the case of a man peeling 
a potato: he plies the knife in such a way as to remove whatever 
skin remains on the potato, and to excise the bad bits from it. 
Take the moment when he cuts out a bad bit. He must have seen 
it, this dark area in the potato. Otherwise he could not have 
known where on the potato to direct his knife so as to cut it 
out. Do we have to suppose that he learns anything about the 
potato, the bad bit, or his own mental condition, at the time 
he cuts out the bad bit? May he not be listening to his 
transistor, enjoying a record that is being played? And if he
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is asked, straight afterwards, about what he has been doing, he 
may only be able to give the thinnest account. It is not as if 
he is in the position of a man who has been told to watch a piece 
of film for thirty seconds so as to be able to give as detailed 
an account as possible of what happens on it, as a test of his 
powers of observation. Our man peeling his potatoes may, out 
of boredom, have deliberately tried to soak himself in the music, 
and at the time he is cutting out the bad bit, may have been 
doing no more than enjoying a particular series of chords, to 
the exclusion of acquiring beliefs or having them reinforced.
A similar example is that of a man going shopping. The way he 
avoids bumping into people, crosses the roads without getting 
knocked down, directs himself to the market, shows that he is 
using his eyes; but at the moment he avoids Mrs. X and ]yir. Y, 
is it not possible that all that is going on in his mind is an 
attempt to remember if there is enough bread in the cupboard 
back at home, or an attempt to plan out the swiftest route 
between the shops he must visit? If he is asked, straight 
afterwards, what accretion to, or strengthening of, his beliefs 
has occurred in the last minutes* walk towards the market, may 
he not say (and be right in saying) that none has occurred? It 
is a characteristic result of our perceivings of physical objects 
that they effect such accretions and reinforcements, but this 
does not mean they always do. The type of example that seduces 
us into accepting that all perception involves such accretion or 
reinforcement is one where the object of perception is an object 
on to which the perceiver*s attention has been drawn or fixed ■ 
at a particular time. It is hard to see how, idien his attention
- 137 -
has been drawn to or fixed by an object, a man can fail to 
acquire some sort of opinion about it. But in the cases I have 
described we do not pay any special attention to the things we 
beyond a doubt do perceive. Thus I believe we have found two 
softs of cases - those of preoccupied people and people exercising 
non-intellectual skills - in which we can suppose that a physical 
object is perceived at a time when the perceiver is receiving 
no accretion to, or reinforcement of, his bel ifs about himself 
and his environment. (A third sort of case is that mentioned by 
J.F. Soltis on pp 32-3 of his work "Seeing, Knowing, and Believing", 
This is of perception of things at the periphery of one*s field 
of vision. It seems quite possible that a man should not enter­
tain any belief about the ash-tray with a cigarette burning 
away in it situated at the periphery of his field of vision, and 
yet should see it. We may well imagine that though previously 
his thoughts were not upon it at all, his attention is called to
the ash-tray when the cigarette burns too short and falls out of
his field of vision. This capture of the attention would
naturally be explained, Soltis suggests, by the supposition that
the man had been seeing the ash-tray.)
SECTION 5* Possible objections to my view.
I have argued that a man can perceive a physical object at a 
time even though he acquires no belief, and has no belief 
reinforced, at that time, concerning himself or his environment.
I think the most plausible arguments against this view of mine 
are likely to be of the form: " "A perceives X" entails "A )^ *s 
X" and A ^*s X only if A acquires, or is reinforced in holding;
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some belief or other," The first example would be that A*s 
perceiving X entails A*s noticing X, and A cannot notice X 
unless he forms some opinion about X. That one who notices a 
stain on the carpet must indeed make some judgment about his 
environment does seem very plausible. White, indeed, goes 
further in his chapter on noticing ("Attention", Ch. 3)» and 
suggests that when we notice something, we are struck by it, 
it makes an impression on us and we receive knowledge of it.
(p 26). This seems to me to be nowhere as obvious as White 
supposes, and his taking it to be true seems to be to some 
extent dependent on false reasoning. objection can be made 
plain by considering what White goes on to say: "To be struck 
by something in the sense of noticing it is to receive know­
ledge of it, to be able to tell what it is . . .. The reason 
why the statement that soneone cannot tell or show what he has
noticed is a contradiction is that to notice, e.g. what or
where X is, implies being able to tell under some description 
what or where X is." (pp 26-?). Here White seems to argue from 
the truth that to notice that p one must know that p to the false 
conclusion that to notice, say, a rat, one must know that it is 
a rat, or something of the sort. But it is quite plain that we
cannot argue from what follows from A's noticing that p to what
follows from A's noticing X, when X is a physical object. More­
over, it seems we can find examples where A notices X but 
cannot identify or classify it correctly. A confirmed but 
insightful drunkard might notice a rat æurrying across the room 
but yet dismiss it as a creation of his besotted imagination. 
However, it might be said he could not be said to notice it
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unless he believed that there was a pink shape there (or some­
thing of the sort), and this was a correct (but uninformative) 
description of the rat. Perhaps, if in a case like this we 
would allow that the person noticing the rat was able to tell 
under some description what it was when he said there was a 
pink shape there, we should withdraw our objection to White's 
statements. However, whether or not I may be completely 
mistaken about what I notice, surely I must have some opinion 
about it. It seems hard to deny this. Clearly, as White says 
(p 29) to notice something is to have our attention caught by 
it, and it seems impossible that once our attention is taken by 
an object we should fail to come to some sort of opinion about 
it. Perhaps, indeed, in order to notice X we must have our 
attention taken by X at least to the extent that we form some sort 
of opinion about it - this is a defining mark of noticing a 
physical object, one might think.
But even if this is the case, and to notice a physical 
object we must hold some belief about it, it will not follow 
that the same is true of perceiving a physical object. For 
perception can occur without noticing. White ("Attention",
P 29f) gives a valuable list of the differences between percept­
ion and noticing. "Noticing", he says, is never the name of an 
activity, "perceiving" sometimes is, e.g. "seeing" sometimes 
means "keeping in sight". Again, "perceiving" may be the name 
of an achievement - "I tried to see it for ten minutes, and 
at last I saw it", the sort of achievement that may be the 
culmination of an attempt to detect something by sight, or to 
make a fine discrimination; what one notices, on the other ha# ,
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strikes one out of the blue, so to speak. This is why, if 
something occupies the main part of our field of vision, we 
could not, (as White says), be said to notice it. This seems 
to be a more plausible reason than the one White appears to 
give, that in such a case there is no question of its being 
contrasted with or standing out from its surroundings. For we 
could scarcely be said to be struck out of the blue by something 
that we could not fail to perceive. Perhaps what White is think­
ing of is the situation where one object occupies all or nearly 
all our visual field. Here indeed there would be no question 
of our noticing it, though we might be said to perceive it, and 
we might be said to notice its properties e.g., a man who is 
staring at the sky may suddenly be struck by the fact that its 
colour varies subtly.
The example White gives that seems to me to be the most 
significant is that of the situation where one is quite 
properly said to see all that is in one's field of vision, but
one could not notice all the things so seen, I don't think
White draws out the implications of this case far enough. For 
they are surely these; noticing involves the capture of the 
noticer's attention by the object noticed. And what normally 
occurs to a perceiver is that his attention dwells on only one
or two of the objects he perceives at any time. This is the
fact which makes it necessary that there should be perception 
without noticing. For me to perceive X, X does not have to take 
my attention, my awareness of it may be obscure, as one might 
say. It is a feature of human consciousness that there are 
usually more things at any time that we perceive tian can take 
our attention.
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So much for noticing and perceiving. Another possible 
objection, or pair of objections, one of which Lretske (p 9) 
notes, might be put as follows; "It is a necessary condition 
of my seeing X that it should look to me as though p. But 
its looking to me as though p is only a special case of my 
believing that p. To see that this is so one only has to 
consider examples of true statements like "It looked to him as 
though the pound would be devalued" where this statement is 
vitually equivalent to "He tended to believe that the pound 
would be devalued". Again, I cannot see X unless I see it 
as something - a dog, a cat, a furry animal, or whatever.
But my seeing X as a dog is nothing more than my taking it to 
be a dog, this taking occurring when X is being perceived. For 
when we say "He saw that scarecrow as a policeman, that's why 
he ran away", what do we do but describe a belief he acquired, 
on seeing something? So there can be no perception without 
belief, after all."
The objection relating to "seeing as" I find difficult t) 
judge. For it is not at all plain to me that we cannot see X 
without seeing it as something. The notion of "seeing as", 
in the sense here used, is not commonly found in ordinary talk,
or even in intelligent, informed discourse. But even if it is
allowed that to see X I must see it as something, it is plain 
that I can see X as an x without taking it to be an x. As 
White remarks ("Attention", p 57): "I may be said to see a 
distant star as a tiny speck because it looks like one, though 
I am in no way inclined to diink it is one or take it as one.”
It may, of course, be true that one would not only see the star
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as a speck but also be tempted to take it to be a speck if one 
did not have a certain background of knowledge. But one who 
has the knowledge suffers from no such temptation. Another case 
where there is no tendency to take a thing to be what we see it 
as is that of the duck-rabbit drawing : the man who sees the
drawing as a duck does not take it to be a duck, neither does 
the man who sees it as a rabbit take it to be a rabbit. But it 
may be said that these cases of interpreting a picture are not 
standard cases of seeing as.
In the case of the phenomenon we call "its looking to me as 
though p",I am inclined to say that the occurrence of this 
phenomenon is indeed a necessary condition of a person's perceiving 
a physical object. And I will also admit that "It looks to me 
as though p" often means "I tend to believe that p", ac, for 
instance, in the statement "It looks to me as though the bottom 
is going to fall out of gilts." But what I suggest is first 
that there is a sense of the expression "It looks to A as thou^ 
p" in which there is no implication that A possesses a belief 
that p, when it is asserted that it looks to A as thoug^ i p.
This is the sense of the expression in statements like "It 
looks to one as thou^ the stick immersed to half its length in 
water is bent, but one knows well that it is not". My second 
suggestion is that only in this last-mentioned sense of "looks" 
is its looking to A as though p a necessary condition of A's 
seeing X. I will discuss this sense of "looks" and other 
"appearing" words in the next chapter. So I conclude that these 
objections to my view that perception need not involve the 
acquisition or reinforcement of belief do not stand up to
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closer scrutiny, whatever their initial plausibility.
SECTION 6. Conclusions.
The conclusions of this chapter can be stated briefly. We 
wished to discover the nature of the sense-experience which a 
man must have if he is to perceive a physical object. Could 
it, we wondered, be nothing other than the acquisition or 
reinforcement of some belief on the man's part? The 
conclusion we have reached is that not only is such an acquisi­
tion or reinforcement of belief not the whole of the having of 
a sense-experience (the perceptual experience must involve 
another factor, which will be described in the next chapter) 
but further it is not even necessary if perception is to take 
place. So it is not even involved as one factor amongst 
others in the having of a sense-experience. This being so, 
it was not hard for us to answer the other question, 
posed on pl22, whether X's playing a part in bringing it about 
that A has such an experience suffices for A's perceiving X, 
where the experience is A's acquiring or being reinforced in 
some belief. For if, as is clear, A must have some ether type 
of experience if he is to perceive X, then X's causing him to 
acquire or be reinforced in some belief cannot be sufficient 
for A's pe ceiving X.
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CHAPTER SIX; THE NATURE OP HAVING A SENSE-EXPERIENCE,
PART TWO: IS IT HAVING A REPRESENTATION?
SECTION 1. Introduction.
The representative or representational theory of perception is 
closely linked to the causal theory. In Chapter 4 I argued 
that the representative theorist should embrace the causal 
theory as well, if he wished to give added plausibility to his 
theory. The theory that would result would hold that A's 
perceiving X was a matter of X's playing a part in bringing 
it about that A had a sense-experience that represented X.
I now propose to examine this theory, seeing that the thesis 
that having a sense-experience is acquiring or being reinforced 
in holding a belief has collapsed. I shall ask two principal 
questions, as I did in the last chapter. First, is it a 
necessary condition of A's perceiving X at t that A have a sense- 
experience at t that represents X, and secondly, if this sense- 
experience is brought about by the action of X on A, among other 
factors, does it follow from the fact that these conditions 
are fulfilled that A perceives X at t? But before we can even 
attempt to answer these questions, it is plain that we must 
give some account of what it is to have a sense-experience 
that represents a physical object. Different representative 
theorists might advance different accounts of this. I shall 
consider two suggestions as to the nature of the experience 
involved in perception which could be classed as suggestions 
that it is the having of a sense-experience that represents the 
object of perception. In both cases I will describe first the
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proposed account of what it is to have a sense-experience and 
second the suggested way in which such an experience can 
represent a physical object.
SECTION 2. Two versions of the representative theory
(a) The sense-datum representative theory.
The sense-datum representative theorist gives a clear account of 
what it is to have a sense-experience. It is, he says, to have 
a sense-datum, to be intuitively acquainted with a non-physical 
particular that has certain features in common with physical 
things, e.g. sense-data are located in space, but not in 
physical space, and they appear and disappear at determinate 
points in time. Now we have already seen that this account of 
the nature of sense-experiences is unacceptable, so we are 
bound to reject the sense-datum representative theory. However,
I want to discuss it here in order to point out two further 
difficulties it runs into when the way in which sense-data are 
supposed to represent physical objects is described. For it is 
natural for the sense-datum theorist to give the following 
account of representation:in have a sense-experience that represents 
a physical object is to have a sense-datum that resembles that 
object. The mind of the perceiver contains replicas of the things 
in the physical world that he perceives. These replicaas 
represent the physical objects because they share a large number 
of qualities with them.
Now these views about the way sense-data represent physical 
objects lead to difficulties if the sense-datum theorist combines 
them with either or both of two doctrines which are usually held
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by sense-datum theorists. The first doctrine is the one that 
the qualities of physical objects can be divided into primary ones 
and secondary ones. According to this doctrine, not only is 
it the case that sense-data may not happen to share all the 
qualities of the physical objects that are severally their 
causes, but further there are a range of qualities which 
physical objects and sense-data can never have in common.
These are the secondary qualities of physical objects, and 
comprise such qualities as their colour, temperature, and the 
qualities ttiat they can be non-inferentially perceived to have 
by hearing, smell, and taste. One may indeed use the same 
words in describing physical objects and sense-data, and these 
words may in the case of physical objects refer to their seconch ry 
qualities, e.g. when one says a man is white, or a lump of sugar 
is sweet, and then goes on to say that this sense-datum is 
white, that one is sweet. But in cases like this, the word 
"white" and "sweet" have different significances when used of 
sense-data from those they have when used of physical objects.
The sense-datum theorist will probably say that a man is white 
insofar as when percieved in normal circumstances he will cause 
the perceiver to have white sense-data, insofar as he has the 
power to produce white sense-data. The whiteness that is 
attributed here to sense-data will be said to be an unanalysable 
quality. There are then, according to the theory of primary; 
and secondary qualities, a great number of characteristics that 
physical objects and sense-data never have in common. These 
are the secondary qualities. The primary qualities, such as 
shape, size, and position in space, are common to both physical
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objects and sense-data. Can this doctrine be held along with 
the view that in perception we have sense-data that resemble 
the objects perceived, like replicas of them? It seems not.
For in the cases of hearing, smelling, and tasting physical 
objects, if these forms of perception are supposed to involve 
the having of sense-data which are replicas of the things 
perceived, the qulities of softness, loudness, sweetness, 
sourness, etc., that the perceived physical objects have should 
also be possessed by their supposed replicas, the sense-data.
But according to the doetrine of primary and secondary 
qualities that sense-datum theorists tend to hold, these are 
secondary qualities of physical objects, and as such are never 
possessed by sense-data. To attribute loudness to a physical 
object is to attribute to it the power to produce loud sense- 
data (in a different sense of "loud"). Such is the doctrine 
of secondary qualities. The doctrine cannot, then, be held 
along with the representative theory which states that the 
sense-data involved in the perception of an object are replicas 
of it. Of course, the sense-datum representative theorist may
be willing to give up the doctrine of the primary and secondary
qualities, but the doctrine has in the past been closely related
to the sense-datum theory.
The second doctrine that is incompatible with a replica 
representative theory is the view that, e.g., when a man sees a 
stick that looks bent because it is immersed in water, he is 
having a sense-datum that is bent. This view is an essential 
feature of the sense-datum theorist's position. But "the stick's 
looking bent to the man" and "the man's seeing the stick"
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are both descriptions (not equally informative) of the same 
phenomenon. So the sense-datum theorist is bound to say the 
man is having a bent sense-datum, but he is also bound to say 
that this datum, as being the datum involved in the man's 
seeing of the stick (as, on his theory, it is), is a replica 
of the stick. But if the stick is really straight, how can 
the datum, which is bent, be a replica of it? It may be said 
in this case that though the datum does not have the same 
shape as the stick it is supposed to be a replica of, it does 
have other common properties - enough to make it a replica.
For, plainly, a replica does not have to resemble its original 
in every detail. But the difficulty remains that some of the 
things we perceive look quite different from what they are - 
for instance a man, seen through a pane of fluted glass. In 
this case of perception the sense-datum theorist could scanely 
suggest that the datum that is supposed to occur would be a 
replica of the man. I don't think the sense-datum representative 
theorist can escape this difficulty, other than by importing 
the notion of a sense-datum's being a systematic distortion of 
a sense-datum that represents an object, and by saying that 
under certain circumstances it is enough that the sense-datum 
involved in the perception of an object be such a systematically 
distorted one. But this is to go beyond representationalism, 
and to give up the view that when A perceives X he must have a 
sense-datum that is a replica of X.
These two arguments I have advanced are not, I think, 
conclusive refutahons of the view that the perception of a 
physical object involves having sense-data that resemble it.
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but along with the arguments of Chapter 3 I think they do 
oeverthrow this view. And if this view is overthrown, so, a 
fortiori, is the thesis that A*s perceiving X at t is a matter 
of X*s playing a part in bringing it about that A has a sense- 
datum at t that resembles X as a replica.
(b) Representation and seeming.
The second theory that I want to describe as a representational 
theory of perception makes use of the notion of its seeming as 
though something is the case. According to this theory the 
phenomenon we have described as A*s having a sense-experience is 
in fact what in everyday language we call its seeming, appearing, 
looking, sounding, etc., to A as though (as if) something is 
the case. If we take it that seeming is the genus of which 
looking, sounding, smelling, tasting, and feeling are the species, 
then, according to this view, instead of saying A cannot perceive 
X at t unless he has a sense-experience at t we can say that A 
cannot perceive X at t unless it seems to A at t as though (asi£ ) 
something is the case. Thus this theory cashes the term of art 
"A’s having a sense-experience" in terms of the everyday expression 
"its seeming to A as though something is the case". Further, the 
way in which a sense-experience that A has can represent a 
physical object is described in terms of the notion of seeming 
and its cognates. For what is more natural to say than that 
A*s sense-experience is a good representation of X iff X is an qC 
with certain properties and it seems to A that there is an pC 
with a fair number of these properties? ('Where to classify a
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thing as ançAis to indicate its specific nature, e.g. in the 
case of my dog Fido to say he is a dog, in the case of my cat 
Jemima to say she is a cat.) Using this notion of a good 
representation we arri'ye at the following account of perception;
"A's perceiving X at t is a matter of X*s playing some 
part in bringing it about that it seems to A at t as if there 
is an with a set of characteristics (o (but not necessarily 
these characteristics only) X being an (X and /3 comprising 
a fair number of X’s properties." (Where to classify a thing 
as an(X.is to indicate its specific nature.)
Does this theory give a correct picture of the sense- 
experience which is involved in each and every case of percept­
ion? I think the answer to this question must be given before 
we go any further : we must first enquire whether it is a 
necessary condition of my perceiving a physical object that it-- 
should seem to me as though something is the case; and then 
whether it is a necessary condition of my perceiving X that X is 
an ot with certain properties and it seems to me that there is 
an with a fair number of these properties. For it may be
that the theory I am considering is successful in giving an 
account of what it is to have a sense-experience, but that its 
demand that the sense-experience be a good representation of 
the perceived object in the sense suggested is excessive. If 
this turns out to be true, we will have to enquire what conditions 
must be fulfilled by the sense-experience involved in the 
perception of a physical object, and whether having good repreænt- 
ations in the sense being used at present is involved in percept­
ion in some other way. However, we should begin by asking whether
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it is a necessary condition of rny perceiving a physical object 
that it should seem to me as though something is the case.
SECTION 5. Is it a necessary condition of one*s perceiving a
physical object that it should seem to one as though 
something is the case?
It has been said by many philosophers that expressions involving 
the word "seem" and its cognates "look, sound, taste, smell, feel" 
are employed in making tentative judgments about the world around 
us, rather than in the description of our sense-experiences. We 
use these locutions, it is said, when we are in doubt, or when we 
know that our evidence is not strong enough to justify a cate­
gorical assertion that p - so we say "It seems as though p". This 
view is vigorously advanced by Britton and Quinton in the symposium 
on Seeming- (AS Supp. Vol. I552) and by Quinton in his article "The 
Problem of Perception" (Mind 1555)' There is also the view, not at 
all incompatible with the above, that statements like "x appears (s 
(seems) to be so-and-so to S" are equivalent in meaning to statements 
like "S believes (thinks) that x is so-and-so". (Vesey, "Seeing and 
Seeing As" (PAS 1955-')» Chisholm; "Perceiving" pp 45-4). Chisholm 
suggests that such locuations as these "may be also taken to 
imply that the subject S has adequate evidence for believing that 
X is so-and-so" (ibid). According to Chisholm, we have 
adequate evidence for p when p is more worthy of our belief 
than not p ("Perceiving" p 5)* Now it is quite plain that 
expressions like "I think that p" and "I have some reason to 
belive that p" can be, and are, used in making tentative judg­
ments. Thus the views of Quinton and Britton on the one
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hand, and Vesey and Chisholm on the other are not incompatible.
I see nothing objectionable in these views, and nothing that is 
incompatible with the suggestion that it is a necessary condition of 
A ’s perceiving X that it should seem to A as though something is the 
case, provided it is allowed that there are some occasions when 
"seeming" expressions are not used in these ways, or in these senses.
That they are on many occasions used in these ways, or in these senses,
I am not disposed to deny. But if they are never used in any other 
way or sense, then it is plain that the thesis we are considering must 
fail. Suppose that it is a necessary condition of A’s perceiving X 
that it seems to A as though p. Now if "It seems to me as though p" 
always expresses a tentative judgment of mine, whenever I say, e.g.,
"I see X" I will in part be asserting that it seems to me as though 
something is the case, that is, expressing a tentative judgment of 
some sort. But this will surely not be the case. Again, suppose "It 
seems to A as though p" means "A tends to believe that p", whenever one 
says that A is perceiving some physical object one will in part be asserting 
that he tends to believe some proposition to be true: but, as I have 
argued in Chapter 5 to say that a man is perceiving a physical object 
is not to say anything about his beliefs. But if the supposition that 
its seeming to A as though p is a necessary condition of A ’s 
perceiving X leads to these false conclusions about perception, the 
supposition itself must be false. But the supposition only leads 
to these false conclusions on the further suppositions that "It 
seems to A as though p" and cognate expressions are always used to 
express tentative beliefs and mean something like "A tends to believe that 
p". But it is plain that there are occasions when these expressions are not
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so used, and do not have this meaning. This is admitted by Quinton, 
Britton, and Chisholm. Quinton says they are sometimes used "to 
describe expe iences". Chisholm says they are sometimes used "non- 
episteraically" (i.e., in a way which does not have any implications 
as to the beliefs or evidence possessed by those to whom it is said to 
seem that such-and-such is the case.) Indeed even Pi'ofessor White 
admits as much at the end of his contribution to the symposium on the 
Causal Theory (AS Supp. Vol Iful).
Let us now prove this by giving examples of cases where expressions 
such as "It seems to me as though p", "It looks to me as if p", "It 
sounds to him as though p", are used in a sense in which they do not 
imply a tendency to believe on someone’s part, or that some proposition 
is worthy of belief; and where the person who so uses them is not makirg 
a tentative judgment that p. Such examples are not hard to find.
(a) At the optician’s we are asked to look at a lighted 
glass plate with lines painted fan-wise on it. Then we are
asked "Does it look to you as though the lines are all equally
dark and well-defined? The answers we give will vary according to 
the changes the optician makes in the power of the lens 
before our eyes. The right lens power is found when it looks to 
us as though the lines are all equally dark and well-defined.
Now what goes on here is not that we are asked our opinion about 
the darkness or the definition of the lines. We know full well that
they are all equally dark and well-defined - indeed, it is 
necessary for the fulfilment of the optician’s purpose that 
they should be, as we will realize if we have any wit. What
we are being asked to do is to describe the nature of the
experience on which we normally base our beliefs about the
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physical world. We go to the optician because changes have 
occurred in the nature of that experience - changes we could 
express by saying, perhaps, "Where I once could pick out figures 
at a distance, row it looks to me as though there are fuzzy 
shapes blending into each other." But when we say this, we 
don’t mean to suggest that we think there are any fuzzy shapes 
blending into each other.
(b) When we look at a straight stick that is immersed 
in water, it does look to us as though the stick is bent, but 
at the same time we know full well that the stick is straight.
But the experience we are describing is one that might lead us 
to the false belief that there was a bent stick there, if we 
weren’t people of experience.
(c) Someone may be setting up a trick, employing a toy 
mouse and a piece of dark thread. He may ask a friend to 
study the effects of his trick, using the following words; "Does 
it look to you as though a mouse is scurrying across the floor?" 
He can ask the question just as sensibly whether the friend knew s 
that a toy mouse is being used or not. The friend might reply; 
"No, it looked like a toy mouse, the thing that moved; but if 
you made it travel faster, then indeed it would look as though
a mouse was scurrying across the carpet."
(d) A man might be practising his imitations of bird-calls. 
He might enlist another person’s aid, and tell him "I’m going cut 
in the garden to try out my repertoire of bird-calls. You sit 
here and tell me if it sounds as though there are thrushes, 
blackbirds, and bullfinches singing in the garden". The friend 
could carry out these instructions without difficulty, even
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though he knew the noises were being made by a man.
In all these examples the "seeming" expressions - "looks", 
"sounds" are not used so as to express a tentative judgment, 
and none of them is equivalent in meaning to a statement to 
the effect that someone is tempted to believe something. So 
much is common ground amongst the philosophers we have 
mentioned. But according to Quinton the use of "seeming" 
expressions in these ways and senses - in the description of 
experience, as he puts it - is "a sophisticated procedure and 
one seldom called for." He says ("The Problem of Perception", 
Mind 1955, P 55): "(The description of experience) is an 
essential accomplishment for painters broadcasting engineers, 
doctors of the eye and ear, cooks and experiemental psychdbgists. 
But unless we fall into their hands there is little need for 
us to become proficient in it." Now in fact there is nothing 
recherche or sophisticated about the use of "seeming" expression.s 
in these ways and senses; any normal person can use them 
satisfactorily without taxing himself at all. The reason why 
Quinton is led to suppose that it is difficult and sophisticated 
to describe experiences is his analysis of what it is to have an 
experience. This is advanced in an obscure passage in his 
article (ibid p 34) where, having described two other supposed 
uses of "appear", he writes: "There is a third use of "appear", 
which resembles the one last mentioned, in that no reasons or 
evidence can be given for statements containing it, but differs 
from it in that certain conditions of observation are supposed 
to obtain, whether they do or not. "It looks to me (here, now) 
elliptical" we say of a plate we know to be tilted and round.
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supposing it to be at right angles to our line of vision.
This statement answers the question "how does it strike you, 
look to you, what exactly do you see?" It is replaceable by 
"there is an elliptical patch in the centre of my visual field". 
It is in this type of case only that the description of 
appearances and experiences coincide."
From -,what he says in this passage it is hard to tell 
what in Quinton’s view goes on when we use "seeming" expressions 
to describe experiences. Take the case of the stick half 
immersed in water, an example he goes on to use. When, 
describing our experience, we say "It looks to me as though 
there’s a bent stick", are we, according to Quinton, saying 
"There is a bent stick", but indicating by the use of word 
"looks" that this is the judgment that we are led to only if 
we make an assumption about the conditions of perception which 
we may well know to be false, e.g. if we pretend that the stick 
isn’t in water, while we know that it is? But this suggestion 
is ridiculous. For it amounts to saying that when asked how 
things look to us to reply correctly we may have to pretend 
that things are other than we know they are and utter a state­
ment we know to be false. Perhaps, then, Quinton’s suggestion 
is that "It looks as though there is a bent stick" means "If 
conditions a,b,c,d . . . obtain (which they may not do), then 
there is a bent stick." A difficulty here is that Quinton gives 
us little guidance as to what these conditions are supposed to 
be. However, it is plain that the conditions are supposed to 
refer to the physical situation of the perceived object vis-a- 
vis the perceiver. But then Quinton’s suggested analysis must
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be wrong. For it is undeniably true, and Quinton himself states, 
that no reasons can be given (let alone are they needed) in 
justification of statements about how things appear or seem 
when these terms are used in the way we are considering. But 
it is plain that if a man says "If the object I am perceiving 
is not immersed to half its length in water, then there is a 
bent stick over there" (which is something like Quinton’s 
proposed analysis of "It looks to me as though there is a bent 
stick") he may well be asked his reasons for saying this, and 
his statement will be disregarded if he cannot give any. So 
it is plain that Quinton’s analysis must be wrong.
I conclude that the "seeming" expressions used in my
examples (a) - (d) are not recherche or sophisticated usages.
Bather, they are quite frequently found in everyday discourse.
What I want to do now is to distinguish by the use of symbols
these usages from the sort that imply belief or a tendency to
believe. Let us first agree to treat seeming as the genus of
looking, sounding, smelling, tasting, and feeling, so that its
looking as though p and its sounding as though p, etc., will be
considered the species of its seeming as though p. This accords
well enough with everyday usage. Then let us distinguish
between two quite different senses that the expression "It
seems to A as though p" can have. Let us say that it seems^
to A as though p when it seems to A as though p in the way
it seemed to the people mentioned in our examples (a) - (d) as
though whatever in each example it happened to bems the case.
When it looks to me as though a stick is bent, even thou^ I
know it is straight, and looks so because half-immersed in
water, this is a case of its seeming^ to me as thou^ something 
is the case. Another example of this is its sounding to me as
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though there are thrushes in the garden, even though I know 
the noises are made by my talented friend. And, in contrast, 
let us say that there is quite another sense of "seems" where 
it is a necessay condition of its seeming to A as though p 
that A should believe (or tend to believe) that p. When it 
seems to A as though p in this sense, let us say that it seems2 
to A as though p. It is plain from the examples I used that it 
is not a necessary condition of its seeming^ to A as though p 
that A should believe (or tend to believe) that p. Let us, as 
well as distinguishing seeming^ from seeming2 by the use of 
the numerical suffixes, distinguish their species in the same 
way, so that we have looking^ (as in "It looks as though the 
stick is bent, but really it’s straight") distinguished from 
looking2 (as in "At first it looked to me as thou^ the bottom 
would fall out of gilts, but then I realised they would rally"), 
and so on throughout the species.
Now we may state the thœis concerning what it is to have 
a sense-experience which is proposed by the representative 
theory we are considering. It is this: "It is a necessary
condition of A’s perceiving X at t that it seem^ to A as 
though p at t". Unless it seems]_ as though something is the 
case to a man, he cannot at that time be perceiving a physical 
object - such is the thesis proposed. I believe that this 
thesis is correct. When I now see my pen, it is the case that 
it looks^ to me as though there is a blue and silver pen in 
my hand. When I look at myself in the mirror it looks^ to me 
as though there is a man some distance in front of me. When I 
feel my arm it feels^ to me as though there is a rounded fleshy
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object beneath my fingers. I cannot think of a case of 
perception where it does not seemq ' ■ s as though something
is the case.
However, an objection may be made to my view that 
perception cannot occur unless it seems^ to the perceiver as 
though something is the case, on the following lines: "The
phenomenon you describe as seemingq a.s though something is the
case is surely a conscious one. But there is equally
certainly such a thing as unconscious perception. This can 
only mean that perception can on occasion occur even though it
does not seem^ to the perceiver as though something is the
case." The force of this objection depends on the significance 
attached to the expression "unconscious perception". If 
unconscious perception is perception that occurs without the 
perceiver*s being aware that it is occurring, then the objection 
clearly fails, at least as it is stated above. For we have 
already seen that it is possible for a man to be aware of the 
fact that it seems]_ to him as though something is the case, 
yet not to grasp (and even to disbelieve) that he is perceiving 
anything, even though he is in fact perceiving something, and 
the seeming} in question is the sense-experience involved in 
that perception. (See Chapter 5, pl55: the man transported to 
Africa is all too well aware of his odd new sense-experiences, 
but doesn’t even think he’s perceiving the things he in fact is 
perceiving.)
But I think a better policy will be to consider some of 
the better known cases that are described as cases of unconscious 
(and subliminal) perception, to discover whether it is true of
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any of them both that it is a case of perception and that the 
perceiver involved is not subject to an experience of the type 
I have described as its seeming^ to someone as though something 
is the case. In this way I will avoid such thorny problems 
as the one whether "unconscious perception" has many senses 
(as J.P. Day suggests in A,S. Supp. Vol I96O, in his contribution 
to the symposium "Unconscious Perception"), or the one whether 
the expression is a misleading misnomer for the mental phenomena 
which it has been applied to (as A.R. White suggests, in his 
book "Attention", p 52 f). It does seem to me that the 
expressions "unconscious perception" and "subliminal perception" 
(particularly the former) have been used rather rashly to cover 
a variety of supposed phenomena. The cases of unconscious and 
subliminal perception I will consider are mentioned by Day in 
his article.
(1) A is in a perfectly normal condition, and is shown a summer­
house. Beside the summer-house is a tulip-tree, which is 
perfectly visible to anyone standing where A stands, looking inb 
the direction A was looking. But afterwards - even immediately 
afterwards - A cannot remember seeing the tulip-tree. He must 
therefore have seen it unconsciously.
Now I believe this case of supposed unconscious perception 
is of no help to one who wishes to argue that A can perceive X a t  
t without its seeming^ to A at t as though something is the 
case. First of all, it is far from clear that in the situation 
described we would want to say that A did see the tulip-tree.
In fact, both Day and Vesey in their discussion in the A.S.Supp 
Vol i960 argue that the tulip-tree is not seen. But if it is
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admitted that A must have seen the tulip-tree, this can only 
be for one reason, that most people who were otherwise related 
to the tree as A was would certainly have seen it (this fact 
being ascertainable by questioning them or observing their 
behaviour). But when it is said that they would have seen it, 
it is surely true that inter «Ua it is being said of them 
that they would have had a certain sort of sense-experience, 
i.e. that it would have seemed} to them as though something 
was the case. There is no suggestion that their seeing of the 
tulip-tree was in any way odd. But the argument to the conclusion 
that A must have seen it too is that, because he was otherwise 
in the same circumstances as they were, he must have been in 
the same state as regards his perception as they were. But 
then A must in seeing the tree have been subject to a similar 
perceptual experience as they were, i.e. it must have seemed} 
to him as though something was the case. So the case of the 
tulip-tree is not one where perceiving can be supposed to occur 
without its seeming} to the perceiver as though something is 
the case.
(2) It is a fact that A, when under hypnosis, in a trance, can 
hear what the hypnotist says. But afterwards he can remember 
nothing. So unconscious perception must have occurred during 
the period A was hypnotised.
Now we may feel like calling perception under hypnosis "un­
conscious perception", but there seems to be no reason to 
suppose that what makes it worthy of this title is the fact 
that it does not involve its seeming^ to the perceiver as 
though something is the case. What is queer about this case
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of perception is, surely, something quite different; the fact 
that the hypnotist can wipe out all remembrance of what has 
been perceived. There is no reason to suppose that the hearing 
was at the time of its occurrence in any way unusual.
(5) A notices that the clock on his wall has stopped ticking, 
but has no memory of hearing it ticking. So, to notice that 
it stopped, he must have heard it ticking, but unconsciously.
One obvious difficulty in this argument, pointed out by 
more than one critic, is that it does not seem to be necessary 
that A should have heard the clock ticking in order for him 
to notice that it had stopped. If all he had heard was a 
background noise, in which the ticking was merged, he could 
have noticed a change, which he then attributed to the clock’s 
ceasing to tick. However, we may suppose that A, previously to 
his noticing that the clock had stopped ticking, was not conscious 
of any background noise. Might we not, if suchms A ’s situation, 
suppose that A had heard the clock ticking? How else could we 
account for his noticing that it had stopped? The question 
now facing us is one of deciding whether, if we made such a 
supposition, which does indeed seem plausible, we would be 
committing ourselves to the view that A heard the clock 
without it sounding^ to him, and thus seeming} to him, as 
though something was the case. I believe we would not. It 
seems to me to be quite possible to hold that A hears the clock, 
or, as might be supposed with regard to the first case I 
mentioned, sees the tulip-tree, without committing oneself to 
the view that in neither of these cases does it seem} to A as 
though something is the case.
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The way out is clearly not by suggesting that in these 
cases, whilst failing to notice that he is perceiving the clock 
and the tree, A nevertheless is aware that it seemS} to him 
as though something is the case. That would be most implausible : 
it is not as if the man says to himself "It looks as though 
there’s a tulip-tree there, but I know I’m not seeing one 
really". Rather what we must suppose is that it can seem^ to 
A as though p without A’s being conscious, aware, of the fact 
that it seems^ to him as though p. It may well be true that 
a man has privileged access to the contents of his mind, but 
I see no reason to suppose that each mental occurrence of his 
should be infallibly known. Indeed, this supposition is just 
what we need to dispense with if we wish to give a sensible 
account of the "unconscious" perception of the rose-tree and the 
clock. In both these cases we wish to assign the blame for 
their oddness not so much to the quality of the perceivings in 
question as to the lack of attention paid by the perceiver.. If 
we do suppose that the objects are perceived, our explanation of 
the perceiver*s failure to remember perceiving them will be 
attributed to lack of attention on his part. If lack of 
attention is not supposed to have featured in these cases, then 
the suggestion that perception took place becomes quite implausible. 
Thus, I suggest, the plausible account of these cases of perce#ion, 
if they are really cases of perception, does not commit us to 
supposing that its seeming} to the perceiver that something is 
the case is not involved in the perception of these objects.
(4) Cards with words on them are flashed before A’s eyes. He 
cannot say what the words are, but a correlation is observable
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between his galvanic skin response and the nature of the words
shown - the "shock" words produce a greater response. Here we
have a case of subliminal perception.
Now if these phenomena really did occur, would we be
forced to admit both that A perceives the words, and that at 
the time he does so it does not look} to him as though something 
is the case? Perhaps we might suppose that A, if he perceives 
the words at all, has sense-experiences of the usual type, but 
of such a short duration that his attention is not taken by, 
and he is not conscious of, them. But I think that if the 
occurrence of such phenomena as the above-mentioned responses, 
or the implanting of information by hypnopedia, became well 
attested, we could understand one who talked of people perceiving 
the words on the cards, or perceiving in their sleep, even 
though we did not suppose that this perception was accompanied 
by its seeming} to them as though something was the case. But 
I do not think that this fact throws any light on the concept 
of perception that we employ in our normal discourse. A 
comparable case can be found with regard to the concept of 
knowledge. It is plain both thai; in normal discourse, to assert 
that A knows that p is in part to assert that it is true that p, 
and that we can understand one who says both that A knows that 
p, and that it is false that p. For "A knows that p" can be 
used to mean "A is very certain, completely persuaded, that p". 
But this fact does not lead us to tbçe unqualified assertion 
that it is not a necessary condition of A’s knowing that p that p 
be true. What we say, surely, is that there are central cases 
of knowing, and others that are peripheral. There is a focal
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meaning to "know", and one who knows that p in this way cannot 
do so unless it is true that p; there is also a parasitical 
way in which "know" can be used, to signify "be very sure".
It can only be used in the second way because when used in the 
central way it usually implies confidence in the knower about 
the proposition known.
I suggest the same is true of the use of "perceive" in cases 
where it is not supposed to imply the having of a sense- 
experience by the perceiver. In the central cases of perception, 
the perceived object in some fashion causes the perceiver to 
have a sense-experience, which will usually be accompanied 
by some differential response, crude (as, for instance, a 
stronger galvanic skin response than is usual) or sophisticated 
(as, for instance, a conscious identification of the perceived 
object), in the perceiver. When such a response is elicited 
in the same fashion by a physical object, only without the 
production of a sense-experience, we may be willing to say 
that the object is perceived, but this use of "perceive" is 
peripheral to, and parasitic on, the central, focal, meaning 
of "perceive". It is because such a case is similar in a way 
to the central case (as it clearly is) that we can talk of it 
as a case of perception. That the classification of such 
cases as perceivings is parasitic can be seen by considering 
the difficulties' that attend on the views that perceiving a 
physical object is nothing more than being caused by it in a 
certain way to give a differential response to it. We then 
get a picture of perception like that advanced by Dember at 
the beginning of his book "The Psychology of Perception": 
that which gives a differential response to a stimulus can be
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said to perceive it, as, for instance, an electric train which 
responds differently to different light-signals that act on a 
sensitive receptor it carries. Apart from the difficulties 
(ignored by Dember) of giving a precise formulation to tais 
doctrine, it is clearly false in that it implies that inanimate 
things like electric trains can perceive. And why is this? I 
suggest that the reason is that the concept of perception can 
only be applied to sensitive beings, even when it is only 
being applied in the attenuated sense of giving a differential 
response. But what is the rationale of this restriction? Is 
it not that it is only to sensitive beings that it can seem} 
as though something is the case, and that the central case of 
perception must involve such seeming^? Thus, though A may be 
said to perceive X even though it does not seem} to him as 
though something is the case, the focal meaning of "perceive" 
determines the range of applicability of the term in its 
peripheral uses, insofar as it can only be applied to beings 
that could be said to perceive in the central sense, i.e., which 
are such that it could seemq to them as though something is 
the case. (For a discussion of other peripheral cases of 
perception see pp203-o).
So I conclude that my view that A's perceiving X at t 
necessarily involves its seeming} to A at t as though something 
is the case has not been undermined by considerations relating 
to so-called unconscious perception: for it is the focal sense 
of "perceive" that interests me, and the vast majority of our 
seeings, hearings, etc., are perceivings in this focal sense 
of "perceive". I believe I can now mention a point which
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renders my view particularly attractive: it arises from the 
fact I mentioned on p 100, that the experiences involved in 
both perception and hallucination may have little or nothing 
about them which enables one who has them to distinguish them. 
Otherwise it is hard to see how one who is hallucinated should 
be deceived about the nature of the world about him.(it may be 
argued, as for instance. Professor Armstrong has, that hallu­
cination is nothing but a tendency produced via the senses to 
hold such false beliefs, but this view is implausible in that 
we feel the need to account for the production of these 
tendencies in terms of something else that is happening to the 
hallucinated man, a point made by several of Armstrong's 
critics.) But if the experiences in perception and hallucination 
must be similar, they should be describable in similar language.
A theory about the nature of the sense-experiences involved 
in perception is thus rendered more plausible if the description 
it gives of these experiences can apply as well to hallucinatory 
experiences. I suggest that expressions of the form "it 
seems} to A a though (as if) p" are in fact naturally and 
normally uæd in the description of hallucinatory experience, and 
that my theory is thus rendered more plausible.
This being so, I am disposed to accept the thesis that A 
cannot perceive X at t unless it seems^ to A at t as though 
something is the case, though I am prepared to treat any counter­
examples to this thesis that may be presented (l cannot myself 
think of any) on their merits. I conclude, then, that we 
have specified the phenomenon that we described as "A's having 
a sense-experience". It is nothing other than its seeming to A 
as though something is the case, in the sense of "seem" I
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illustrated by examples, and called "seem}".
SECTION 4» Is the second representative theory I sketched in 
Section 2 a correct analysis of the perception of 
a physical object?
The theory we have now to consider is the one I described on 
p 150. It offers the following account of perception:
"A's perceiving X at t is a matter of X's playing some 
part in bringing it about that A has a good representation of
X at t, i.e. that it seems^ to A at t as if there is anc<
with a set of characteristics p  (but not necessarily these 
characteristics only), X being an oC and comprising a 
fair number of X's properties". (Where to classify a thing as 
an (j/Q is to indicate its specific nature.) We have seen that 
it is indeed a necessary condition of A's perceiving X at t 
that it should seera^  to A at t as though something is the
case (l have altered the 'feeem" of the account on p I50 to
"seem}", in the light of the intervening discussion). But is 
it a necessary condition that it should seem^ to A at t as if 
there is an with a set of characteristics p  (but not 
necessarily these characteristics only), and X should be an 
and /I comprise a fair number of X's properties? In other 
words, is the contention involved in this theory about the way 
the sense-experience must represent the perceived object 
correct? It seems not. For I may perceive X, which is an 
even though it seems^ to me as though there is a . It may
be that what I see is a scarecrow, but that it looks^ to me 
as though there is a man. I may be seeing a dog, but all that
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may be properly included in a description of my sense-experienœ 
may be the words "It lookS} to me as though there is a small 
animal". In the case of things perceived at a distance, or in 
a bad light, it may only seem^ to the perceiver as though there 
is something there. When a sentry sees a man moving in the 
dark, it may seem} to him as though it was the shadow of a 
tree that moved. As to the demand that if X is to be perceived 
it must seem} to A that there is something that has a fair 
number of the properties that X actually has, the examples of 
things seen in the dark or at a great distance show that what 
it seemS} is there may be virtually uncharacterized. "It 
looked} as though something moved", "It looked} as though 
there was some sort of building". Moreover, the characteristics 
things possess may be quite misrepresented in a hall of illusion, 
and yet the things are still perceived. I may be seeing a tall, 
thin man even though it looks^ to me as if there is a short, 
fat person present.
This being so, I conclude that the demand that the perceiver's 
sense-experience be a good representation (in the sense describe d) 
of the perceived object is too severe, and would lead us to 
deny that perception occurred in many situations where it 
actually does. Moreover, I do not think that the theory we are 
now discussing contains an account of conditions sufficient for 
the perception of a physical object, either. For take the 
following case: suppose there are two identical light-bulbs, A 
and B. They are arranged so that A’s being switched on causes 
B to be illuminated, too. Suppose they are so placed that I 
see B when it is illuminated, but cannot see A at all. Now
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according to the theory when I see bulb B it seems^ to me 
as though there is a light-bulb with certain characteristics, 
most of which B possesses; but A also is a light-bulb with at 
least a majority of those characteristics (for A and B are 
identical), and A plays a part in bringing it about that I 
have a sense-experience, its seeming} to me as though there is 
a light-bulb with certain characteristics. So A plays a part 
in bringing about a sense-experience of mine which represents it 
just as much as B- So it must be seen by me at the time B is 
seen, if the theory under consideration is correct. But as by 
hypothesis it is unseen, the theory must be incorrect. So I 
conclude that the proposed theory contains conditions neither 
sufficient nor necessary for perception. However, we have seen 
that it contains a satisfactory account of what it is to have 
a sense-experience, and I believe that it is in part by the use 
of the concept ofhahng a good representation that it employs, or 
one closely related to it, that we will arrive at a satisfactory 
account of the perception of a physical object. I will now go 
on to consider what conditions the sense-experience involved in 
the perception of a physical object must fulfil, and whether it 
is possible, given that X must produce a sense-experience of A's, 
to arrive at conditions sufficient for X's being perceived 
merely by adding conditions about the way A's sense-experience 
must represent X.
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SECTION 5» Further attempts to advance a satisfactory representative 
theory of perception, employing the notion of seeming].
The first question we must ask is what conditions A's sense- 
experience must fulfil if it is to be the sense-experience 
involved in A's perception of a physical object, X. We have 
already seen (pp 1jO-1u2) that the sense-experience does not 
have to be a good representation of X: neither the species nor
the majority of the characteristics of the perceived object 
need be- represented by the sense-experience. This is shown 
by cases where things are seen at a distance, or in a bad light, 
or only fleetingly. There are also the cases mentioned by 
H.P. Grice ("The Causal Theory of Perception", AS Supp. Vol 
19cl, p 144): "Objects can be said to be seen even when they
are looked at through rough thick glass or distorting spectacles, 
in spite of the fact that they may then be unrecognizable".
But there are cases even more extreme than these. Sometimes 
when we see something distant of fast-moving, our sense-experience 
may only be a matter of its looking} to us as though there is 
a tiny speck or a vague blur ; when we see something in bad 
light it may only look} as though there is a dark shape; 
when something brushes against our body or we make a passing 
contact with it with our fingers, and so feel it, it may only 
feel} to us as though something is in contact with our body 
or fingers. I conclude that all that must be said if we are to 
specify the experience essential to A's perceiving X at t is 
that the experience must be an instance of its seeming^ to A 
at least as though (as if) something is there. Even though 
the fullest description a man can correctly give of his sense-
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experience at a particular time is "It feels as though something 
is there" or "It looks as though something is there", it may 
still be the case that the sense-experience he is having at 
that time is one that is involved in the perception of a 
physical object. Usually, of course, our sense-experiences 
have more detail - it looks^ to me now as though there is a 
table with a writing pad on it and a pen moving over the pad, 
and so on.
Let us now say that A has a seeming at t iff it seems} 
to A at t at least as though (as if) something is there. That 
is, it will be true of A at t that he has a seeming if it 
merely seems^ to him at t as though something is there, but 
it will be equally true of him if at t it seemS} to him as 
though there is a table with a writing pad on it in front of 
him, or a vast landscape with trees, hills, and rivers. I 
believe that we now have a full specification of the nature 
of the sense-experience that A must have if he is to perceive 
X at t: it must be the case that A has a seeming at t, in the
sense of this expression I have just introduced. Within the 
range of sense-experiences which can properly be called 
"seemings" there are some which represent a physical object in 
great detail, others that are merely cases of its seeming} as 
though something is there. If a man is to perceive a physical 
object, he must have a sense-experience at the time of his 
perceiving it that falls within this range, but it may fall 
anywhere within it, either representing the object well, poorly, 
or scarcely at all. Indeed, it would be hard to see how we 
could say the sort of sense-experience describable as its
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seeming’} to A merely as though something was there represented 
a particular physical object - for in what sense would it 
represent that object better than any other object taken at 
random?
Before leaving this topic I will make two observations 
about my choice of the term "having a seeming" to stand for 
the sort of sense-experience integral to perception. The first 
is to admit that the term is a barbarism. But it is chosen, I 
might say, for this purpose. By using it, as opposed to some 
expression like "having an appearance", which contains an 
expression in common usage, I avoid all the difficulties that 
may arise when philosophers employ words in common usage in 
some specialised sense of their own. No-one can accuse me of 
abusing terms in ordinary usage or of giving an illicit 
plausibility to my argument by clothing views which may be 
controversial in the garb of language which is used to make 
statements which all agree to be true. The oddness of the 
expression "having a seeming" is central to the second point 
I wish to make. This is an answer to the question: "Why don’t 
you say "having a seeming^", since you distinguish two senses 
of expressions of the form "it seems to A as though (as if) p"?" 
My answer is that whilst expressions of the last-mentioned 
form are common in ordinary talk, and can be used in more than 
one sense, a fact which my argument demanded I made clear by 
the use of an added numeral, there is no need to make such a 
distinction in the case of an expression which is a creation of 
my own. There can be no doubt about the meaning of expressions 
like "A has a seeming" whenever they occur subsequently in this
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work. So there is no need for the use of the added numeral.
So much for my discussion of the conditions that the sense- 
experience involved in the perception of a physical object 
must fulfil.
Let us now see if we can describe sufficient conditions 
for perception starting from the formula "A perceives X at t 
if X plays a part in causing A to have a good representation of 
X at t”, and adding further stipulations, but only about the 
nature of the representation, not about the nature of the 
causal relation. If we can describe sufficient conditions 
for perception in this way, we might conclude that we had 
defined a central case of perception, and that the other 
cases, where we admit that perception has occurred even though 
these conditions are not fulfilled, are offshoots of the central 
case. Having described the central case, we should then proceed 
to show how the other cases are related to it, and acquire their 
right to be called cases of perception.
Let us then try to describe a central case of perception.
Let us say that A has an optimal representation of X iff it 
seems^ to A as though there is an at place %  with a set 
of characteristics A (but not necessarily only these character­
istics); and X is an and is at and /B comprises a fair 
number of X's characteristics. (Where to classify a thing as 
an o( is to indicate its specific nature.) Then let us consider 
the suggestion that A perceives X at t if X plays a part in 
causing A to have an optimal representation of X at t. How 
this proposed analysis seems promising, as it avoids the 
difficulty of the account where it was only demanded that the
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sense-experience be a good representation of X. Our present 
account adds the further demand that the perceived object 
must be at the place where it seems^ as though there is an 
object which in other ways tallies with it. The problem about 
the previous account was that it implied that if A and B' &re 
qualitiatively identical, and both play a part in bringing it 
about that a man has a sense-experience, then if B is perceived 
by the man, A must be also. But this is not implied in our 
present account, for A and B cannot both be in the same place 
at the same time. If A and B are qualitatively identical 
objects, both in part responsible for a man*s having a sense- 
experience, which consists of its seeming^ to the man that 
there is an C< (let us suppose A and B are *s) at place TF^ 
then if B is being perceived, it will not, according to the 
account of perception now under consideration, follow that A 
is perceived as well; for among the reasons which must make 
us in this case say that B is being perceived is the fact that 
it is at and if B is at A cannot be there as well. So 
it will not fulfil the conditions for being perceived by the 
man simply because it is qualitatively identical with something 
else that does fulfil them, as happened on our previous account. 
However, the present account still implies that things which 
are not in fact perceived are perceived. Imagine there are 
two light-bulbs, A and B. A is at place p, but invisible to
an observer, 0. When A goes on, B is as a result illuminated.
B is visible to 0, and because of a cunning mirror arrangement, 
it looks^ as though B is at p. Now, when A is switched on, it
looksq to 0 as though there is a light-bulb at p, and there is
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a light-bulb at p; and the properties that the light-bulb at 
p possesses have as a sub-set the group p which comprises a 
fair number of the whole, and it looks^ as though there is a 
light-bulb at p which possesses /) ; and the light-bulb at
p plays a part in causing it to look^ to 0 as though there is 
a light-bulb at p. But the light-bulb at p is A, and on onar 
account this bulb A is seen. But, by hypothesis, it is not.
So our account is defective.
Perhaps an alternative account can be given that will be 
more successful. Let us say that A has an individual 
representation of X iff it seems^ to A as though X has character­
istics p (but not necessarily these characteristics only) and 
is in place , and X is afjl , and p comprises a fair number 
of X*s characteristics. Now is it the case that A perceives 
X at t if X plays a part in causing A to have an individual 
representation of X at t? If John plays a part in causing it 
to seem^ to me as though John is standing by the window, eatiig 
an apple, and John is in fact standing by the window eating an 
apple, doesn’t it follow that f perceive John? But consider 
the ruse employed by Sherlock Holmes in Conan Boyle’s tale 
"The Empty House". To frustrate his would-be assassins he had 
a lifelike dummy constructed, so that from a distance it looked^ 
as though he were sitting in a certain place. Suppose such a 
dummy were arranged so that it could only be seen from outside 
in a mirror. Let us suppose that to one looking from outside it 
looked^ as though,Sherlock Holmes was sitting at place p, as a 
result of the operations of this dummy-mirror arrangement. Now 
let us suppose Sherlock Holmes happens to be sitting at p at
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the time someone looks in from outside, but is of course 
invisible to the person because of the mirror arrangement.
Let us also suppose Sherlock Holmes has set up the dummy and 
mirror arrangement himself. Now it will be the case that 
Sherlock Holmes has played a part in bringing it about that it 
lookS]_ to the watcher as though Sherlock Holmes is sitting at 
place p, and it is in fact true that Sherlock Holmes is sitting 
at p. But, by hypothesis, he is not visible, whilst on the 
account under discussion the watcher perceives him. Our account, 
then,fails.
But how could A ’s sense-experience better represent X 
than an optimal or an individual representation does? It is 
impossible that it should. So I am led to the conclusion that 
over and above mention of X ’s causal role, and the way A ’s 
sense-experience represents X, there must be specified some 
other conditions before we arrive at an account of conditions 
sufficient for A ’s perceiving X.
SECTION 6, Conclusions
In this chapter I first discussed two versions of the 
representational theory, one of which involved reference to 
sense-data, and the other to its seeming^ as thou^ something 
was the case. Neither version proved acceptable, but in 
discussing the second I came up with what I consider to be an 
important result, in that I showed, as I believe, that it is 
a necessary condition of A ’s perceiving X at t that it should 
seem^ to A at t as though something is the case. (l marked out 
a particular sense of "seem" by the expression "seem^",
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illustrating my distinction by the use of examples.) I then 
went on to argue that it is further necessary if A is to perceive 
X at t that A should have a seeming- at t, giving a definition 
of the expression "have a seeming". I had already argued 
that it was not a necessary condition of A ’s perceiving X at 
t that he should have a good representation of X at t, and that 
it was not a sufficient condition of A ’s perceivingX at t that 
X should play a part in bringing it about that A had a good 
representation of X at t. I then went on to show that it was 
not a sufficient condition of this occurrence that X should plqy 
a part in bringing it about that A had either an optimal or 
an individual representation of X at t. (l gave definitions of 
the notions of having good, optimal, and individual represent­
ations of a physical object.) I am thus led to suppose that in 
order to give sufficient conditions for A ’s perceiving X it will 
be necessary to consider the nature of the causal relation 
between the perceived object and the perceiver in perception. 
Perhaps it is by specifying this in some way I will come closer 
to the account I desire. I believe that this specification will 
involve reference to one of the notions of representation I have 
introduced in this chapter, or one similar to it. Representation 
may thus figure in perception, but in a less obvious way than 
traditionally was supposed. However, this will become clearer 
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE NATURE OP TE CAUSAL RELATION INVOLVED IN
E-IE PERCEPTION OF A PHYSICAL OBJECT.
SECTION 1. Introduction
We have seen that we cannot arrive at a set of conditions 
sufficient for A ’s perceiving X merely by stipulating that X 
play a p .,rt in causing A to have a sense-experience and then 
by describing what the nature of this sense-experience must be.
We have seen, though, that it is necessary, if A is to perceive 
X at t, that A should have a seeming at t, in the sense I gave 
to that expression in the last chapter. I suggest that we now 
attempt to give a set of conditions jointly sufficient and 
separately necessary for A’s perceiving X at t by enlarging- 
on the mode of causation by which X plays its part in causing 
A to have a seeming at t. When we considered Grice’s proposed 
account of perception in Chapter 4> it seemed that it might be 
possible to arrive at sufficient conditions for perception by 
enlarging on this mode of causation. But Grice’s account did 
not, we considered, have the requisite generality. I believe 
that if the mode of causation is described in a sufficiently 
general way, we will get nearer to specifying conditions both 
sufficient and necessary for A’s perceiving X. I shall attempt 
to come closer to these conditions in this manner in the present 
chapter.
SECTION 2. First attempts to specify the nature of the causal
relation involved in the perception of a physical cb^pct, 
Let us begin by considering the suggestion that A perceives X at 
t iff X is the cause of A ’s having a seeming at t. I will not
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attempt to describe the conditions under which something is 
properly called "the cause", as opposed to "a cause", of some­
thing else. However, it is plain that we do make this 
distinction, and perhaps it is as the cause of the seeming 
that we distinguish the object of perception from other things 
that along with it produce that seeming, but are not perceived. 
But in fact it does not always seem to be the case that the 
perceived object is the cause of the perceiver*s having,; the 
seeming involved in its being perceived. Take the case where 
I am looking for a book in a dark room. A friend puts the light 
on, and I see the book. What in this case is the cause of my 
perceptual experience, the one involved in my seeing the 
book? There surely is one, and can there be any doubt that it 
is my friend’s putting the light on, not the book or anything 
about it. But this does not entail that I don’t perceive the 
book. And the same example shows that X ’s being the cause of 
A ’s having a seeming is not a sufficient condition of A ’s 
perceiving X; for it may well be the case that I do not 
perceive my friend, though he is the cause of my having the 
experience I do.
Let us try to find some other way of formulating conditions 
for A’s percedng X by means of specifying the causal relation 
between X and A’s having the seeming. We must clearly try to 
ensure that it does not follow from our account that in every 
case of perception the perceiver’s brain and sense-organs are 
perceived, just because they play a part in causing the 
perceptual experience. We might attempt to do this by 
stipulating that the perceived object must be involved in the
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causal process leading to the production of the seeming before 
any part of the perceiver’s body is involved in the process.
But what further specification must we add so that our account 
will not imply that if I see an object by the light of an 
electric light bub, I must see the bulb, because it plays a 
causal role in the production of my perceptual experience?
It might seem to the case that we should avoid this difficulty 
by stipulating that the object perceived must be the last 
physical object involved in the causal process before any part 
of the perceiver*s body is involved in it. But on the above 
stipulation, a man who wears spectacles will never see anything 
but his spectacles. Indeed, it is plain that no limitation 
can be placed on the number of objects that may be involved in 
a perceptual process after the perceived object, but before 
any part of the perceiver’s body, has been ivolved in it; there 
may be none, or, as in the case of a thing seen by means of 
a set of mirrors, as in a periscope, there may be many. Similarly, 
in the case of hearing, when we hear an echo, we hear the thing 
that produces the sound, not the object or objects that reflect 
it. Perhaps it may be thought that we could avoid these 
problems by stipulating that the object perceived must be the 
last physical object, excepting reproducing media, to be 
involved in the causal process before any part of the perceiver’s 
body is involved in it. We could then say that spectacles, 
mirrors, and the like were reproducing media. But how could we 
define "reproducing medium"? Only it would seem, on the 
following lines: "M is a reproducing medium iff physical objects
may be perceived even though M is involved subsequently to them
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in processes leading to the production of the seemings involved 
in the perception of the physical objects". But then there would 
be a circle if we defined "perception" in terms of "reproducing 
medium". Moreover, if we stipulate that the object perceived 
is always the one involved in the causal process before any 
reproducing medium, this falsely implies that we can never 
perceive spectacles, mirrors, etc.
But anyway it is plain that the line of argument we have 
been pursuing is vitiated by two obviously false assumptions. 
First, that the perceived object is always outside the perceivæ’s 
body. But it is plain that when I feel something, it is usually 
in contact with my body - so it is not involved in the 
perceptual process before any part of my body is. Often, 
indeed, the perceived object is within my body, as when I feel 
the hypodermic needle sinking into my arm. Finally, and most 
obviously, it is possible to perceive one’s own body, its limbs, 
its surfaces, and even the muscles and organs beneath its 
surface. The second false assumption is that there is only 
one causal process external to the perceiver*s body that 
contributes to bringing about his having the seeming. This is 
not so. Suppose I wake up and see my clock, and the seeming 
involved in my seeing the clock is S. Also suppose that I 
would not have woken up unless the church bell had roused me.
Now the church bell played a part in producing S: if it had not 
rung, I would not have had S. But we do not want to say that 
because of its causal role, the church bell is perceived when 
I have S. There are many causes, external to the perceiver’s 
body, of his having seemings, which are not perceived when he
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has those seemings. We may conclude that these attempts to 
specify the nature of the causal relation involved in 
perception have failed. I believe, however, that we can do 
better.
We may remember that Price thought that the causal theorist 
could render his theory more plausible by distinguishing the 
standing from the differential conditions of our sense-experiences, 
(Price takes the having of a sense-experience to be the having of 
a sense-datum), Price realised that it was utterly implausible 
to say that, if an object causes a man to have a sense-experience 
of some sort, then it is for that reason perceived by the man.
For our sense-experiences may have unperceived causes. He 
thought that only if objects caused men to have sense-experiences 
as differential conditions of those experiences was it reasonable 
to say that the men perceived the objects. He wrote:
("Perception", p 70): "There are certain conditions which 
condition all the sense-data of any one sense, conditions in 
the absence of which none of them can come into being: in the 
case of visual sense-data there must be a source of light, an 
eye, a retina, an optic nerve, etc. . . . But these standard 
conditions, just because they are necessary to all the visual 
sense-data alike, do not determine any one of them. For that, 
something more is wanted, a varying or differential condition 
which accounts for the difference between this square one 
and that elliptical one. Obviously it is quite absurd to 
identify . . M (the perceived object) with any or all of the 
standing conditions of S (the sense-datum); but it is quite 
plausible to identify it with the differential condition of S."
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Now it is plain that, according to Price, C is a standing 
condition of A’s sense-experience if it conditions the nature 
of A ’s experience as a whole, but does Price mean to say that 
D is a differential condition of A ’s sense-experience if it 
conditions some particular detail of A ’s sense-experience, or, 
quite distinctly, if it conditions some particular detail, 
but not the whole nature, of A’s experience? For only if he 
means the second of these is it true, as he assumes, that a 
condition cannot both be a differential and a standing condition 
of a particular experience. For a particular object may 
condition both the whole and a particular detail of a man’s 
visual sense-experience, for instance, when a man sees the 
objects in his room by the light of an electric bulb, and one 
of the things he sees is the bulb itself. Here the bulb is 
both a standing and a differential condition of the same sense- 
experience, if we take "differential condition" in the first 
sense proposed.
Now it does seem to me that, if we take "differential 
condition" in the first sense proposed, it is a necessary 
condition of A’s perceiving X that X is a differential condition 
of A ’s sense-experience. For it seems that unless X plays a 
considerable part in determining what I shall call "the detail" 
of A ’s seeming, or at least whatever detail A ’s seeming has, 
then we would not wish to say that A perceived X. By "the 
detail of a seeming", I mean the characteristics that distinguish 
it from other seemings, e.g., one seeming may be a matter of 
its seeming^ as though there is a big black cat on the mat, 
whilst another may be a matter of its seeming^ as thou^ there
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is a small blue box with white lettering on it. Both of these 
phenomena are seemings, but they differ in detail. It is clear 
that we must say "If A is to perceive X, X must play a 
considerable part in determining whatever detail A’s seeming has", 
for it may be that A’s seeming is virtually uncharacterised, 
virtually without detail, as I pointed out on p 1?1. It may 
only be a matter of its seeming-^  ^ to A as though something is 
there.
I will now say that X plays a differential part in bringing 
it about that A has a seeming, s, iff X both plays a part in 
bringing it about that A has s, and, if s has any detail, 
largely determines what that detail is. I then suggest that 
it is at least a necessary condition of A’s perceiving X at t 
that X should play a differential part in bringing it about 
that A has a seeming at t. That this is necessary is, I think, 
amply shown by the examples Price advances. For instance, thou^ 
the sun usually plays a part in bringing about the visual sense- 
experiences we have when we see things during daytime, it is 
only said to be perceived when it plays a particularly 
significant part in determining the detail of our visual sense- 
experiences, as in the case when it looks^ to us as though the 
sun is peeping over the horizon.
But it is plain that it is not a sufficient condition of 
A ’s perceiving X at t that X should play a differential part in 
bringing it about that A has a seeming at t. Two examples will 
suffice to show this. The first is that of Grice’s expert with 
his device for stimulating a man’s cortex so that it looks^ to 
the man as though there is a clock on the shelf. The device in
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question clearly plays a differential part in bringing it about 
that the man has a seeming at t, supposing it is activated just 
before t. For it largely determines the detail of the man’s 
sense-experience. But clearly we do not wish to say that the 
device is perceived. The second relates to a case where a man 
has a virtually undetailed seeming. Now it will be true of 
anything that plays a part in bringing it about that someone 
has such a seeming that it plays a differential part. For 
the second condition that a thing had to fulfil if it was to 
play a differential part in bringing it about that someone had 
a seeming will not apply in this case, as it was only to apply 
if the seeming in question had some detail.
So I must continue, and attempt to discover if there is 
something else about the causal link between a physical object 
and a person’s having a seeming that, given that the conditions 
so far described are fulfilled, can ensure that the person is 
perceiving the object.
SECTION 3* Further specification of the nature of the causal 
relation involved in the perception of a physical 
object.
y
I shall now attempt to formulate a further condition, relating 
to the way in which X plays its part in bringing it about that 
A has a seeming, which is needed to supply the deficiency in 
my present account of what it is for A to perceive X. I shall 
try to be as precise as I can, but at certain points a degree 
of vagueness will creep in: I am not sure whether this is to 
be attributed to my own lack of philosophical acumen or to the
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nature of the subject-matter, I suggest that we may find out 
what we are looking for if we consider what it is that makes 
our perception of physical objects a reliable guide, so to speak, 
to their nature, as it clearly is. It seems to be true that 
when we perceive physical objects we usually have what I have 
called good representations of them, if not something better.
As I write this, I see my pen, and it looks^ to me as though 
there is a blue and silver pen moving across a piece of paper 
about a foot before my eyes, and all this detail of my sense- 
experience is correct. There is such a pen, it has these 
characteristics, and it is where it looks^ to be. And this 
applies generally, I believe, to the majority of the things 
we perceive. In perception it usually seems^ to us as though 
there is a physical object of a certain sort and with certain 
characteristics and in a certain place; and usually the physical 
object perceived is of that sort, has those characteristics, 
and is in that place. So the majority of the sense-experiences 
occurring in perception are likely to be at least good 
representations of the physical objects in the perception of 
which they are involved. Furthermore, this seems not to be a 
contingent matter,
I suggest that in giving an explanation of these facts we 
will be led to a grasp of the true nature of the causal relation 
that must obtain between a perceived object and the perceiver*s 
sense-experience. The explanation of these facts is, I believe, 
something of this sort: that it is necessary, if A is to
perceive X, not only that X should play a differential part in 
bringing it about that A has a seeming, but also that X should
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play its part in. a way such that, if any physical object plays 
a part in bringing it about that a person has a sense-experience 
in that way, then it is highly probable that the sense- 
experience will be at least a good representation of ihat 
physical object. (When I say a sense-experience is at least a 
good representation of X I mean it is either a good representation 
of X or an optimal representation of X or represents X better 
than a good representation in some other fashion than that in 
which an optimal representation does, e.g., a sense-experience 
might represent the colour-qualities of X better than a good 
representation need do, whereas an optimal representation 
represents the spatial relations of X better than a good 
representation need do.) If the way in which X plays its part 
in bringing it about that A has a seeming has to fulfil the 
condition I have just mentioned, if perception is to occur, 
then it is easy to see why a perceiver*s sense-experience must 
usually be a good representation of the object perceived. For 
if the perceived object must play its part in bringing about the 
seeming in such a way, then it is necessarily true that it 
highly probable that the seeming involved in each case of 
perception will be at least a good representation of the object 
perceived, and this entails that in the vast majority of cases 
the seemings involved in perception will be at least good 
representations of the physical objects perceived.
Thus I have suggested a further condition necessary for 
A ’s perceiving X. But before I can plausibly advance a set of 
conditions, of which this is one, that are jointly sufficient 
for A ’s perceiving X, I must meet a difficulty. The difficulty
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relates to the fact that one and the same sense-experience both may 
and may not at one and the same time represent a physical object, since
it may well represent that object as it was at time t, but not
represent it as it was at time t^, if the object has changed in
the interval between t and t],, We may therefore ask the questicn :
"Given that the sense-experience involved in the perception of a 
physical object at t is likely to be at least a good represent­
ation of it, is it likely to be a good representation of it as 
it is, or was, at any particular time?" The immediate temptation 
is to answer: "The sense-experience involved in the perception at 
t of a physical object is likely to be at least a good represent­
ation of it as it is at a particular time, and that time is t".
We have a natural desire to assent to the view that the sense- 
experience involved in the perception of a physical object is 
likely to be at least a good representation of it as it is at the 
time it is perceived. But then we may call to mind the fact that 
the causal processes by means of which physical objects, when 
perceived, bring it about that the perceiver has a seeming take 
time, and may of course take a very long time indeed. They may 
take so long that the sense-experiences they culminate in may not 
represent the physical objects that initiate them as they were at 
that time* indeed, these physical objects may not just have changed, 
but may even have ceased to exist. There is no difficulty in 
supposing that the distant star we are now seeing may not now exist;
(it is one of the advantages of my account of perception that it is 
quite compatible with our making such a supposition.) Bearing in 
mind these facts, I think we are led to the view that in perceiving 
a physical object one is likely to have at least a good representation
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of that object as it was when it played its part in bringing about 
one’s sense-experience. Normally, the time-lag between the object’s 
playing its part and the occurrence of the sense-experience is so 
tiny that it can virtually be ignored, but this is not always the 
case.
It is plain that I will have to make an alteration in the 
condition that I demanded be fulfilled by the way a perceived 
object brought about a perceiver*s seeming. Let us now say that it 
is a necessary condition of A’s perceiving X at t that X should play 
a part in bringing it about that A has a seeming at t, and that X 
should play its part in a way that is productive of good 
representations. And let us say that a way, M, in which physical 
objects may play a part in bringing it about that people have sense- 
experiences, is productive of good representations iff, if any 
physical object plays a part in bringing it about that a person has 
a sense-experience by means of M, than it is highly probable that 
the sense-experience will be at least a good representation of that 
physical object as it was when it played its part in bringing about 
the sense-experience.
I think it is far from implausible, if we employ this notion 
of what it is to be productive of good representations, to suggest 
that it is a sufficient condition of A’s perceiving X at t that X 
should play a differential part in bringing it about that A has a 
seeming at t, and play its part in a way productive of good represent­
ations. What seems to me to be implausible is to suggest that it is 
a necessary condition of A ’s perceiving X that X should play its 
part in a way productive of good representations. Some qualifications 
must be made to this thesis, as expressed at present. What these are
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will become apparent as we consider three matters.
First, we must take into account the fact that it might well 
be the case that under certain circumstances a physical object which 
brings about a sense-experience in a certain way, M, will be likely 
to bring about a sense-experience that is a good representation of 
itself, whilst under different circumstances if it brou^t about 
sense-experiences in way M it would be most unlikely to bring about 
a sense-experience that is a good representation of itself. Let us 
imagine that, contrary to what is presumably the case, hallucinations 
are often caused by a special type of process that is initiated by a 
small group of terrestial objects, and by no others. Let us suppose 
these objects emit some type of ray - let us call it an H-ray - 
which afiects the brains of those within a certain range so that 
they are hallucinated. It is clear that normally when one of these 
objects produces a man’s sense-experience, this sense-experience, 
being hallucinatory, is not at all likely to be a good representation 
of the object that produces it. But let us now suppose that the 
same object is taken by spacemen to another galaxy, and there it is 
found that the processes involving the object and a man, where H-rays 
from the object cause the man to have a sense-experience, usually 
result in his having at least a good representation of the object.
This is found to be due to the presence of some factor in this 
galaxy which is not found on Earth. Now it is plain enough what we 
would want to say: that on Earth the process involving H-rays was 
not a way of bringing about sense-experiences that was productive of 
good representations, and could not be involved in perception; whereas 
in that galaxy it was a way productive of good representations, and 
could - and probably was - involved in perception.
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To take these considerations into account, we must alter our 
definition of A’s perceiving X, and say rather:
A perceives X at t iff X plays a differential part in bringing 
it about that A has a seeming, s, at t, and plays its part in a 
way that is productive of good representations in the general 
circumstances in which A has s and X plays its part in bringing 
this about.
We thus recognise that a way of bringing about sense-experiences 
is never productive of good representations simpliciter, but always 
productive of good representations in certain circumstances. But 
it will be noted that I have not demanded that X play its part in 
a way productive of good representations in the totality of 
circumstances in which A has s, etc., but only in the general 
circumstances in which A has s, etc. What do I mean by "in the 
general circumstances", and why do I not make the stronger demand? 
What I have in mind is something like this: there may well be a 
drug, which, when administered to subjects, has the result that the 
visual seemings they have which are brought about in the way or ways 
characteristic of vision are no longer likely to be at least good 
representations of the things that bring them about in this way.
We would not, for this reason, want to say that the objects 
bringing about th^ visual seemings in the usual way or ways were 
not seen. This, I suggest, is because being affected by the drug 
is not a feature common to all the potential perceivers in a 
certain extensive portion of space for a certain considerable period 
of time, this portion and this period being the ones somewhere in 
which the perceivings in question occur. Only factors that apply 
generally throughout an extensive portion of space and for a
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considerable amount of time are relevant to our enquiry when we 
wish to determine whether a way in which physical objects play 
a differential part in bringing about seemings is one such that a 
person in that part of the space-time continuum may properly be 
said to perceive a physical object in virtue of being affected in 
that way by the object so as to have a seeming. We need only take 
into account whether the way in question is productive of good 
representations in these general circumstances, i.e. under these 
conditions applying generally throughout a large portion of space 
and over a long period of time, when deciding whether a person 
and an object, both situated in that portion of space and in that 
period of time, can respectively be perceiver of, and perceived by, 
the other. We do not need to take into account whether the way is 
productive of good representations under less general conditions, 
e.g. in the circumstances where the person is under the influence 
of a drug.
The second matter I think we must take into account relates 
to any discussion in Chapter 6, Section 3. There I suggested that 
not only was A’s having a sense-experience a matter of its seeming^ 
to A as though something was the case, but also that there were., 
at least five main species of seeming^, viz., looking^, sounding^, 
smelling^, tasting^, and feeling^. Now let us suppose that there 
is a way, M, in which physical objects play a differential part 
in bringing about people’s seemings, which for roughly half the 
time brings about visual sense-experiences (a visual sense-experience 
being a matter of its looking^ as though something is the case) 
that are in the vast majority of cases at least good representations 
of the physical objects which play their part thus. But let us
- 194 -
suppose that equally often tactual sense-experiences are brought 
about thus (a tactual sense-experience being a matter of its 
feeling^ as though something is the case), and these are scarcely 
ever even good representations of the objects thus playing their 
part. Will this fact lead us to say that M is not a way, in 
which physical objects can play a differential part in bringing 
about seemings, that is productive of good representations? Will
we not, rather, wish to say that M is productive of visual sense-
experiences that are good representations, and is not productive 
of good tactual representations?
Let us therefore say that its looking^ as though p, its 
sounding^ as though p, its smelling^ as though p, its tasting^ 
as though p, its feeling^ as though p, and any other equally 
general sort of sense-experience which we might at a future date 
encounter, are types of sense-experiences. (l ignore the contention 
that feeling^ does not have the unity of the other sorts, and
itself contains diverse sorts of sense-experiences. If this
contention is correct, my account of a type of sense-experience 
needs only a little alteration.) I now offer the following 
definitions:
(l) A way, M, in which physical objects may play a part in bringing 
it about that people have sense-experiences is productive of good 
representations of type Z, iff, if any physical object plays a 
part in bringing it about that a person has a sense-experience 
of type Z by means of M, then it is highly probably that the sense- 
experience will be at least a good representation of that physical 
object as it was when it played its part in bringing about the 
sense-experience.
-  195 -
A perceives X at t iff X plays a differential part in 
bringing it about that A has a seeming, s, of type Z, at t, and 
plays its part in a way that is productive of good representations 
of type Z in the general circumstances in which A has s and X 
plays its part in bringing this about.
The third matter for consideration is my account of what it 
is to have a good representation. This was given on p 149*
According to this account, A cannot have such a representation of 
X unless it seems^ to him as though there is an , and X is 
in fact an , where to say that a thing is an iX. is to indicate 
its specific nature. But if the causal relation involved in 
perception has, as I have demanded, to be (with certain provisos) 
productive of good representations, then it is surely too much 
to ask that when a man has a good representation of, say, Fido, 
it must seem^ to him as though there is a dog, or in general when 
he has a good representation of an , it must seem^ to him as
though there is an • For in the case of feeling physical objects, 
the correct description of the seeming involved in this sort of 
perception is not normally "its feeling to us as though there is 
a man", or "its feeling to us as though there is an aeroplane", or 
"its feeling to us as though there is a wall". Probably in most 
cases of perception by feeling the correct description of our 
seeming will be something like "it feels to me as though there is 
something hard, dry, and flat" or "it feels to me as though there 
is something hairy and warm and trembling".
I therefore propose to alter my account of what it is to have 
a good representation, as follows:
A has a good representation of X as it is (was) at t iff it
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seems^ to A as though (as if) there is a physical object with a 
set of characteristics (but not necessarily these characteristics 
only); and X is (was) a physical object that exists (existed) at t, 
and p  comprises (comprised) a fair number of the characteristics 
that X has (had) at t.
(in the light of my discussion on pp 189-901 have defined not 
simply what it is to have a good representation of X but rather 
what it is to have a good representation of X as it is (was) at a 
particular time.)
I have thus weakened my thesis, and now suggest that when one 
perceives physical objects it needs only to be the case that one 
usually has seemings properly describable as "its seeming^ as 
though there is a physical object with such-and-such properties", 
where the physical objects in the perception of which the seemings 
are involved do have the properties represented in the seemings. 
Though I have weakened my thesis, this fact will not appear in
the statement of my account of the perception of a physical object.
This as follows;
A perceives X at t iff X plays a differential part in bringirg- 
it about that A has a seeming, s, of type Z, at t, and plays its 
part in a way that is productive of good representations of type Z 
in the general circumstances in which A has s and X plays its part 
in bringing this about.
(where the technical terms I use have the meaning I attached 
to them when I introduced them, either in this chapter or the 
previous one, and the later accout of what it is to have a good 
representation (the one I have just given) is understood to super­
sede the one I gave on p 149•)
I believe there is a great deal of truth in the account of the
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perception of a physical object that I have just given. It is 
(subject to two provisos that I will mention at the end of 
this section) the best account I am at present able to give. It 
would be foolish of me to suppose that it is devoid of difficulties 
and insusceptible to improvements. However, I think a 
consideration of the cases in which we allow, or refuse to allow, 
that physical objects are perceived goes a long way towards 
recommending my account. I cannot myself think of a case where 
we would allow that perception occurred, even though one or more 
of the conditions I have described was not fulfilled; nor of a 
case where all the conditions are fulfilled where we would wish 
to deny that perception occurred (but see the discussion in the 
next section). If difficulty should arise, I do not think it 
will relate to the suggestion that I (and others) have made out 
that it is a necessary condition of A's perceiving X at t that 
X should play a differential part in bringing it about that A 
has a seeming of some type at t; rather, it will relate to 
the further condition I have specified, that X should play its 
part in bringing about this seeming in a way that is productive 
of good representations of that type in the general circumstances 
of the causal transaction between X and A ’s having the 
seeming.
Now that this further condition is necessary is suggested by 
the fact that all the normal cases of perception we acknowledge 
satisfy it. I now see this piece of paper, and it plays a 
differential part in bringing it about that I have a visual seeming.
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But is not the way in which it plays this part, i.e. by reflecting 
light-waves emitted by the sun, which go on to affect my eyes and 
then my brain in certain fashions that are more or less mysterious, 
one which is productive of good visual representations in the 
general circumstances of the causal transaction between the paper 
and me? Isn’t a way of producing sense-experiences which fulfils 
the condition I laid down always involved when I see, or otherwise 
perceive, any physical object at all? The ways may differ from 
case to case: if we consider only vision, there are causal processes 
involving mirrors or other surfaces that reflect light, there are 
others which envolve media such as spectacles or binoculars;
But all these ways fulfil the condition I laid down. This 
conclusion is reinforced by consideration of a refined version 
of the example used by Grice, for a different purpose, of the 
specialist who can cause a man to have a good representation of 
a clock on a shelf by stimulating his cortex. Let us suppose that 
the specialist, having placed his device in the man’s brain, waits 
till he sees that the man is looking at the clock on the shelf 
before activating the device. Here, it is plain, the man does 
not see the clock, at least, not if we suppose that the only 
sense-experience the specialist can produce by activating the 
device is a good representation of a clock on a shelf. Thus, the 
man does not see the clock. But the clock clearly plays a differential 
part in bringing about his seeming. For if the expert hadn’t seen 
that the clock was being looked at by the unfortunate subject, he 
wouldn’t have activated the device. I suggest the reason why we 
deny that perception occurs is that the way in which the specialist 
brings about the man’s seeming is not productive of good
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representations of whatever type the man*s seeming belongs to, in 
the general circumstances of the causal transaction between the 
clock and the man. Imagine that the specialist had activated the 
device when he saw that the man was looking at something other than 
a clock on a shelf. Suppose he did it when there was a radio set 
there, just to baffle the man. Then there would have been no 
good representation of the object, the radio set, which played its 
part in bringing about a seeming in the way in question.
That the condition relating to the way's being productive of 
good representations is, in conjunction with the others I described, 
sufficient for perception is, I think, suggested by a case similar 
to the one I have just mentioned, but . different in one significant 
particular. That is of a man who has been blinded, and is then 
fitted with a movable light-sensitive plate on his forehead which 
transmits impulses to a device implanted in his brain. As a 
result, when physical objects affect the plate by means of light­
waves, he normally has at least good representations of them, 
just as he would if he still had the use of his eyes, I think that 
in this case we would be very tempted to say that the blind man had 
been given his sight back, and saw the objects affecting the plate. 
But his situation is like that of the subject of the specialist's 
whimsical experiments, except that the way in which the physical 
objects play their part in bringing about his seemings fulfils my 
proposed conditon, whereas the way in which the clock, via the 
specialist's intervention, played its part in bringing about the 
subject's seeming did not.
I have thus given, to the best of my ability, an account of 
what it is to perceive a physical object. I shall now go on in
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the next section of this chapter to deal with certain possible 
objections to my account. In dealing with one of them I shall 
admit that there are what might be called "peripheral" cases of 
perception of physical objects, to which my account does not 
apply. But this admission will not cause me to alter my account:
I shall, rather, argue that its scope is more limited than my 
treatment of the topic so far might have suggested. In the last 
chapter of my thesis I will, amongst other things, consider 
objections to my theory which spring from the existence of a wide 
range of things which can properly be said to be perceived. In 
the face of these objections I shall not give up my account of 
what it is to perceive a physical object, but I shall distinguish 
two senses in which, I believe, physical objects are said to be 
perceived, and suggest that my present account embodies a plausible 
analysis of the more basic of these senses.
SECTION 4* Objections to my account of the perception of a physical 
object.
I have used technical terminology, invented by myself, in giving 
my account of perception, so much is plain. But I do not think 
this lays me open to the sort of charges which Grice rightly made 
against Chisholm's version of the causal theory, that his theory 
made reference to notions that ordinary people may well not have, 
even though they have the concept of perception. For my technical 
terminology is all cashable - indeed, it is always cashed - in 
terms of everyday expressions which anyone who had the concept of 
perception might be expected to know and understand. It may be 
said that, on my view, the concept of perception (i.e. of the genus
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of seeing, hearing, feeling etc.) that ordinary people have is 
rather complex. But I see no reason (a priori) why this should 
not be so.
A stronger objection, similar to the one which Grice takes 
note of ( AS Supp. Vol 1961 p 144), relates to the question whether, 
if my account is correct, one could ever know that one was perceiving 
a physical object. For, on my account, this would involve knowing 
that there was a physical object which had played a differential 
part in bringing it about that one was having the seeming that one 
was having, and that it had played its part in a way productive of 
good representations, etc. But the normal man is incapable of 
specifying in any detail the ways his seemings are brought about, 
and even a scientist may admit there are details of the processes 
which remain as yet unclarified. So if one does not know the 
nature of the ways in question, how can one know that they are
productive of good representations, etc.? The first point that I
would make in answer to this objection is that it is quite possible
that I should know quite important facts about the way in which
something is brought about and yet not have any precise knowledge 
about what the way in question is. Suppose I am in London and my 
mother is in a small town in central France. A letter from her 
arrives for me one morning, and I know was posted the night before.
I will be quite perplexed when I consider how it could have been 
conveyed to me so quickly, but one quite important thing I will 
know - that the way in which the letter has been conveyed is 
quicker than the normal one. However, the objector has a reply to 
make: that it is not necessary if I am to know that the letter has 
been conveyed in a remarkably speedy way that I should be able to
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recognise the way in which it has been conveyed. All I need to 
know is that it has been conveyed and that letters usually take 
much longer to make the journey from central France to London.
But in the case of knowing that the way in which a physical object 
has played a part in bringing it about that one has a seeming is 
a way productive of good representations, etc., it necessary that 
one should be able to recognise the way in question, the objector 
will insist. For what must happen in this case is that I recognise 
that the way in which my seeming is brought about is the same as 
one which, as I have discovered for myself or have been informed, 
is productive of good representations, etc. And if it is the case 
that I have discovered this for myself, then I must have been able 
to recognise the way in question: how else could I have come to 
know that physical objects that played a part in bringing it about 
that people had seemings in that way were likely to have good 
representations, etc.? But I cannot recognise a way of bringing 
about seemings with which I am familiar unless I can give a 
detailed specification of the nature of the way, it will be asserted, 
My reply comes in two parts. First, it is far from clear 
that I cannot recognise that certain phenomena are brought about 
in the same way unless I can give a detailed specification of the 
nature of the way. (Grice makes this point, op. cit. p 144)•
For instance, I may recognise that a piece of music is being 
rendered in the same way as I have heard it rendered before, without 
being able to specify in any detail the nature of the technique 
involved; I can recognise that a bowler has delivered two balls 
in the same way without being able to specify the way in any detail. 
I will be able to say something about the way in which the phenomena
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were produced, in both cases, but then the ordinary man is able 
to say something about the way physical objects affect him when 
he perceives them. My second point is that it is equally unclear 
that my knowing that the letter I have received has been conveyed 
in an unusually fast way and my knowing that I am perceiving a 
physical object, which, inter alia, involves my knowing that I am 
being caused to have a seeming in a certain way, are comparable 
in the way which the objector assumes. It is clear that in order 
to know that the letter has been conveyed in the way it has, I 
must be able to give reasons that support the proposition which I 
know. But must this be true when it is a matter of my claiming 
to know that I am perceiving a physical object? It is plain that 
there are propositions which we can properly be said to know even 
though we cannot provide evidence, give reasons, for their being 
true. Perhaps, thai, we can know that we are perceiving a physical 
object, and thus that the seeming we are having is brought about 
partly by a physical object acting in a way productive good 
representations, etc., even though we cannot truthfully say to 
ourselves: "I recognise the way this seeming is brought about and 
I know it is the same as one which I have learned to be productive 
of good representations, etc."
The final objection that I will discuss relates to the fact 
that we are said to see things on television and the cinema screen, 
hear things on the radio or on a record. It may be said against my 
view that if it is correct, such cases of seeing and hearing will 
be classed in with such cases of seeing as that which is now 
occurring with regard to me and the paper on which I am writing and 
such cases of hearing as that which is now occurring with regard to
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me and the workmen talking in the yard, outside my open window.
It may be said that the sense of "see" in which I now see this 
paper is different from the sense in which I saw Hitler on ieLevision 
last week; that the sense q£ "hear" in which I now hear the men 
outside is different from the sense in which I heard Bessie Smith 
on record not so long ago; but that on my account of perception 
no distinction would be made between these cases, and all alike 
would count as cases of perception, on the same level. Now it is 
plain that this objection can only be valid if the assumption it 
contains is correct, that I perceived Hitler and Bessie Smith in 
the cases I just mentioned in a different sense of "perceive" 
from that in which I now perceive this paper and the workmen in 
the yard. But I am not persuaded that this assumption is correct. 
Rather, I believe that these cases of perception by television, 
on the cinema screen, by radio, on record, and in similar ways 
are to be compared with the case of subliminal perception I 
mentioned on pp I64-6. There I argued that a man might properly 
be said to perceive a physical object even though he did not ha.ve 
a seeming at the time of perception, and not in a different sense 
of "perceive" from that in which we normally perceive. Rather, I 
suggested that perception without having a seeming was a peripheral 
case of perception, and the cases of perception which I was giving 
an account of were focal ones. I believe the same is true of the 
cases of perception which the objector is now making reference to: 
they do not satisfy the conditions I have laid down for perception, 
but it does not follow that they are perceived in a different sense 
of "perceive" from that in which most things are perceived. They 
are cases that to some degree differ from, but, to a greater extent, 
resemble the central cases of perception.
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It may be asked in what respects I think they fail to satisfy 
the conditions I have laid down for perception. I think they more 
O r  less fail to fulfil the conditon that demands that the seeming 
involved in perception must be brought about in a way productive 
of good representations, etc, , . . For when we see something on 
television, and, even more obviously on the screen, it is not the
case that it is highly probable that we will have at least a good
representation of it as it was when it played its part in bringing ab­
out the visual seeming. The most obvious way in which the seemings 
involved in such cases are defective is that they usually misrepresent
(insofar as they represent at all) the spatial relation of the
object perceived to the perceiver, both in respect of distance and 
direction. So I believe that one who accepts my account of 
perception, or one like it, can give a plausible explanation of the 
fact that perception by television, or the cinema screen etc., are 
only peripheral, and not focal, cases of perception, and also of 
the fact that they are cases of perception in a non-metaphorical 
sense, i.e. not cases of perception in the sense in which perceiving 
the point of an argument is. For the similarities between these 
peripheral cases, and the central cases of perception are obvious 
to one who accepts my account of perception: in the peripheral 
cases the object perceived does play a differential part in bringing 
about a seeming, and in a way not much inferior to that found in the 
focal cases of perception.
I conclude that, though this last objection does not undermire 
my thesis about perception, it does bring into a clearer focus the 
nature of the enterprise I have been undertaking. That is to give 
an account of the essential nature of the central, focal, cases of
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perception of physical objects. I am thus able freely to admit 
that these are cases of physical object perception that are 
incompatible with my account. But I suggest that these cases 
both are rare in comparison to the number of those which satisfy 
my proposed conditions and can naturally and without difficulty 
be explained as offshoots of, and peripheral to, those central 
cases.
SECTION 5» Conclusions.
In this chapter I attempted to give a satisfactory account of 
what it is to perceive a physical object, at least in the central, 
focal cases of perception which, I believe, make up the large 
majority of all the cases of perception that are to be found. I 
did this by suggesting conditions for perception that related to 
the way in which the perceived object brings about the perceptual 
experience. I first proposed that the perceived object must play 
what I called a differential part in bringing about the perceptual 
experience, and then suggested that it must play it in a way that 
is productive of good representations of the type to which the 
perceptual experience belongs in the general circumstances in whbh 
the perceptual experience occurs and the object plays its part. I 
gave a full explanation of the meaning of the expressions I intro­
duced to facilitate the formulation of my account. If I am correct, 
then it will follow that the traditional view that perception 
involves representation has some truth in it; representation, 
however, figures in perception in a less obvious way than has been 
thought.
I will now go on to consider some criticisms of causal theories
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of the type to which mine belongs which relate to the width of 
the range of physical objects that we perceive. As a result,
I will be led (as I said on p 200) to distinguish two senses 
in which physical objects may be said to be perceived, the more 
basic of which, I hope, I have already analysed in this chapter, 
and not without a certain plausibility.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE RANGE OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION. T'//0
SENSES OF "PERCEIVE".
SECTION 1. Criticisms of my theory that relate to the range of 
the objects of perception.
I want now to consider two sets of criticisms of my position. The 
first arises from the fact that sounds, tastes, and smells are often 
perceived. It could be advanced as follows: "You have said that
the perception of a physical object must involve the object's playing 
a differential part in bringing it about that the perceiver has a 
seeming. Now the physical objects you have had in mind when formulating 
your theory have clearly been things like men and animals, buildings, 
pieces of furniture, machines, and the like. All these are three- 
dimensional things, composed of matter, exclusively occupying the 
space they happen to be in at any time, and resisting the entrance 
of other such things to a greater or a lesser extent. But there are 
physical objects of quite different types that are perceived: there 
are sounds, smells, and tastes, for a start. What is involved in 
the perception of a sound, or a smell, or a taste? We can say this 
at least, that if we are talking of seeing a car and hearing the 
sound it makes, and we say that we perceive both the car and the sound 
it makes, the sense of "perceive" used in both cases i,s the same.
Of course, in one case there occurs an instance of one species of 
perception, seeing, and in the other an instance of another species, 
hearing. But the phenomena occurring in both cases fall in the same 
genus, perceiving. Seeing a car, feeling it, hearing the sound it 
makes, smelling the smell it makes, tasting the many tastes it 
would give us if we went round it licking it - these are
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all instances of perceiving things - a car, a sound, a smell, 
and some tastes - and in all of these cases we may say that some­
thing is perceived, and in exactly the same sense of "perceive".
The point may be made in another way: what goes on when we see or 
feel a car, or a chair, or a dog, must be similar in nature to 
what goes on when we smell, hear, and taste smells, sounds, and 
tastes respectively. The objects of perception are different, and 
there is some difference in nature between seeing, say, and hearing. 
But, and here is the important part, if seeing a car, or a chair, 
or a dog, qua perceiving them, is to be given a causal account, so 
must hearing a sound, qua perceiving it. Seeing a car and hearing 
the noise it makes could not differ so much that one involved a 
causal relation between perceived and perceiver, and the other did 
not".
Having established these points, our objector is now able to 
complete his attack, as follows: "When we inquire whether it is 
reasonable to suppose that the hearing of a sound, the smelling of 
a smell, and the tasting of a taste can be analysed as the sound 
causing the hearer, the smell causing the person smelling, and the 
taste causing the person tasting, to have a sense-experience, we find 
that it is not. But if these cases of perception of physical objects 
cannot be given a causal analysis, it follows not only that your 
proposed account of the perception of a physical object is too 
ambitious, as there are some physical objects to the perception of 
which it does not apply, but also that it cannot even apply in the 
particularly favourable cases that you chose to use to bolster up 
your theory. For we saw that hearing a sound made by a car, and 
seeing the car could not differ so much as cases of perception that
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one involved a causal relation between perceived and perceiver, 
and the Oi.her did not. So your account cannot even apply to the 
cases with regard to which you developed it, those of the 
perception of animals, plants, manufactured material things, and 
the like".
This argument bases itself on the fact that we perceive 
sounds, tastes, and smells. But the second set of criticisms I 
want to consider relates to the facts of perception by sight. They 
are advanced by Mrs. J. Teichmann in her paper "Perception and 
Causation" (PAS 1970-71)» Having declined to criticise the causal 
theory on the grounds that it contravenes what she calls "the 
slogan that the cause and the content of perception must necessarily 
be different", she declares (pp 37-8): "The real objection to a
causal theory lies rather in the nature and variety of things 
which can be seen. A rough and ready expression of the objection 
can be made by borrowing the slogan above as follows; for some 
objects of sight it the case that cause and content must be 
different . . . .  Anyone making any sort of reasonably detailed 
report of say, the view from a hilltop, or the look of a room, will 
quite typically mention many or several naterial objects (trees, 
rivers, chairs, tables): describe their colours and spatial 
relations: and refer also to some of the following things: haze, 
the sky, distances, sunlight, apparent colour (the purple of the 
mountains), glints, shines, gloss, contrasts, movement, shadows, 
similarities, bunches and collections, and also "the overall effect." 
There is no good ground for saying that these are not all elements 
of "the scene", but there are difficulties involved in saying, 
concerning some of them, that they are elements of an overall 
cause." The difficulties she alludes to arise in the cases, for
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instance, of seeing darkness or seeing the sky. She compares 
the case of seeing a sunbeam with the more problematic one (for 
the causal theorist) of seeing the sky. She declares (pp 40-I):
"A sunbeam is a quasi-object, that is to say, it can (on occasion) 
be picked out visually, it can move, things happen to it, i.e., it 
can be bent by being directed through glass or water, and it can 
do thing's (cause fires). It is possible to think of a sunbeam as 
a cause without knov/ing anything about its make-up. Nevertheless 
(as I have already said) it is natural to ask "But how is it we 
can see it, as it's not solid?" At this level (scientific) theory 
comes in, in the form of a contingent identity statement to the 
effect that a sunbeam a stream of li^t-waves. It is arguable 
whether this has any bearing on a (philosophical) causal theory 
concerned with "the notion" of seeing a sunbeam . . . While it
is possible to think of a sunbeam as a stream of light-waves, it
is not possible to see it as such.
"The sky differs from a sunbeam in both respects. Unless you 
happen to believe that the sky is a blue steel dome (E.g.) it is 
not possible to think of it as a cause. The sky cannot move, do
things, or have things done to it: it cannot reflect things, and
nothing emanates from it. Second]^, the sky (like the sunbeam) 
cannot be seen as a collection of light-waves, but worse still, it 
cannot even be truly thought of as such a collection, for that is
not what it is, even contingently . . .
"I see the teapot because it is there".
"I see the sky because it is there".
Is the "because" a causal "because" in both cases or only in the 
first case, or in neither case? I think if the first alternative
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is insisted on, then it will have to he admitted that the notion 
of causation has here become very attenuated indeed".
These, then, are the two sets of criticisms that I want to 
consider. They are directed towards the refutation of my analysis 
of the perception of a physical object, and are meant to do this 
by proving tha^ some cases of physical object perception, and 
others that are relevantly similar to the ones I have analysed 
causally, are incapable of such analysis. My reply to these 
criticisms, to be found in Section 2, will consist partly in 
showing that some of these cases are not relevantly similar, and 
partly in showing that the others are not incapable of such analysis, 
I will support my argument by proposing a causal analysis of the 
most significant of the latter cases. Thus, I hope to refute these 
criticisms. But, even if they are unsuccessful, they will have 
done a valuable service. For they will have drawn our attention 
to the fact there are other sorts of physical objects that are 
perceived, e.g., sounds, smells, tastes, sunbeams, shadows, and 
rainbows, than those which philosophers usually restrict themselves 
to when they study the perception of physical objects.
SECTION 2. Reply to the criticisms relating to the range of the
objects of perception, PART 1;sounds, smells and tastes,
I advanced a theory along causal lines of the perception of physica 1 
objects. By "physical objects" I meant entities capable of 
individuation which have a place in the common space in which human 
beings are located, and the contents of which are publicly percept­
ible and thus the subject-matter of physical science. But the 
things the perception of which I used as examples in advancing my
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theory were all examples of the sort of thing that W.D. Joske 
calls "a material object" in his book "Material Objects". He 
singles out some things to receive this honorific title because 
of their fundamental importance for human knowledge and utility.
They are three-dimensional entities, composed of matter, bounded 
by precise surfaces, publicly observable, enduring through time, 
behaving as manipulable units, and bearing qualities from diverse 
determinable ranges. Now it is clear enough that if my account is 
satisfactory in the case of the perception of such material objects, 
it is also satisfactory in the case of two other sets of things, 
instances of which are readily perceptible. The first class is that 
of fluid particulars, e.g., pools of water, heaps of sand, pinches 
of salt. These things differ from material objects in that they 
lack manipulable unity - they are not cohesive to the extent that 
they can be dragged about or lifted whilst retaining their unity.
The second class is that of volumes of gas, vapour, and the like, 
e.g., clouds in the sky, clouds of mustard gas, blasts of wind.
These, of course, do not possess manipulable unity, nor do they 
have precise surfaces. However, I suggest that such things as these, 
as well au fluid particulars, do not present the causal theorist 
with any problems which material objects have not already 
presented him with. Such things as these can produce sense- 
experiences in the same ways that physical objects do, and can be 
represented by sense-experiences in the same fashion.
The physical objects which the critic had recourse to were, 
rather, sounds, smells, and tastes. He suggested that there were 
difficulties in giving a causal analysis of the perception of these.
I will go on to argue that there are no such difficulties, and that 
a causal analysis is demanded in their case as much as in the case
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of material objects. But first I must meet a possible objection to 
my tactics. For it may be said that, since sounds, smells, and 
tastes are not physical objects at all, I have conceded too much 
to the critic, and should rather have argued that cases of 
perception of sounds, smells, and tastes are not relevantly similar 
to cases of perception of physical objects. One who makes this 
objection must do so on the grounds that sounds, smells and tastes 
are not particular things at all, but are, rather, qualities of 
true physical objects like men and mushrooms. But I believe even 
as cursory an examination of the nature of sounds, smells, and 
tastes as the one which follows will suffice to undermine this 
objection. (The following remarks are largely derived from 
Professor Urmson's lecture "The Objects of the Five Senses",
PRA 1968.) What sort of thing is a sound, for instance? Surely it 
is an individual thing existing in physical space. Sounds may be 
counted. They can survive the destruction of the physical objects 
that produce them (e.g. the sound of the explosion survives the 
shell that exploded), and are identifiable without reference to 
those objects, both in the sense that we can describe them in terms 
which make no reference to those objects, and in the sense that we 
can pick them out without necessarily being able to pick those 
objects out. A sound lasts for a period of time, and occupies a 
volume of space, though with no distinct boundaries^ and not to 
the exclusion of other sounds. It extends outward through space 
from the point from which it emanates, though it does not always 
have to extend back to the point of its emanation - it may have 
died out there whilst persisting for a short while in more distant 
places. It seems clear enough, then, that sounds are particulars.
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or, rather, that very often when we talk about sounds we are 
talking about particulars. Suppose I hear one rifle firing, and 
you hear another. It is clear that in one sense we do not hear 
the same sound. But if the two sounds are qualitatively identical, 
it would not be improper to say that the two rifles made the same 
sound. An expression like "a loud cracking noise" can thus be used 
to stand either for a particular or for a universal, or, at least, 
a type with tokens. I suggest the same can be said of smells 
and tastes. Things of both these types are located at a particular 
place in space, are given off or produced by other physical objects, 
and can be counted.
The case is quite different, however, for what might be thought 
the parallel visual phenomena, i.e., looks. Looks are not located 
in space, they are not things that are given off by the objects to 
which they belong, and they cannot be thought of as existing apart 
from these objects. There is only one sense in which two different 
things can have the same look, and two things which were qualitatively 
identical in respect of visually perceptible properties could not 
fail to have the same look. We may thus agree with Urmson who 
declares (op. cit., p 150): "To talk about sounds is primarily to
talk about physical phenomena caused and emitted by things; to talk 
. about looks is to talk about things in so far as they are objects 
of sight." He has already argued that this fact is responsible for 
the dissimilarity between the use of "has an f look" and "has an f 
sound". He writes (op. cit., p 129): "We say that the Alps have a 
majestic look, but that they are high, rather than that they have 
a high look. But if we take an adjective clearly descriptive of 
the audible, such as "reedy", we find that we may say that the oboe
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has a reedy sound, just as easily as that it has a plaintive 
sound. The explanation of this fact is that there is a sound to 
be described, and we may say that it is reedy or slightly acid.
But there is not a look to be talked about, so we cannot say that 
a look is red or tall".. I think he makes the point rather badly, 
but it is surely this, that, on the one hand, unless some sounds 
are particulars it is hard to see how sounds could be said to be 
loud, quiet, harsh, high-pitched, and in general to have the audible 
characteristics they are said to have; whilst, on the other hand, 
if looks were particulars, we would expect them often to be said 
to possess visible characteristics such as colour and shape and 
size which in fact are rarely said to belong to them.
Thus, 1 do not believe I can argue that sounds, smells, and 
tastes are not physical objects, and I shall therefore attempt to 
silence my critic by showing that there is no difficulty in giving 
a causal analysis of the perception of such physical objects. I 
will begin my discussion by asking what difficulties are supposed 
by the objector to render implausible a causal analysis of the 
perception of sounds, tastes, and smells? Let us take the perceptioi 
of sounds as a representative of all three sorts of perception. The 
causal theorist would have to analyse "A hears sound S" on the lines 
"Sound S brings it about that A has a sense-experience". Now it 
may first be objected to this account that a sound, like a smell or 
a taste, is not one of the things we accept as being able to act on 
people. It is a category mistake, it may be said, to attribute 
causal agency to any of these things. But this is clearly false. A 
loud noise occurring unexpectedly will cause me to jump. The sound 
of a violin brings tears to my eyes. The smell of garbage turns my
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stomach. The taste of lemons causes me to screw up my face.
However, it may be argued that though sounds, smells, and tastes 
could affect us in various ways, the things that bring about our 
sense-experiences are never sounds, smells or tastes. For instance, 
if I describe the way the sense-experiences invoi/ed in my hearing 
the sound of a violin are produced, I will mention a violin, sound 
waves, a medium conducting these, perhaps something like a radio 
set, my ears, and brain. No mention of a sound. If I describe 
tasting an apple, I will mention the apple, my taste buds, my brain. 
No mention of a taste. And so on in all the other cases. So if 
hearing a sound involves a sound acting on us, we never hear sounds. 
And the same argument will apply to tasting tastes and smelling 
smells.
This is a stronger objection to the causal theory. But it
seems to bring in a far wider issue. If we say that in perception
we are never acted upon by sounds, smells, and tastes, we are 
virtually saying that these things never act on us at all. For it 
is rare for them to act on us unless we perceive them. If a bullet
hits me, it will affect me whether I feel it or not; a sound cannot
please or scare or surprise me unless I hear it. But if this is so, 
sounds, smells, and tastes seem to have become unnecessary entities. 
Once upon a time they were needed to explain why a man jumped when 
a dog barked, why a man screwed up his face when he drank lemon juice, 
Now we explain these occurrences by reference to waves of a certain 
type, and the action of particles of a lemon on the man's taste-buds.
Now a causal theorist who agrees with the objector that it 
follows from the fact that we refer to dogs and sound-waves when 
explaining the causation of a man's sense-experience when he hears
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dogs yapping that in this case the sound of the dogs* yapping 
can have played no part in causing the man's sense-experience, may 
agree with the objector on the further point, that if the causal 
theory of perception is correct, and applies to sounds, no sound 
is ever heard. But the causal theorist may wish to say to the 
objector that as it is true that no sound is ever heard, it is no 
objection to the causal theory that it implies that this is so.
For the causal theorist may take up the following position: "The 
everyday view of perception is indeed causal. Seeing a material 
object is being caused by it to have a sense-experience. Hearing 
a sound is being caused by it to have a sense-experience. The 
phenomena called "sounds", "smells", and "tastes", which are said 
to be perceived were invoked by men of an earlier age to explain 
the occurrence of certain sense-experiences . . . Now we can 
explain these occurrences by reference to material objects and certain 
waves and particles. So we causal theorists no longer have any 
reason to believe in the existence of sounds, smells, and tastes, 
and will not, strictly, speak of their being perceived. For we 
have found out that there are no such things. We will only talk of 
the perception of material objects and other things composed of 
matter, for the occurrence of all sense-experiences can be explained 
by reference to these alone. Ordinary people, however, are in a 
mixed-up state. They talk of hearing sounds, etc., and by this 
they mean that sounds are acting upon them, but they are familiar 
enough with science to know that sounds don't really exist and that 
the way our sense-experiences come about can be fully explained 
without reference to sounds. They are like people who have from 
time immemorial attributed the occurrence of madness to possession
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by devils, but have recently been taught that there are no demons 
and that madness is the result of malfunctions of the brain. In 
ordinary conversation, they will say of a lunatic "The evil spirits 
have got him", whilst if they are asked to give a serious explanation 
they will refer to a malfunction of the brain,"
To recap this argument and counter-argument : the objector 
has argued that if the perception of a sound is a matter of the
perceiver being caused by the sound to have a sense-experience, then
no-one ever perceives sounds. For, when describing the causes of 
sense-experiences, we never make mention of sounds. But as people 
do perceive sounds, the causal analysis of such perception must be 
wrong. The counter-argument given by the causal theorist is that 
a man's perceiving a sound would be a matter of the sound's causing 
him to have an experience, and that the fact that it follows from 
this that we do not perceive sounds is not an objection. For we 
do not in fact perceive sounds. Sounds, smells, and tastes are 
theoretical constructs invoked at an ear1er stage of civilisation 
to account for the production of certain sense-experiences. Now 
we can, and do, give this account without needing to refer to these 
entities. So they must now be rejected as non-existent, just as 
the demons that were supposed to cause madness must be rejected.
The fact that ordinary people continue to talk of perceiving smells,
sounds, and tastes only shows their confused state of mind.
But this counter-argument has a very objectionable feature: it 
treats sounds, smells, and tastes as theoretical entities, things 
that are not themselves perceived but are presumed to exist because 
the supposition of their existence helps us to explain the perceptible 
phenomena. But it is quite plain that the ordinary view is that
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sounds, tastes, and smells are perceptible phenomena, and that our 
reason for believing in their existence is that we believe we 
perceive them. The theorist's description of the status of the 
concepts of sound, smell, and taste seems to be wrong. It is quite 
different from the status of the concept of an evil spirit; those 
who believe in evil spirits are ready to admit that these things 
are not themselves perceptible, but are belived to exist because 
perceptible phenomena seem to call for this supposition if they are 
to be explained. One who denies the existence of sounds, tastes, 
and smells on scientific grounds is, rather, like the man who denies 
the existence of the sky, if that is understood to be a coloured 
dome mounted on the earth. He is saying that something that appears 
to be there isn't really there. But while we can give up our belief 
in the existence of the sky without fear of involving ourselves in 
scepticism with regard to the senses, the belief that we have always 
been deceived in our acceptance of sounds, tastes, and smells, which 
form a large sub-class of the things we think we perceive, cannot 
be entertained without casting strong doubts on the reliability of 
perception in general.
The causal theorist would therefore be well advised to take a 
different line about sounds, smells, and tastes. And I think a far 
more plausible one does present itself. It is to suggest that the 
objection he is facing is based on a false suppostion, viz., that is 
is incompatible with a sense-experience's being in part produced by 
a sound, smell, or taste that a complete account of the way in which 
it is brought about should make no overt mention of any of these 
physical objects. The situation is, I think, similar to one where 
a scientific explanation is given of the demolition of a house when
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struck by a bolt of lightning, or of the fall of rain on a 
particular spot, or of the effect of a tornado on a boat at sea.
In these cases, the explanation of the phenomena in question may 
make no overt reference to bolts of lightning, clouds, or tornadoes, 
but involve reference to discharges of particles, condensed water 
vapour, air currents, and the like. But we would not want to say 
that for this reason it was to be supposed that a lightning-bolt, 
some clouds, or a tornado had nothing to do with the phenome^, 
played no part in bringing them about. Rather, we should want to 
say that in some sense the things referred to in the scientific 
account were the same as those referred to in a common-sense 
account of the same phenomena, and that the two accounts were 
alternative descriptions of the causes of the phenomena, one of 
which might well be superior, but neither of which was incorrect.
I suggest that the same is true of the accounts of the cause of an 
auditory sense-experience, where one is in terms of the effects of 
a sound, and the other in terms of the effects of sound-waves, and 
of the accounts of the causes of olfactory and gustatory sense- 
experiences, where one is in terms of the effects of a smell or a 
taste, and the other is in terms of the effects of certain particles 
given off by physical objects. To give an example: we would not 
think there was anything incompatible between our everyday explanation 
of a man's giving a surprised start in terms of the effect on him of 
a sudden noise and a more scientific one in terms of the effect on 
him of certain waves which affected the sensitive parts of his ears.
If asked the reason for this, we would probably say that it was that 
the two explanations somehow referred to the same things.
At this point in the argument there seem to be two things I ought
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to say: first, that I think it is true that there is no incompat­
ibility between the two sorts of explanation; that the reason for 
this is that in the case of such pairs of phenomena as discharges of 
particles of a certain type and bolts of lightning, sound-waves and 
sounds, and particles of a certain type given off by physical 
objects and smells, the two members of each pair are in some way to 
be equated; and that to equate them in some way is the only plausibDe 
course open to us when faced with the facts. Second, that the 
philosophical problems that this equation poses are considerable, 
and demand more space and more ability that I at present possess if 
they are to receive proper treatment. I believe there is no reason­
able alternative to the view that a sound happens to be in some sense 
the same as a set of waves of the type we call "sound-waves", and 
that smells and tastes are in some sense the same as certain groups 
of particles given off by physical objects. For what are the 
alternatives? One I have already discussed, that these things are 
not physical objects at all, but are qualities of physical objects.
A cursory examination of what we think it proper to say of them 
convinced us that this view is untenable. Another is that sounds, 
smells, and tastes are sense-data, mental entities ■ to which a 
perceiver has privileged access of some sort when he hears, smells, 
and tastes physical objects. But this view is not only unattractive 
philosophically, as committing the holder to a belief in sense-data 
in an objectionable sense of the term, but it also runs counter to 
our everyday ideas about sounds, tastes, and smells. For it is 
clear that we wish to locate these in the public space in which the 
physical objects from which they emanate are located. Another altern­
ative would be to suppose that these things exist, but that they are 
causally inefficacious: but this view, like the previous one, is
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■unattractive philosophically, involving the supposition of a 
mass of causally idle physical objects, and. in conflict with 
common-sense, which often attributes causal agency to them. The 
final alternative that appears to be open is to deny the existence 
of sounds, smells, and tastes altogether. My criticisms of this 
view have already been advanced on p 220. Thus, in the absence of 
any plausible alternative, I feel I am justified in presuming that 
my view of sounds, smells, and tastes is correct, even though it 
involves difficulties that I cannot at present discuss adequately.
I will now move on from this discussion of the criticism that 
sounds, smells, and tastes, despite what ordinary people believe, 
are causally inefficacious, to consider whether a plausible analysis 
can be given on causal lines of our everyday concept of the perception 
of sounds, smells, and tastes. For so far I have only argued that 
such an analysis is not impossible. Let us therefore attempt to 
analyse "A perceives a sound, S", in the belief that what holds 
good in this case will hold good for the perception of smells and 
tastes. It seems to me to be true, first of all, that A cannot 
perceive S at t unless S plays some part in bringing it about that 
A has a sense-experience at t. This is shown by considering a case 
similar to the one Grice employed when discussing the perception of 
material objects (mentioned on p 100). Suppose an expert can, by 
inserting a needle into a man's brain, bring it about that it sounds 
to the man as though a clock is ticking. Suppose that the expert 
inserts the needle when the man is placed near a ticking clock, but 
with his ears blocked with cotton wool. Why in such a case do we 
refuse to say that the man hears the clock's ticking? Is it not 
because the sound of the clock's ticking plays no part in bringing
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about the man*s sense-experience? But clearly it is necessary that 
the S'junds should do more than just play any part. Let us suppose 
that the insertion of the needle makes it sound to the man not as 
though there is a clock ticking but as though a bomb has just 
exploded in the vicinity. Suppose that the expert is preparing 
to insert the needle when a bomb explodes in the vicinity. The 
expert gives a start, and involuntarily pushes the needle into the 
man*s brain, causing it to sound to him as though a bomb has just 
exploded. In this case it would not be true to say that the man 
perceived the sound of the explosion, even though this caused the 
expert Id jerk his hand and insert the needle. The sound must 
therefore play its part in bringing about the sense-experience in 
a way which fulfils certain conditions. I suggest that we could 
easily find examples similar to those used in Chapter 7> sections 
2 - $, to show that, if a person A is to perceive a sound, S, at t, 
it must be the case, first, that S plays a differential part in 
bringing it about that A has a sense-experience at t; and,second, 
that S plays its part in a way that is productive of good 
representations of the type to which A*s sense-experience belongs, 
in the general circumstances in which A has that sense-experience 
and S plays its part in bringing this about. (Where the terras of 
art here employed are defined as in Chapter 7> sections 2 - 3 ) .
A further condition, over and above those relating to the 
nature of the causal relation between S and A*s sense-experience, 
must relate to the nature of A*s sense-experience itself. It is 
plain that A does not have to have a good representation of S at t 
if A is to perceive S at t. Indeed, all that seems to be necessary 
is that A should have a seeming at t. (My definition of "have a
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seeming" is to be found of p I71). It may be objected that if A 
is to perceive a sound, it must seem^ to A at least as though theie 
is a sound. But if my view of sounds is correct, they will be 
perceptible by other senses than hearing. One is enabled to 
see the sound-waves spreading out from a vibrating body through 
some medium will, on my account, be seeing a sound. I suggest it 
is not an unusual occurrence for us now to feel sounds (nor would it 
be unusual for us to describe the experience as "feeling a sound"). 
The cases I am thinking of are those where the sound-vibrations are 
so fierce that they are perceptible by feeling, e.g. in the case of 
the deeper pipes of an organ or of a pneumatic drill. Sounds can 
break glasses; they can also cause objects to vibrate to a degree 
that is perceptible by touch. So sounds are perceptible otherwise 
than by hearing. But it does not seem to me that in cases of 
perception of sounds by sight and feeling the proper description of 
the sense-experience occurring would always be "its seemingp to 
someone at least as though there is a sound."
I suggest that the conditons I have mentioned are separately 
necessary and jointly sufficient for A*s perceiving S at t. If I 
am right, or something on these lines is correct, then it follows 
that cases of perception of sounds furnish the critic of the Causal 
Theory with no ammunition at all. Rather, what has come to light is 
that we would naturally analyse the perception of a sound on the 
very lines that the account of the perception of a physical object 
that I gave in Chapter 7 would have led us to expect. I suggested 
a causal theory of the perception of physical objects; sounds, it is 
agreed, are physical object; we find that it is natural to give a 
causal account of the perception of sounds. I believe that a similar
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analysis, justified in the same way, could he given for the 
perception of tastes and smells. (indeed, I see no reason why 
it should not be extended yet further to the perception of some 
other things that emanate from material objects, e.g. sunbeams 
and other beams of light, and heat-rays). I conclude that, since 
a causal analysis must be given for the perception of sounds, 
tastes, and smells, the critic of the Causal Theory cannot draw 
upon such cases of perception to aid him in his attack on the 
account I have given of the perception of a physical object.
SECTION 3. Reply to the criticisms relating to the range of the 
objects of perception, PART 2; the objects of 
perception mentioned in Mrs. Teichmann*s "Perception 
and Causation".
Mrs. Teichmann adopts as her slogan against the Causal Theory the 
statement "For some objects of sight it the case that cause 
and content must be different." (PAS 1970-71, P 37)* She mentions 
certain objects of sight for which she thinks this is true. These, 
to my mind, fall into two classes; those which are particulars 
and those which are not. I will deal with the second class first, 
and try to show that what Mrs. Teichmann alleges about them is not 
fatal in its implications for the Causal Theory.
This second class comprises such things as colours, spatial 
relations, and similarities and differences. She mentions them 
on pp 37-8, not distinguishing them from such things as shadows, 
reflections, lightning, and surfaces, all of which are clearly 
particulars, if they are anything at all. Now I am willing to 
admit that the perception of colours, spatial relations, similarities
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and differences is not capable of causal analysis, or at least 
not of the causal analysis which I have suggested for the percept­
ion of physical objects. But this does not seem to constitute a 
serious objection to the causal analysis of the perception of 
physical objects. For the latter objects of perception are 
particular things, whilst the former are not. For surely colours, 
spatial relations, similarities, and differences are universais.
It is indeed the case, as Professor Urmson says, that "philosophers 
have often talked as though colours were like glows, emitted by a 
thing but condensed into a film on the thing*s surface". ("The 
Objects of the Five Senses", PEA 1968, p 12o), But such talk, as 
he says, is wrong. However, Mrs. Teichmann has little time for 
one who gives such an answer to her objection. For, speaking of 
the causal theorist's claim that sense of "see" in which we see 
colours and the like is quite different from the sense in which 
we see material objects, she declares (p 38): "(This answer)
simply asserts that there are different senses of "see" for no 
other reason than that there are different kinds of "things seen 
. . .  it looks as if the assertion that there are different senses
of "see" is merely a way of stating the fact that the objects of
sight are various". Now, if my argument had been "X and Y,
which are both objects of sight, are of different ontological
status, therefore the sense of "see" in which X is seen must be 
different from that in which Y is seen", then, I agree,
Mrs. Teichmann*8 criticism would be valid. But what I am suggesting 
is that if we find that the analysis of perceiving X that seems 
appropriate to us does not seem to fit the perception of Y, this 
discovery is not necessarily fatal to "the analysis, given that X
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and Y are of widely different ontological types. A theory of 
perception that provided a similar analysis for the perception of 
all the objects of perception would in virtue of this fact be 
preferable to the Causal Theory, I admit. But I believe that no 
plausible theory can be advanced that does this. My position is the 
same as that of the man who gives a different analysis of the sense 
of "know" in "I know Jones" and "I know that I am a man". The 
difference in ontological status between the objects of knowledge 
involved in the two cases gives us some reason for supposing that 
the difference in the analysis is not unfounded. It is surely not 
automatically an objection to the Causal Theory of Perception that 
it can only be applied to a certain range of objects, viz., physical 
objects. I willl now move on to those particular things which 
Mrs. Teichmann considers to be objects of perception, but incapable 
of playing a part in bringing about the sense-experience involved 
in their perception. I will deal with them in three groups.
The first comprises such things as glints, shines, edges, 
lightning, the Aurora Borealis, and sunbeams. I can see no reason 
why any of these things should be thought causally ineffecacious. 
Indeed, Mrs. Teichmann says as much about the sunbeam (p 40). She 
mentions that it is not possible to see a sunbeam as a stream of light­
waves, and seems to think that this poses a problem for the causal 
theorist if he argues that there is a contingent identity between 
a sunbeam and a stream of light-waves, but I cannot grasp 
why she finds this problematic. For it does not seem 
to me to be necessary if I am to see X, which is an oC , that 
I should be able to see it as an cA • This paper which I now see 
is, no doubt, a conglomeration of tiny particles of which I have
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only the remotest knowledge, but I ca,nnot see it as such a 
conglomeration.
The second comprises such things as the sky and rainbows.
Mrs. Teichmann argues that the sky cannot act upon, or be acted 
upon by, anything. It cannot be identified with any of the 
phenomena that science reveals to uss. (pp 40-I). So it cannot 
be the cause of sense-experiences. But what conception of the 
sky is Mrs. Teichmann adopting when she makes these statements 
about the sky? Common-sense reasoning is enough to persuade us 
that the sky is not a coloured bowl covering a flat earth.
Science later informs us that the fact of our seeming to see a 
coloured bowl covering the earth is to be explained in terms of 
the scattering of sunlight by the gases composeing the earth*s 
atmosphere. (A similar phenomenon relating to rain drops accounts 
for rainbows). What then has become of the sky? It seems to me 
we can take one of two courses: first, we can identify the sky 
with the groups of gas molecules that scatter the light-waves, 
or, second, we can say that there is really no such thing as the 
sky, but to continue talking about seeing the sky (to give this 
up would be pedantic), but to mean no more by this than that we 
have certain sense-experiences caused by the scattering of sunlight 
by gases in the atmosphere. Now it is clear that Mrs. Teichmann 
is taking the second course. The first, indeed,would be 
incompatible with her criticisms of the causal theory relating 
to the sky. For one who takes the first course identifies the 
sky with certain entities revealed by physics, and there is no 
reason why these should be thought causally inefficacious. But if 
she takes the second course, her criticisms are empty. For how
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can she demand of the causal theorist that he bring into the 
explanation of the occurrence of certain sense-experiences a 
reference to an entity which she herself holds to be non-existent? 
She cannot hold it against him that on his theory the sky cannot 
be perceived, for that is her own view. Or, rather, she ha,s 
admitted that the sense in which the sky can be said to be 
perceived is a very special one, adopted to avoid pedantry. How 
then can she draw inferences about perceiving in the standard 
sense from the case of perceiving the sky? The same arguments 
would apply in the case of perceiving rainbows.
The third class of supposedly problematic objects of perception 
comprises things like shadows and holes. But are such things 
really incapable of causal efficacy? A shadow that looms up 
suddenly may terrify me, a hole may canse me to stumble, or wet 
my feet in the icy water beneath the ice. Someone might deny 
that there are such things as shadows and holes, because they 
have no physical basis. But then he could scarcely demand that 
the perception of such nonentities (if it were to be allowed that 
they could be said to be perceived at all) should receive the 
same analysis as the perception of real things.
So much for Mrs. Teichmann*s criticisms. I hope I have shown 
that the causal theorist has an answer to all of them. So I may 
conclude this section by expressing the hope that I have shown 
that both sets of criticisms set out in Section 1 fail to achieve 
their ends. For I have shown that some of the cases of perception 
which were, it was suggested, incapable of causal analysis are in 
fact capable of it, e.g., the cases of the perception of sounds, 
smells, surfaces, and shadows, and have pointed out that the cases
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of perception which are not capable of causal analysis along 
the lines I suggested e.g., the cases of the perception of 
colours, shapes, similarities, and differences, all differ in a 
significant way from cases of physical object perception. For in 
the one set of cases the objects of perception are universals, whilst 
in the other they are particulars.
SECTION 4. Two senses in which a physical object can be said to 
be perceived.
In Chapter 7 I proposed an account of what it is to perceive a 
physical object, at least in the central or focal cases of 
perception. But I also remarked that I would be led to distinguish 
from the sense I had accounted for a second sense of "perceive".
(pp 200, 205). I postponed discussion of this topic until I 
reached the present point in my thesis because I thinlc that such 
a discussion springs naturally from the topic which I have just 
been dealing with, the perception of sounds, smells and tastes.
Now sounds are (usually at least) perceived by hearing, smells by 
smell, tastes by taste. But there are things other than sounds 
that are heard; things other than smells that are smelled; things 
other than tastes that are tasted. These are the physical objects 
that make sounds, give off smells, have tastes. But an interesting 
fact strikes one about the perception of these objects by hearing, 
smelling, and tasting. It is that one cannot perceive them in 
any of these ways without in each case perceiving a physical object 
of another type, and one the existence of which is logically 
independent of them. Take the case of hearing a motor-car at t.
This cannot occur unless at t a sound is perceived, which is, of 
course, a physical object of a different type from that to which
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the car belongs, and could conceivably e; ist even though the car did 
not, though in fact it is produced by the car. The same goes for one 
who smells the car at t, for he cannot do this unless he smells a smell 
at t. Further, one who tastes an apple at t must also taste a taste at t.
V/hy are these things so? The reason is surely that hearing a 
physical object other than a sound at t is a matter of hearing a sound 
at t that is produced by the physical object, smelling a physical object 
other than at a smell at t is a matter of smelling a smell at t that 
is produced by the physical object, and tasting a physical object other 
than a taste at t is a matter of tasting a taste produced by the physical 
object. Let us say that perceiving in the sense of "perceive" that 
I have analysed in the preceding chapters is perceiving^. What I 
now suggest is that when, say, I hear a car, it is not necessary that 
I should perceive^ the car, but rather that I should perceive^ a sound 
that is produced by the car. Let us say that in such a case I perceive^ 
the car.
What sort of account can we give of perceiving^? We might begin by
suggesting that A perceives^ a physical object, X, at t iff A perceives^
at t either a sound or a smell or a taste produced by X. But this
account seems deficient insofar as it is lacking in generality. Surely
there must be a feature common to sounds, smells, and tastes, such that,
if A perceives^ something which both has this feature and is produced
by X, then A will perceive^ X. Well, it seems clear that sounds, smells,
and tastes could all be described as emanations from the physical objects
that give them off. For under certain circumstances some physical objects
give off, emit, such things as sounds, smells, tastes, light, and heat,
and these things might well be called "emanations." Can we say ther^re that
A perceivesg X at t iff A perceives^ at t an emanation from X? The .difû culty
about this account is that we seem to be unwilling to say that a man sees a
searchlight or a
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torch if all that he sees is its beam. But the beam is clearly 
a.n emanation from the searchlight or the torch. Perhaps the 
difference between a sound and a beam of light is that the former 
is more informative about its source hi an the latter, and we 
should therefore say that A*s perceivings X at t is a matter of,
A*s perceiving^ at t an emanation from X that is significantly 
informative about its source. ¥e could indicate how informative 
an emanation had to be to be significantly informative by contrasting 
such cases as I have just mentioned, where in the one case a source 
is said to be perceived when its emanation is, whilst in the other, 
although the emanation is perceived, its source is not said to be. 
But I see no reason why, say, the radiant heat given off by a 
fire should be any less informative about ds source, the fire, 
than the noise the sound makes is. But then, if the account under 
consideration were correct, just as we say that the fire is heard 
in virtue of the fact that the noise it makes is heard, we should 
have to say that the fire was felt in virtue of the fact that the 
heat it gives off is felt. But we do not wish to say this, so the 
present account must be wrong.
Thus, I have failed to put my finger on the significant feature 
that sounds, smells, and tastes have in common - if there is one, 
that is. A further difficulty about the sort of account I have 
been proposing of perceiving^ is the following one. If, as I ha^e 
suggested, sounds are perceptible by other senses than hearing, and 
may be seen and felt, then, on my account, one who sees, and thus 
perceives^, a sound given off by X will for that reason perceive 
X. (The perceiving of X will be an instance of perceiving^). But 
it is obvious that we would not want to admit this. What we are
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ready to admit is that A perceives^ X at t provided that A either
perceives, at t, by means of hearing, a sound that X has produced, or
perceives^ at t, by means of smell, a smell that X has produced, or
perceives^ at t . by means of taste, a taste that X has produced.
I leave these difficulties unsolved. I think it is plain, though, 
that there is such a thing as perceiving^ a physical object, and that 
such phenomena as hearing a motor-car or smelling an oily rag are 
examples of it; and, further, that perceiving^ is more basic than 
perceiving^. For we can say this at least of perceiving^, that an account 
of its nature must involve a reference to perceiving^, as it is clearly a 
necessary condition of A* s perceiving  ^ X at t that A should perceive^ 
at t an emanation from X. Thus, I hope that, though 1 have not 
succeeded in giving an account of perceiving^, I have done enough to 
distinguish it clearly from perceiving^.
SECTION 5. Conclusion of the thesis as a whole.
In this chapter I supported the account of the pexception of a physical 
object that I advanced earlier in my thesis, by showing that it is highly 
plausible to suppose that the perception of certain sorts of physical 
objects to which philosophers of perception have given little attention, 
such as sounds, tastes, and smells, is a causal matter. I argued that , 
the existence of certain objects of perception, the perception of which 
is not susceptible to such a causal analysis, is not fatal to my theory, 
as these objects are of a different ontological status from that of 
physical objects. Finally, I distinguished a sense of "perceive" in which 
physical objects can be said to be perceived, but different from the sense 
which I had previously analysed. I suggested that it was secondary to 
that sense, and so called perceiving in this sense "perceiving^".
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This concludes my treatment of the Causal Theory of Perception.
I hope I may now claim to have carried out the programme which I set 
myself at the end of Chapter I (p 31 ff). There, on the basis 
of the enquiry I had engaged in earlier in the chapter, I distinguidied 
several types of Causal Theories, and called the main types "A^".
"Ag" , and "B". In Chapters 2 and 3 I gave my reasons for- 
rejecting all Causal Theories of types Ap and B. Chapter 4 contains 
the argument which leads me to think that some theory of type A^ 
must be correct. The rest of my thesis has been devoted to the 
attempt to advance this correct theory. The kernel of my theory 
is to be found in Chapter 7> in the discussion culminating on p I56, 
where I suggest that a perceiver, A, perceives a physical object,
X, at time, t, iff X plays a differential part in bringing it about 
that A has a seeming, s, of type Z, at t, and plays its part in 
a way that is productive of good representations of type Z in the 
general circumstances in which A has s and X plays its part in 
bringing this about.
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Appendix ; Russell on perception and our knowledge of the 
e X te rnal w o : • Id.
I now believe that my treatment of Russell*s views on these topics 
in Chapters 2 and ) is insufficient and in some ways misleading.
The account I gave on p jb of Russell*s view that our knowledge 
of the external world is inferential, which contains the assertion 
that Russell thought that all that we know about physical objects 
must be inferred from propositions we know about our mental 
phenomena, is very unsatisfactory. This does seem to be his 
view in "The Problems of Philosophy" (OPIJS edition, p 21) and 
"Human Knowledge" p 245, P 247), But the doctrine advanced in 
"The Relation on Sense-data to Physics" ("Mysticism and Logic" p lllf) 
is that sense-data are physical objects. This was Russell’s view up 
till the time he enbraced Neutral Monism. His position after that 
time is correctly described in my account. For his view was that 
we infer the existence and nature of physical objects from sensory 
particulars in our own biographies, and these are mental phenomena, 
according to Russell. (See "The Analysis of Mind", Lecture 7)*
Perhaps we could characterise Russell’s view by saying that he 
believed all any of us knows about physical objects must be inferred 
from phenomena private to him. For even when he thought that a 
sense-datum was a physical object, he considered that it was private 
to the person who was acquainted with it ("Mysticism and Logid', p 117f).
With regard to my note on p51 , it is interesting to note what 
Russell wrote in "The Problems of Philosophy"; "We must, therefore, 
admit as derivative knowledge whatever is the result of intuitive 
knowledge even if by mere association, provided there is -a valid
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logical connexion and the person in question could become aware 
of this connexion by reflection. There are in fact many ways, 
besides logical inference, by which we pass from one belief to 
another: the passage from the print to the meaning illustrates
these ways. These ways may be called "psychological inference,"
(opus edition, p J8), It is a pity Russell did not continue in 
this vein in his later treatments of the topic.
Turning now to my references to this appendix in Chapter 3, 
on p 77 and p 93, what I have already said shows up the defects 
of my earlier account. When Russell believed in sense-data, he 
was for a long time convinced they were physical, not mental. And 
when he embraced Neutral Monism, he gave up his belief in sense- 
data. For he was no longer prepared to give an act/object analysis 
of sensation. (See "The Analysis of Mind", pp I4I-2). However,
I believe that my most important criticisms of sense-data, when these 
are understood to be mental phenomena, apply equally to Russell's 
physical sense-data, and to the particulars of neutral status 
which he later invoked.
